Hi,

If you have some time to go through the report of US1702 accident occurred last year, please go through these files:

http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hi...rtRow=1&order=1&sort=0&TXTSEARCHT=

What came to my mind is "how stupid can you be?"

The reasons for the accident were, as usual, multiple. The end case was that the takeoff performance speeds were not set in the computer, the A320 didn’t know what V1, Vr or V2 were. The overriding lesson is simple. It’s better to look a little stupid now—reject the takeoff at low speed, taxi back, enter the V speeds, try again—than it is to look a lot stupid later; Like maybe crash.

At the start of the takeoff roll, when the airbus spoke up its warning about the lack of V speeds, the audible alarm saying “Retard” [the thrust levers], the pilots decided to ignore it. From the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript:

retard

retard

“What did you do? you didn’t load. we lost everything.”

retard

retard

retard

“No”

retard

retard

retard

“We’ll get that straight when we get airborne.”

retard

retard

“Wh*. I’m sorry.”

retard

retard

retard

Within the next fraction of a second, the CVR captured the ‘sound of decreased background noise, similar to power reduction’ and then the ‘sound of first impact’.


It’s better to look a little stupid now, than a lot stupid later.


BR,
744lover

Airbus airplanes tell you to RTO if your V-speeds aren't loaded? I wasn't aware of that. I thought the "RETARD" aural callout was only during flare.

le sigh

Sometimes I have to wonder if these things need a loud horn and "ABORT ABORT ABORT" to gain attention.

Might have helped in this situation.

Why did they pull the throttles back after the plane was airborne?

[/quote]

Quoting D L X (Reply 3): Why did they pull the throttles back after the plane was airborne?

Because the captain though he could flare the airplane back to the runway and reject an already airborne takeoff....      

Quoting 744lover (Reply 4): Quoting D L X (Reply 3): Why did they pull the throttles back after the plane was airborne? Because the captain though he could flare the airplane back to the runway and reject an already airborne takeoff....

Yeah, I just came to a similar conclusion in my head. He realized he was fubar, and tried to bring it back in instead of fly through it. (The right move?)

EDIT: Above V1, the correct answer is "fly through it," correct? But it appears that the pilots didn't know their V numbers, so had no way to know if they were above V1 or not. The report says rotation occurred at 159 kts and the mains lifted off. What is a typical V1 speed, and what is a the typical range?

[Edited 2015-12-10 13:11:05]

Quote: An A320 Check Airman told NTSB staff that he had never seen anyone take off without Vspeeds, it was not trained, and if there were no V-speeds he would expect a crew to reject the takeoff, and then taxi off the runway. The USAirways Airbus Fleet Director told NTSB staff that the airline’s expectations for a pilot confronted with no V-speeds would mean that they did not finish their checklist, and they should not have taken an active runway. The USAirways FAA Aircrew Program Manager told NTSB staff that he had never seen a situation on the line or in the simulator where a pilot initiated a takeoff roll with no visible V-speeds on the PFD, and the lack of visible V-speeds on the PFD during the initial takeoff roll would be consistent with their reject criteria, and would probably be a reason not to begin the takeoff roll in the first place since the V-speeds were supposed to be confirmed prior to takeoff. The USAirways Managing Director of Flight Technical Operations told NTSB staff he never experienced a situation where he did not have V-speeds on takeoff, and “I wouldn’t dream of taking off without V-speeds.

WOW.


Was there any action taken against the crew for this, out of curiosity??

At least the aircraft knew who she was dealing with according to the CVR transcript.

Chris

Quoting D L X (Reply 5): Above V1, the correct answer is "fly through it," correct?

Far as I know, there is only one exception, and that's when the pilot is convinced the airplane is not capable of safe flight.

the captain, in his interview, specifically stated that he felt this was the case.

Is that the plane thats still at PHL without US Airways branding? (or has that been moved?)

Quoting litz (Reply 8): Quoting D L X (Reply 5): Above V1, the correct answer is "fly through it," correct? Far as I know, there is only one exception, and that's when the pilot is convinced the airplane is not capable of safe flight. the captain, in his interview, specifically stated that he felt this was the case.

For Boeing airplanes, and I assume the same for Airbus.

"Rejecting the takeoff after V1 is not recommended unless the captain judges the
airplane incapable of flight. Even if excess runway remains after V1, there is no
assurance that the brakes have the capacity to stop the airplane before the end of
the runway."

For those who have not seen it, this article does a good job of describing what happened

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/pilots-played-role-in-us-airways-1702-crash-faa-407032/

Apparently they switched runways but then did not re enter all the necessary information. They got a takeoff warning due to attempting to do a derated takeoff without the correct data. At 80 knots they got the retard warning, but continued and the airplane climbed to somewhere between 20 and 70ft. The throttles were retarded, the tail hit the ground and then the nose gear hit and collapsed.

That sounds terrifying.

[Edited 2015-12-10 14:04:25]

[Edited 2015-12-10 14:05:04]

[Edited 2015-12-10 14:05:25]

Quoting D L X (Reply 3):

The PILOTS did NOT pull the throttles back. About a week after the crash, a post was up about the incident that explained what happened. Here is a quick outline .

Plane taxied to a Different runway than what was loaded into the FMS(last second runway change). FO could not get it loaded in a timely manor. Capt said to never mind loading it and pushed the power up. As the plane got airborne , the FO got the data into the FMS and pressed enter. The plane was accelerating and was past V2. When the automation realized the plane was faster than V2 , the computer pulled the power back ....yes, the{%^+}>computer. It gets better!! Both pilots thought duel engine failure so they....BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward. The aircraft impacted hard enough to break off the nose wheel and crack the fuselage . Plane was not repairable.

Much more detail is available and more accurate but that is so non pilots can understand approximately what happened.

Now, every other manufacture has throttles that move so you would be able to quickly deduce what is happening because you could see the automation retarding the power . Also the pilots would have seen the other on the controls and both would not have pushed forward at the same time. Real close call here due to pilot error combined with Airbus automation. Easily avoidable....

From the Flight Crew Training Manual of a major airplane manufacturer. This impiles they need not have aborted.

"There have been incidents where pilots have missed FMC alerting messages
informing them that the takeoff speeds have been deleted or they have forgotten
to set the airspeed bugs. If, during a takeoff, the crew discovers that the V speeds
are not displayed and there are no other fault indications, the takeoff may be
continued. The lack of displayed V speeds with no other fault indications does not
fit any of the published criteria for rejecting a takeoff (refer to the Rejected
Takeoff NNM in the QRH). In the absence of displayed V speeds, the PM should
announce V1 and VR speeds to the PF at the appropriate times during the takeoff
roll. The V2 speed should be displayed on the MCP and primary airspeed
indicators. If neither pilot recalls the correct rotation speed, rotate the airplane 5
to 10 knots before the displayed V2 speed."

Quoting iad51fl (Reply 7): At least the aircraft knew who she was dealing with according to the CVR transcript.

Classic, I guess an Airbus is the only one that can get away with the term these days.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): Now, every other manufacture has throttles that move so you would be able to quickly deduce what is happening because you could see the automation retarding the power . Also the pilots would have seen the other on the controls and both would not have pushed forward at the same time. Real close call here due to pilot error combined with Airbus automation. Easily avoidable....

You don't need moving throttles or interlocked controls. That's old technology. The computer knows better than any human being, so should have ultimate authority of the airplane. (sarcasm intended)

I wasn't aware that Airbus' autothrottles did not move the physical throttle levers. That is a serious ergonomic failure, along with the two joysticks not physically reciprocating each other's movements (see AF447).

A lot of communication in the cockpit is verbal, both between the two pilots, and between the pilots and the computer (the GPWS is a good example), but some of it is also non-verbal, like the First Officer's control column moving when the Captain commands a movement with his, or the throttle levers moving on their own when TO/GA is selected. I dislike that Airbus thinks that the computer is smarter than the pilot, but Airbus aircraft have demonstrated some serious issues with communication between the aircraft computer and the crew. This needs to change. If the aircraft is going to make its own decisions, it needs to inform the pilots one way or another, and there needs to be a way to manually override the computer's decision of that decision will put the aircraft in serious danger.

Quoting Mcoov (Reply 17): I wasn't aware that Airbus' autothrottles did not move the physical throttle levers. That is a serious ergonomic failure, along with the two joysticks not physically reciprocating each other's movements (see AF447).

Oh boy, here we go again...

This thread is going places now.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): Real close call here due to pilot error combined with Airbus automation. Easily avoidable....

100% pilot error. All they needed to say is we just need a minute, we need numbers for the runway. When doing your performance you can load up to 3 runways when you send away for data. I personally always use all 3 slots for runways I think we could get but it's not required, some just load the one they think they are going to get, I like to be prepared for changes.

Quoting Mcoov (Reply 17): I dislike that Airbus thinks that the computer is smarter than the pilot, but Airbus aircraft have demonstrated some serious issues with communication between the aircraft computer and the crew.

It doesn't think that at all, garbage in, garbage out. There are 8 Golden Rules that Airbus tells all their pilots, these guys broke at least 5 of them. The number 1 rule is that aircraft can be flown like any other out there. Know your FMA, cross check your FMS, task share and back each other up and the big one, if it's not going as planned, take over. Take over by taking all the automation off, TOGA and 15 degrees nose up, it was flying! It's not like they had no airspeed indication or control issues, they just didn't have V-speeds. You come back full circle to it being able to be flown like any other aircraft.

Quoting Mcoov (Reply 17): I wasn't aware that Airbus' autothrottles did not move the physical throttle levers.

Not sure why people think this is a big deal. Like the sidesticks, it literally only takes a few minutes to get used to the transition.

Quoting D L X (Reply 5): EDIT: Above V1, the correct answer is "fly through it," correct? But it appears that the pilots didn't know their V numbers, so had no way to know if they were above V1 or not. The report says rotation occurred at 159 kts and the mains lifted off. What is a typical V1 speed, and what is a the typical range?

159 is on the high end of the V1 range for the 320.

For the record, I've flown A and B and like them both, just glad I'm not flying a Learjet...

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): The PILOTS did NOT pull the throttles back. About a week after the crash, a post was up about the incident that explained what happened. Here is a quick outline . Plane taxied to a Different runway than what was loaded into the FMS(last second runway change). FO could not get it loaded in a timely manor. Capt said to never mind loading it and pushed the power up. As the plane got airborne , the FO got the data into the FMS and pressed enter. The plane was accelerating and was past V2. When the automation realized the plane was faster than V2 , the computer pulled the power back ....yes, the{%^+}>computer. It gets better!! Both pilots thought duel engine failure so they....BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward.

The NTSB report said that the captain, in interviews, said he decided to reject the takeoff. FDR data indicates that the thrust levers were pulled back, and that the FO never manipulated her stick. You might want to check your sources.

-Mir

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward.

So what, if they did, which apparently they didn't, it has no impact on the flight controls.

Unlike linked control columns, both pilots pushing the control sticks forward does not increase the force on the elevators.

The Airbus will only accept control inputs from one controller. One pilot can push the priority button to take control away from the other pilot, but there is no dual input to the flight controls possible in the Airbus.

Quoting D L X (Reply 5): Yeah, I just came to a similar conclusion in my head. He realized he was fubar, and tried to bring it back in instead of fly through it. (The right move?)

Quoting roseflyer (Reply 12): That sounds terrifying.

I'm not a pilot, or in the aviation industry, so take what I surmise as you will - Having read the report, I can't comment on whether the pilot and F.O. were grossly negligent in getting into the situation they found themselves in, but the pilot's comment to the effect that "the plane is unsafe to fly" resonates with me as a rational response to the incongruous warnings he was receiving on the take off roll. I've often read that a pilot often has mere seconds to understand a critical situation and choose his/her response. Often the pilot can't assess in such a short period and disaster results. This pilot didn't understand the warnings, and felt something was very wrong - wrong enough to abort the flight. I think he did the best he could do having gotten himself into this situation. Given his lack of understanding as to what was happening, he may not have had the presence to get the plane out of the situation it was in had he continued the flight and a much greater disaster could have followed.

Quoting tb727 (Reply 19): The number 1 rule is that aircraft can be flown like any other out there.

With about 6000 hours on 320 series aircraft, that is the main point.

If rejecting is not an option, (and I can't understand why it's not), then just move the thrust levers to TOGA thrust (yes, the thrust levers move on the A320, you just have to move them), and rotate at 150 knots. Odds are you are in the right ball park.

When you are safe an on your way, slap each other in the back of the head!

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 21): The Airbus will only accept control inputs from one controller. One pilot can push the priority button to take control away from the other pilot, but there is no dual input to the flight controls possible in the Airbus.

Never flown an Airbus, but I believe I read in the Air Asia report that the computer averages the inputs if both sticks are being used while displaying a dual input message on the display.

Quoting JAAlbert (Reply 22): Having read the report, I can't comment on whether the pilot and F.O. were grossly negligent in getting into the situation they found themselves in

Attempting a takeoff with the wrong runway loaded in the FMS and no speeds posted is an indication of negligence.

Quoting JAAlbert (Reply 22): the pilot's comment to the effect that "the plane is unsafe to fly" resonates with me as a rational response to the incongruous warnings he was receiving on the take off roll. I've often read that a pilot often has mere seconds to understand a critical situation and choose his/her response. Often the pilot can't assess in such a short period and disaster results. This pilot didn't understand the warnings, and felt something was very wrong - wrong enough to abort the flight. I think he did the best he could do having gotten himself into this situation.

The problem with that logic is that he did recognize the warnings, and then decided to ignore them and take the plane into the air and sort it out there. Even if you did think he did the best he could after he got himself into the situation, the fact that he got himself into the situation is a serious problem. This was entirely an error of his own creation.

-Mir

Within the OP's link, the FO states that her glasses fell off during the accident, and they couldn't perform the evac checklist until she was able to get her spare set. This comes from page 5 of the "crew statements" section of the NTSB report. Not a comfort to read...

http://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/hi...rtRow=1&order=1&sort=0&TXTSEARCHT=

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 21): Quoting reltney (Reply 13): BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward. So what, if they did, which apparently they didn't, it has no impact on the flight controls. Unlike linked control columns, both pilots pushing the control sticks forward does not increase the force on the elevators. The Airbus will only accept control inputs from one controller. One pilot can push the priority button to take control away from the other pilot, but there is no dual input to the flight controls possible in the Airbus.

That is actually incorrect, there is the possibility of a dual input on the Airbus, there's even an aural warning for it, flight control inputs are "algebraically" added so if I push forward half way and you do too the elevator will reach full deflection.

As you say, if one pilot presses the Take Over pushbutton, he/she will have control priority, if you don't press it a dual input will take place.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): The PILOTS did NOT pull the throttles back. About a week after the crash, a post was up about the incident that explained what happened. Here is a quick outline .

I'm going to rely on the NTSB report, which contradicts everything you said, rather than a posting on an Internet board by people who weren't even there...

Quoting Mir (Reply 25): Attempting a takeoff with the wrong runway loaded in the FMS and no speeds posted is an indication of negligence

Totally agree, and to think the whole situation could have been easily avoided, here are my thoughts on how they could have handled the situation.

They had performance numbers for RWY 27R which is 9500ft long, they were re-cleared to RWY 27L which is 1000ft longer (10506ft), they could have left the MCDU as it was, the same speeds and runway 27R loaded, the tower did say "fly heading 270, cleared for take-off", so just take-off and soon after you're airborne pull HDG and be done with it, as for the performance part, they would have had no problems since the speeds calculated for that particular take-off were for a runway that was 1000ft shorter than what they really had.
How do I know this? Well, I had to do it once!

One other thing I find odd is, instead of going to the runway analisis charts for the airport soon after ATC told them "taxi to RWY 27L via Yankee hold short of RWY 9L APP" all they did was chit-chat about how congested the frequency was and how hungry they were, whatever happened to the "Sterile Cockpit" concept?

One question remains, the MCDU on the Airbus has a Secondary Flight Plan function, in it you can load anything you want, for take-off it is used in case there is an special engine out procedure published, when there isn't one (don't think PHL has one) it is normally used for a diferent runway, in this case they could have used it for RWY 27L, are there reports on what was loaded onto the SEC-FPL? Or was it left empty?

[Edited 2015-12-10 21:44:23]

Quoting trent772 (Reply 29): so just take-off and soon after you're airborne pull HDG and be done with it, as for the performance part, they would have had no problems since the speeds calculated for that particular take-off were for a runway that was 1000ft shorter than what they really had.

That's probably why the Capt (PF) elected to proceed with the takeoff even though the jet was making all sorts of weird noises. By the time things got really weird (the 'retard' callouts), they were passed 80 knots and into a high-speed RTO, which he felt wasn't justified because things looked flight worthy. Just to clarify, though - he had the speeds in his memory, but they had dropped out of the FMS with the runway change.

But that's the thing: It WAS flight worthy. It WAS flying. The engines were producing plenty of thrust, and they face-planted the airplane* after rejecting the takeoff AFTER becoming airborne. My question is: Why would you do that? All I can think of is in case the gusty winds stopped blowing right when they lifted off and they lost 20 knots, and felt the wind come out of the sails, so to speak. A dual input would also make the plane respond squirrely, but I don't see that on the FDR/CVR.

*Hard enough for the oxygen masks to fall and the cockpit door to open. That's hard. 4 g's on the FDR.

**Edit: comparing the airspeed and the airplane's rotation, it doesn't look they lost any airspeed after rotation, although they didn't accelerate much, and they didn't reduce the TLA. I'm totally lost on this one.

[Edited 2015-12-10 21:44:26]

Wow! I can't believe both crew members screwed up so bad! This could have been much much worse. Does anyone know what happened to the pilots? I guess lessons were learned by this mess.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): Plane taxied to a Different runway than what was loaded into the FMS(last second runway change). FO could not get it loaded in a timely manor. Capt said to never mind loading it and pushed the power up. As the plane got airborne , the FO got the data into the FMS and pressed enter. The plane was accelerating and was past V2. When the automation realized the plane was faster than V2 , the computer pulled the power back ....yes, the{%^+}>computer. It gets better!! Both pilots thought duel engine failure so they....BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward. The aircraft impacted hard enough to break off the nose wheel and crack the fuselage . Plane was not repairable.

Quoting catiii (Reply 28): I'm going to rely on the NTSB report, which contradicts everything you said, rather than a posting on an Internet board by people who weren't even there...

I can't find the reltney version in the report either.

Quoting trent772 (Reply 29): One other thing I find odd is, instead of going to the runway analisis charts for the airport soon after ATC told them "taxi to RWY 27L via Yankee hold short of RWY 9L APP" all they did was chit-chat about how congested the frequency was and how hungry they were, whatever happened to the "Sterile Cockpit" concept?

I noticed that too.

Quoting Florianopolis (Reply 30): But that's the thing: It WAS flight worthy. It WAS flying. The engines were producing plenty of thrust, and they face-planted the airplane* after rejecting the takeoff AFTER becoming airborne. My question is: Why would you do that? All I can think of is in case the gusty winds stopped blowing right when they lifted off and they lost 20 knots, and felt the wind come out of the sails, so to speak. A dual input would also make the plane respond squirrely, but I don't see that on the FDR/CVR.

He was overloaded. A gust of wind was enough to take him over the panic threshold after a series of unexpected events.

Quoting rta (Reply 10): Is that the plane thats still at PHL without US Airways branding? (or has that been moved?)

She's still at PHL. I just took these on Monday:




All I know is that they are planning on moving it "soon". It's been wrapped in blue for a little over a month now. I can only assume they were waiting for all the investigating to be finished.

Quoting BoeingGuy (Reply 16):

Sarcasm noted with big smile and spilled drink on key

Reltney
747 pilot

Quoting catiii (Reply 28):

Wow, totally different from what USair check pilot buddy said a week after. I should know better and wait for the NTSB report only. My bad.

Shame on the crew for not following procedures...that's no the interesting part to me though. Once we are past the point where the crew fails to discover their mistake of not having the V-speeds set, I think the Captain's decisions were pretty reasonable under the circumstances. Everybody on here seems to be making such a big deal about the V-speeds not being set, as if to say that if you are rolling down the runway without them you are surely to crash, but in reality, that is not such a big deal (aside from the fact that "it's the procedure"), many many airplanes fly just fine without the ability to set any v-speeds at all, I would contend that having the ability to have the V speeds displayed on the speed tape is almost at the level of a crew convenience item. I would not be surprised if you could fly an Airbus with an MEL that allows you to fly the airplane without the ability to set the V-speeds at all, you can on a 737. I would put it on par with the altitude bug where you set your DA. He knew what they were anyway, if all of his screens failed 5 knots before V1 the procedure would be to rotate off the standby instruments which don't have any bugs set.

...second, if you fly the airplane using v-speeds with +/-10 or dare I say +/-20 knots you will probably be okay as long as both engines keep turning as they did in this case. The danger in not setting/knowing the V-speeds is that if you end up single engine, where you are going to need to eek out every bit of performance you can, precise flying of the speeds is critical.

With these two points in mind I don't think it's unreasonable that the Captain elected to continue the takeoff after he discovered the speeds were not set.

My Hypothesis is that his initial instinct with the majority of his experience in classic Boeings in which pilot-airplane are connected and any automated computer warnings that you believe are false can be safely ignored without catastrophic consequences since the computer is not in control of the airplane. As he approaches rotation, he's overloaded with the screw-up, the constant "retard - retard" by the computer, he probably thinks, as would I "what the hell is the computer bitching about now...Is this airplane going to let me fly it". He lifts off and he probably hits a wind gust that makes the airplane seem a little squirrelly which confirms for a split second in his mind that the airplane, but more specifically the computer, is not letting him fly the airplane. He makes an instantaneous decision to go back for the runway and the rest is history.

My final point, although i'm not sure how this may fit into my hypothesis above, the fact that the "retard" annunciation is apparently used as both a normal (during every landing) and an abnormal(during take-off) indication. The Captain does mention in his interview that he thought the "retard" was erroneous, and this may have something to do with it. At the least it would seem to be confusing to me at least.

Quoting litz (Reply 2): loud horn and "ABORT ABORT ABORT"

a really shrill woman's scream? That is said to have
made the difference for the fighter jocks ?

Quoting RickNRoll (Reply 32): I can't find the reltney version in the report either.

Quoting catiii (Reply 28): I'm going to rely on the NTSB report, which contradicts everything you said, rather than a posting on an Internet board by people who weren't even there...

Who needs facts when you can rely on your 1970s-era prejudices and Anti-Airbus agenda?

Quoting D L X (Reply 5): EDIT: Above V1, the correct answer is "fly through it," correct? But it appears that the pilots didn't know their V numbers, so had no way to know if they were above V1 or not. The report says rotation occurred at 159 kts and the mains lifted off. What is a typical V1 speed, and what is a the typical range?

If you've taken off, you're beyond V1.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): Plane taxied to a Different runway than what was loaded into the FMS(last second runway change). FO could not get it loaded in a timely manor. Capt said to never mind loading it and pushed the power up. As the plane got airborne , the FO got the data into the FMS and pressed enter. The plane was accelerating and was past V2. When the automation realized the plane was faster than V2 , the computer pulled the power back ....yes, the{%^+}>computer. It gets better!! Both pilots thought duel engine failure so they....BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward. The aircraft impacted hard enough to break off the nose wheel and crack the fuselage . Plane was not repairable.

Well, this didn't happen. The CA rejected. Also after takeoff the a/c is in pitch mode for speed, not thrust. The thrust wouldn't change, only the target speed would with the FO's input.

Quoting rfields5421 (Reply 21): The Airbus will only accept control inputs from one controller. One pilot can push the priority button to take control away from the other pilot, but there is no dual input to the flight controls possible in the Airbus.

Untrue. Airbus averages the two inputs.

Quoting bueb0g (Reply 40): Untrue. Airbus averages the two inputs.

No. It adds the inputs algebraicly, up to the maximum allowed.

Quoting bueb0g (Reply 40): Quoting D L X (Reply 5): EDIT: Above V1, the correct answer is "fly through it," correct? But it appears that the pilots didn't know their V numbers, so had no way to know if they were above V1 or not. The report says rotation occurred at 159 kts and the mains lifted off. What is a typical V1 speed, and what is a the typical range? If you've taken off, you're beyond V1.

Is this true even with unusually high and gusty winds? There is another poster on this forum that was remarking at the time of the accident that he was fixated on watching the planes take off that day because the strong gusts were affecting the takeoffs. They were shooting upwards on liftoff. I think we had the question back then of what would happen if a gust of wind either materialized or dissipated as a plane were approaching V1. Any insights for this non-pilot?

TIA

Quoting reltney (Reply 13):

Let's match up your version to the statements given by the flight crew.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): Plane taxied to a Different runway than what was loaded into the FMC(last second runway change). FO could not get it loaded in a timely manor. Capt said to never mind loading it and pushed the power up. As the plane got airborne , the FO got the data into the FMS and pressed enter.

CA:
"We pushed back and taxied single-engine to runway 27L...When we were cleared to taxi to the hold short line of runway 27L I called for the line items. At this time I noticed runway 27R was displayed in the MCDU and on the PFD. The First Officer changed the entry to runway 27L and we completed the checklist items."

FO:
"We taxied single-engine for a runway 27L departure...We completed the taxi check list 'to the line' and were cleared to line up and wait on runway 27L. We accomplished the 'line items' and as we taxied onto runway 27L we realized the wrong runway was in the MCDU. I changed the runway to 27L and completed the check list."

So, no last minute runway change; 27R was simply entered incorrectly. The captain did not push the throttles up before the FO was finished entering 27L into the MCDU. No one was touching it during the takeoff roll either.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): The PILOTS did NOT pull the throttles back.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): The plane was accelerating and was past V2. When the automation realized the plane was faster than V2 , the computer pulled the power back ....yes, the{%^+}>computer. It gets better!! Both pilots thought duel engine failure so they....BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward.

CA:
"We continued the takeoff and I started rotation at 159 knots. Once the wheels were off the ground, I had the perception the aircraft was unsafe to fly and I decided the safest action was to not continue. I slowly reduced the thrust to idle, reduced the pitch and the aircraft contacted the runway."

FO:
"At approximately 159 knots, the Captain rotated the aircraft at a normal rotation rate and to a normal pitch attitude. The aircraft was wallowing...the captain said, 'we need to get this thing back on the ground' and pulled the thrust back."

The CA pulled the throttles back. Not the computer. The CA reduced pitch to make contact with the runway. While they both seemed to think that the aircraft was having trouble getting airborne, neither indicated that they thought it was a dual engine failure.

Quoting PassedV1 (Reply 37): With these two points in mind I don't think it's unreasonable that the Captain elected to continue the takeoff after he discovered the speeds were not set.

One interesting thing I noticed in their statements was that the Captain actually moved the throttles out of the FLEX detent when the FO called out "thrust not set" but then returned them to FLEX. As he elected to continue the takeoff instead of aborting, I think longhauler made a pretty good point...he should have just pushed them up to the TOGA detent.

Quoting reltney (Reply 13): Plane taxied to a Different runway than what was loaded into the FMS(last second runway change). FO could not get it loaded in a timely manor. Capt said to never mind loading it and pushed the power up. As the plane got airborne , the FO got the data into the FMS and pressed enter. The plane was accelerating and was past V2. When the automation realized the plane was faster than V2 , the computer pulled the power back ....yes, the{%^+}>computer. It gets better!! Both pilots thought duel engine failure so they....BOTH... pushed the control sticks forward. The aircraft impacted hard enough to break off the nose wheel and crack the fuselage . Plane was not repairable.

Already been stated but worth saying again, this is entirely wrong.

Quoting Mir (Reply 25): Attempting a takeoff with the wrong runway loaded in the FMS and no speeds posted is an indication of negligence.

Also not correct, they did reload 27L into the FMS however the PM failed to reenter the Vspeeds.

It would seem to me that the Retard call out should be inhibited during takeoff roll.

Quoting PassedV1 (Reply 37):

Your username is ironic  

But yes, I think this is a good summary. In light of the preceding events, the captain was looking for something to confirm the idea that the airplane was behaving strangely, and the wind gust provided just that confirmation.

Quoting reltney (Reply 36): Wow, totally different from what USair check pilot buddy said a week after.

Good buddy of the accident captain too was he?

Quoting BoeingGuy (Reply 16): You don't need moving throttles or interlocked controls. That's old technology. The computer knows better than any human being, so should have ultimate authority of the airplane.

Right. Ask the Asiana crew at SFO how much good back driven throttles did them. They might also have a comment or two on the usefulness of 777 automation.

It's been my observation (from outside the world of professional aviation) that when the pilot screws up bad enough, both Boeing and Airbus hardware will take equal delight in biting them in the a$$.

Quoting hivue (Reply 46): Quoting BoeingGuy (Reply 16): You don't need moving throttles or interlocked controls. That's old technology. The computer knows better than any human being, so should have ultimate authority of the airplane. Right. Ask the Asiana crew at SFO how much good back driven throttles did them. They might also have a comment or two on the usefulness of 777 automation.

I'm willing to bet you have no understanding of the Asiana accident and automation on the 777. You threw that out there to try to counteract my other post. That's like me setting the cruise control in my car in a parking lot and then blaming the design of the cruise control because I hit another car.

I do agree with your last comment though. It doesn't matter how robust something is designed. If someone wants to screw up bad enough, they can.

Quoting reltney (Reply 36): Wow, totally different from what USair check pilot buddy said a week after. I should know better and wait for the NTSB report only. My bad.

You directly contradicted the NTSB report after it had been published.

Attitudes like yours are what cause accidents like these (and worse). One can only hope a check airman catches it before you kill someone.

How did they complete the before take-off checklist without the V-speeds? Unbelievable.

Quoting Maverick623 (Reply 48): You directly contradicted the NTSB report after it had been published.

Actually, I don't think a report has been produced yet. What the OP linked to was just the docket.

Quoting BoeingGuy (Reply 47): I'm willing to bet you have no understanding of the Asiana accident and automation on the 777.

In the immediate aftermath of the accident I learned (on these forums) more about the so called "flight level change mode trap" than most laymen would probably be interested in learning. I will certainly plead guilty to not being an expert, though.