We have seen a number of incidents, major crashes and disasters due to getting wrong information, improper numbers put into calculation computers, flight controls and when done by hand. It can be the flight route info (think of KAL 007) the take off point per weight, bad calculation of weight and balance, base altitude settings, and others. Checklists should prevent it, but sometimes, cockpit crews make mistakes, don't double check as tight on time, get fixed on making sure one item is right and if needed corrected and miss if another number is right.
To me here several failures to follow the airlines procedures, failures to double check information and calculations, maybe cockpit resource management issues, pressure to take off, all and more were considered and used as factors in the firing of these pilots. This happened with an airline based in a country with little or no labor rights as to workers, unlike many countries so likely have no legal recourse, indeed they could face criminal charges but hopefully won't, that the firings and likely renovation of their visas by the Qatar government is sufficient punishment.

Quoting D L X (Reply 13): “(The pilot flying) was not asked to leave because he did anything by putting passengers at risk. What he did was he violated the company regulations on takeoff distance required by an aircraft, especially with the weight he was carrying on that aircraft.”

This quote raises a question. If the correct takeoff calculations from the intersection had been used, and the aircraft took off without incident, would the pilots still have been fired? Was the reason they were fired because they used an intersection when they shouldn't have regardless of takeoff capability, or were they fired because they made a mistake when inputting the takeoff point. Big difference.

Quoting eielef (Reply 33): What about the MIA Control Tower? Isn't there a ground control that follows each plane across all the taxiways, appron and even the Runways?

ATC cannot possibly know the required runway length for each individual airplane on any given day. Even identical aircraft to a given destination may be able to take an intersection one day, then require full length the next. There are a multitude of variables such as aircraft weight (can vary greatly from day to day depending on pax and cargo load and fuel requirements), temperature, and runway condition. Even if departure from this intersection was unusual for this particular flight, for all ATC knew the aircraft was ferrying home empty. ATC's sole job in this regard is to authorize an intersection departure if it offers an operational advantage and the crew accepts it.

[Edited 2016-03-03 17:47:45]

Trying to remember back to the original incident, but wasn't the damage to the approach lighting system on RWY 27 reported to the flight crew and/or the airline when the airport ops guys discovered it? If the tower controllers were watching the departure, they would have likely seen the damage take place...in which case the tower controller would have alerted the flight crew.

I know that ATC is under no obligation to actually watch a departure...but I also know as a pilot, that most tower controllers are extremely observant  

If so, how timely was this information relayed to the flight crew? Or was it? If I were looking at disciplining a flight crew, this is where I would start  

If they knew they hit something, they should have been coming back to get the aircraft inspected. I don't doubt that they probably didn't feel the plane hitting the MALSR lights-big plane, tiny lights  

To what extent can the ATC monitor things like entering the runway from the wrong on ramps?

Quoting Mir (Reply 34): Quoting D L X (Reply 13): To be totally fair, he made these statements quite a while ago. To be totally fair, there's no appropriate time to say "overruns happen all the time".

Context matters, Mir. I never said that I agreed or even tolerate AAB's words. Just that he's recently said something that is quite different.

Quoting Mir (Reply 34): If they'd been fired for continuing to Doha (assuming they had reason to suspect damage), I'd be more understanding.

Completely agree.

Quoting eielef (Reply 33): What about the MIA Control Tower? Isn't there a ground control that follows each plane across all the taxiways, appron and even the Runways? We've seen the worse accident on history (the one in Tenerife) because of two planes in the same runway at the same time, but also we've seen similar scenarios in LIN or LAX, and even worse as planes landing at closed runways, or taking off from runways which are taxiways, or which are not complete, or so. The ATC should have warned them and even forbid them to take off, if they were not in the safe place to take off. Which RWY were they using???

ATC asked the crew if they could accept a departure on runway 9 from the T1 intersection and the crew said they could.

As far as ATC was concerned, they took off from exactly where they should have. It is the crew's responsibility to know what their airplane can and cannot do, and that airplane could not have safely taken off from T1.

Quoting eielef (Reply 33): The ATC should have warned them and even forbid them to take off, if they were not in the safe place to take off.

ATC isn't in the business of calculating aircrafts' performance capability.

Quoting bennett123 (Reply 38): Is there any real advantage in not starting your roll close to the start of the available runway.

Depends on the layout.

If it's an intersecting runway system for example, and you can safely takeoff on the remaining length that's past the intersection point, then aircraft can save both time and collision-potential by not using full length.

That's just one example.

In answer to reply 51, if they did the same thing but took off without incident they would have got the get out of jail free card called 'I screwed up but no one noticed'.

Quoting OB1504 (Reply 56): ATC asked the crew if they could accept a departure on runway 9 from the T1 intersection and the crew said they could.

This makes things much more clear for me.
Although RWY 09/27 is the longest of all in MIA, there is a displaced threshold of about 800m at RW09. (but it doesn't matter for taking off). But at the intersection of T1 the runway has lost 1300m (and there are only 2550m left). All B777s (besides B772) need at least 2600m for a safe take off at MTOW, so it wasn't right to take off using a shorter segment of the runway needed (even being just 50m).
And is not really the ATC job to tell them, eventually to warn them that they are at a taxiway and not at the beginning of the runway (which happened on some opportunities taking off or even landing at taxiways, or from different runways than told). But I think it was the pilot's fault, endangering the plane and its passengers and crew just by a mistake...

I don't understand the intersection take off either, it is unnecessarily risky, even if the flight computer says you can make it why do it if you don't have to. A few years back an AA 772 diverted to MSY. When the pilots were preparing to depart the ATIS was calling for departures off 28, over 10,000 foot runway and in the direction they were going, but when they called for taxi they were told go to runway 1, much shorter at 7,000 feet. This is how accidents can happen, a last minute runway change to a shorter runway. When they got to 1, the tower controller queried them if they were aware that this runway was only 7,000 feet, the pilot replied "the computer says we can make it". I just don't understand this risk if it is not necessary. There is also almost no overrun area at the end of this runway as it is surrounded by highways on both ends.

Another incident also with AA but that really is irrelevant, a 738 departed LAX and flew all the way to YYZ where upon arrival it was discovered that the aircraft had suffered a tail strike on takeoff from LAX and had a damaged aft pressure bulkhead. The FO I believe entered the wrong V speeds and the captain rotated early and struck the tail. A serious incident for sure but doubt those pilots lost their jobs.

Quoting COSPN (Reply 6):

Hearing such comments always makes me cringe- and doubt about the authors aeronautical expertise. Sorry COSPN, I don´t mean you personally , but you are just an example of the tenor of many comments here.
I would like you to realize the differance between a mistake and being at fault. As we in most of western europe try to exercise a "no blame culture"- usually there will be no punishment for making a mistake.

Nobody can for sure tell weather the crew in this case, mixed up the two "T1" as in T no.1 and T#1- which would be a classical mistake. Here, we would expect a crew to report the mistake (if noticed) in order to probably have the intersection re-named, and deleting possible future errors.

If you know you are going to be sacked- well you of course do not report a mistake... alas nobody can profit from your experience.

As far as I know- it isn´t even clear if the crew even knew something was wrong, or if they had struck the antenna/light?

If the crew should be found at "fault" - that would have to imply they did a mistake on purpose, or tried to cover up. That , of course would be evident after listening to the CVR, which probably would not be made public (from QR).

Quoting D L X (Reply 23):

That at last would have been a bit difficult with a house hanging off your wing, pax tend to notice something odd...

So to everyone calling for the employees to be flamed and fired for making a mistake - I sure hope you never make a mistake on your job. Or you could be in politics, of course, then just disregard my post!!

Quoting 71Zulu (Reply 60): When the pilots were preparing to depart the ATIS was calling for departures off 28, over 10,000 foot runway and in the direction they were going, but when they called for taxi they were told go to runway 1, much shorter at 7,000 feet. This is how accidents can happen, a last minute runway change to a shorter runway. When they got to 1, the tower controller queried them if they were aware that this runway was only 7,000 feet, the pilot replied "the computer says we can make it". I just don't understand this risk if it is not necessary. There is also almost no overrun area at the end of this runway as it is surrounded by highways on both ends.

While you may have heard whatever it is you heard, that particularly situation is completely exaggerated.

I've seen widebodies take off from the former Rwy1/19 (I refuse to refer to it by its new alignment) at MSY many times over many years, a 763ER even doing a transatlantic nonstop off of it back when 10/28 was closed in 2005.

A 777, likely going to DFW, would have no difficulty whatsoever getting off of that runway with plenty of room to spare.

Quoting LAX772LR (Reply 62): While you may have heard whatever it is you heard, that particularly situation is completely exaggerated. I've seen widebodies take off from the former Rwy1/19 (I refuse to refer to it by its new alignment) at MSY many times over many years, a 763ER even doing a transatlantic nonstop off of it back when 10/28 was closed in 2005. A 777, likely going to DFW, would have no difficulty whatsoever getting off of that runway with plenty of room to spare.

It was a MIA-LAX diversion so was going to LAX. I agree that 7,000 feet is no problem for a 772 going to LAX but my point is the pilots could have and perhaps should have, asked for 28. The fact that they made it and they obviously did, still does not change the fact that there was more risk than if they had used 28. From the tone of his voice, the tower controller sounded surprised hence the added query.

Quoting thegman (Reply 47): And what do they do when they get home? Because the carrier work rules are a lot better than some.

As in back to base in Doha? Well the women and men have vastly different rules if you're talking about cabin crew. They all live in QR funded accommodation, and whilst a perk can also be seen as yet another way for the company to keep tabs on them. You need to swipe your ID whenever you leave and enter your own apartment building, and women aren't allowed out past certain times when off duty. You can't bring anyone back with you who doesn't live in the same building and up until recently absolutely no photos of you in uniform were allowed to be posted online, even on personal protected accounts. You could be terminated for any of these offenses. This is vastly different from EY and EK, both of whom are more liberal, EK even more so than EY. Whilst down route I've heard that the senior crew do keep tabs on what other crew do whereas with Etihad and Emirates you're usually left to your own devices, so long as you report at the lobby on time and ready to go it's up to you what you do.

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 51): This quote raises a question. If the correct takeoff calculations from the intersection had been used, and the aircraft took off without incident, would the pilots still have been fired? Was the reason they were fired because they used an intersection when they shouldn't have regardless of takeoff capability, or were they fired because they made a mistake when inputting the takeoff point. Big difference.

If they had put the correct distance remaining in the FMS that would have crunched numbers and probably given them higher thrust to take off or told them it was not possible.

Quoting 71Zulu (Reply 63): It was a MIA-LAX diversion so was going to LAX. I agree that 7,000 feet is no problem for a 772 going to LAX but my point is the pilots could have and perhaps should have, asked for 28. The fact that they made it and they obviously did, still does not change the fact that there was more risk than if they had used 28. From the tone of his voice, the tower controller sounded surprised hence the added query.

Maybe the winds favored the other runway? Maybe the pilots were looking for a better flow towards destination? If you put the correct info into the box and it gives you numbers and you can confirm that, then why not do it? TOLD calculations are purposely conservative anyways. You have to have trust in the engineering or else you're going to be scared to use less than 12,000 feet with max thrust.

Quoting sq_ek_freak (Reply 64): As in back to base in Doha? Well the women and men have vastly different rules if you're talking about cabin crew.

Don't really care about cabin crew, I'm talking how long before the pilots are back on the road? The point I am getting at is that I can be alerted to a 24 hr day with 3 pilots, if we have a leg that is at least 6 hrs, and we can string together multiple 24 hr days or close to that with 18 hrs of crew rest (from completion of post-flight, to next takeoff).

I a little surprised at the adversion to intersection take-offs voiced on here. Normally this site is populated with those a little more "aware".

Not only are intersection take-offs very common, but some airports are designed for it. The "extra" concrete is always available, but really only used for those very heavy, with some MEL restrictions or in contaminated conditions. As I pointed out above, whether starting out at the end or from an intersection the aircraft usually leaves the earth at close to the same spot. The only difference is that your take-off and initial climb will be with less thrust had you used the full length.

For fun, I ran the numbers using our performance computer on MIA. A B777-300ER would take about a 25,000 Kg penalty by using T1 over the full length. (Ours would, with the engines we have, at the weights we are authorised ... I don't know under what parameters QR flies theirs.)

Quoting 71Zulu (Reply 63): still does not change the fact that there was more risk than if they had used 28. From the tone of his voice, the tower controller sounded surprised hence the added query.

There was not likely more risk. Just more thrust. The passengers would have got a hell of a kick much to the glee of any a-netters on board. The tower is probably not used to seeing B777s in MSY. In reality, the thrust/weight ratio and take-off capabilities are about the same as a B737.

Quoting bennett123 (Reply 58): In answer to reply 51, if they did the same thing but took off without incident they would have got the get out of jail free card called 'I screwed up but no one noticed'.

I don't know about the Safety Management Systems in place at QR, but this would be an example of "differences". Had no damage occurred, and the crew were aware of their mistake .... more progressive airlines would have used this as an example and the crew would have been freed from blame. No one intends to make a mistake, but when it happens, it is pointed out to all pilots so they will not make the same mistake.

I fear that QR feels that by firing the crew, they have solved the "problem".

I may be wrong on this but I thought at QR and EK if you are involved in ANY incident/accident, you get the boot. Anyone recall the thread on the BA 777 that landed on the grass at LHR - the pilot was a member here for a while (MMM038 or something like that) - I'm sure he was going to work for EK, but then got refused as he'd been involved in an accident?

Quoting longhauler (Reply 66): a little surprised at the adversion to intersection take-offs voiced on here. Normally this site is populated with those a little more "aware". Not only are intersection take-offs very common, but some airports are designed for it. The "extra" concrete is always available, but really only used for those very heavy, with some MEL restrictions or in contaminated conditions. As I pointed out above, whether starting out at the end or from an intersection the aircraft usually leaves the earth at close to the same spot. The only difference is that your take-off and initial climb will be with less thrust had you used the full length. For fun, I ran the numbers using our performance computer on MIA. A B777-300ER would take about a 25,000 Kg penalty by using T1 over the full length. (Ours would, with the engines we have, at the weights we are authorised ... I don't know under what parameters QR flies theirs.)

Intersection departures are fine, but my thing is why do it when you don't have to? It's a last minute change, puts extra wear and tear on the engines, etc.

Threat and Error Management is king. I don't like playing "Monday morning quarterback" with incidents/accidents but given the circumstances, I'm really left scratching my head. Why accept a last minute change for a shorter runway? To save 2 minutes on a 13 hour flight?

I have declined intersection departures in the past simply from a TEM standpoint. It wasn't briefed, we are already set up, so why throw more variables into the equation? I'm also curious as to how in depth QRs CRM/TEM training is.

Quoting ual777 (Reply 68): It's a last minute change, puts extra wear and tear on the engines, etc. Threat and Error Management is king. I don't like playing "Monday morning quarterback" with incidents/accidents but given the circumstances, I'm really left scratching my head. Why accept a last minute change for a shorter runway? To save 2 minutes on a 13 hour flight?

Was it a last minute change? Honest question, as I haven't been able to get an answer. Reading the report, it almost looks like the Captain thought it was his only option, as 09#T1 were the only figures presented ... also, the usual notation "Intersection Take-offs are not permitted" was not added to the performance figures. We now understand the confusion, and it presents a very odd coincidence, but I can certainly see how that Captain ended up where he did.

However, what you state is 100% true, last minute changes are never good and a very real threat to risk management. Where I fly, we have a "last minute change" checklist where you stop the aircraft and go down the list.

It pisses the hell out of ATC, but the deal is when they say at the last minute, "switch to runway XX", we say fine, we stop right where we are .. and sit for 5 minutes while all Ts are crossed and Is dotted as the check list is completed. They soon learn not to do it at the "last minute".

However, if local knowledge dictates that you know where you are likely to take off, intersections included, then you prepare for it before you leave the gate. At YYZ, 33R from V and 23 from H are common interesection take-offs.

Quoting longhauler (Reply 69): Was it a last minute change? Honest question, as I haven't been able to get an answer. Reading the report, it almost looks like the Captain thought it was his only option, as 09#T1 were the only figures presented ...

Or thought that the full length was an option, but that the intersection departure was what the company expected him to use (and thus would have planned and briefed it). It's easy to see how that could happen.

-Mir

Quoting 71Zulu (Reply 63): but my point is the pilots could have and perhaps should have, asked for 28.

Why?

You (and apparently these tower staff) seem wayyyy too hung up on the fact that it was a widebody. To be honest, I'd be far more worried about a 739 selecting that runway than a 777.

But for all either of you knew, aggregate conditions may have actually favored using the shorter runway. As has been stated many times in this thread and elsewhere, ATC is not in the business of understanding aircraft performance requirements.

Quoting 71Zulu (Reply 63): The fact that they made it and they obviously did, still does not change the fact that there was more risk than if they had used 28.

Using that reasoning, why isn't every runway in America 14,000ft?

Quoting thegman (Reply 65): Maybe the winds favored the other runway? Maybe the pilots were looking for a better flow towards destination? If you put the correct info into the box and it gives you numbers and you can confirm that, then why not do it?

  

[Edited 2016-03-04 11:49:00]

In my eyes (for what that's worth) on an ultra long haul flight with a very heavy load I'm struggling with the fact that four flight crew members together failed to register a red flag at the mere thought of giving up 4000' of runway for departure. Perhaps because I began flying before the computer era (1980) or because of a life of flying aircraft older than I am, my viewpoint is a bit different. Its not like these guys just showed up for work that day and had no concept of their aircraft's performance envelope. It takes one hell of a lot of study, work and training to even get the opportunity to fly a 777 in the first place. It just looks like another case of blind reliance on a computer. I'm saying 13000' - 4000' = 9000' in a fully loaded departure to DOH from MIA in a 777??? In a G-V ok, that might make sense. But in a 777??? I just can't imagine mental red flags, alarms bells and whistles not going off in every head in that cockpit.

Technology is great and has made flying both safer and easier across the board. I'm all for it but not at the expense of keeping your head in the game. i expect a professional airline crew to have their heads sufficiently in the game to realize when something appears out of whack. I can understand the data entry error. We all make them whether we admit to them or not. That said though sufficient situational awareness must be maintained so that an obviously questionable output stands out. Did no one brief the departure runway and takeoff? One look at that runway diagram for that aircraft and weight and I'm immediately thinking "no way in hell am I accepting that request".

I know its easy to say sitting here at my keyboard. I'm quite sure that there had to be some serious human factors in play here that created an atmosphere that allowed this error to go unnoticed. I would truly love to know what those were. I'm not trying to hang these guys in any way. Something was wrong in that cockpit at that moment. Would just love to know what that was.

Quoting longhauler (Reply 69): Was it a last minute change? Honest question, as I haven't been able to get an answer. Reading the report, it almost looks like the Captain thought it was his only option, as 09#T1 were the only figures presented ... also, the usual notation "Intersection Take-offs are not permitted" was not added to the performance figures. We now understand the confusion, and it presents a very odd coincidence, but I can certainly see how that Captain ended up where he did. However, what you state is 100% true, last minute changes are never good and a very real threat to risk management. Where I fly, we have a "last minute change" checklist where you stop the aircraft and go down the list. It pisses the hell out of ATC, but the deal is when they say at the last minute, "switch to runway XX", we say fine, we stop right where we are .. and sit for 5 minutes while all Ts are crossed and Is dotted as the check list is completed. They soon learn not to do it at the "last minute". However, if local knowledge dictates that you know where you are likely to take off, intersections included, then you prepare for it before you leave the gate. At YYZ, 33R from V and 23 from H are common interesection take-offs.

Agreed.

Someone posted above that ATC offered the intersection and they accepted so thats the impression I had.

Quoting DTWPurserBoy (Reply 36): Nice gesture but it would play havoc with scheduling. If it is daily service you would have to have eight pilots laying over at any one time not to mention double the hotel costs and per diem. Also take into consideration that each pilot gets a nice long break in a warm bunk for a good part of the flight.

Either you're a troll, or you've never operated a ULR flight

Quoting thegman (Reply 65): If they had put the correct distance remaining in the FMS that would have crunched numbers and probably given them higher thrust to take off or told them it was not possible.

I am aware of that. The quote in question makes it sound like the SOPs don't allow intersection takeoffs if the full option is available.

Quoting Mir (Reply 70): Or thought that the full length was an option, but that the intersection departure was what the company expected him to use (and thus would have planned and briefed it). It's easy to see how that could happen.

It might be the other way around, that the intersection should not have been chosen if the full option was available. It is an important distinction because if they got fired because of an honest mistake that does not set a good precedent, however if the crew should have chosen the full length but decided not to against company policy for whatever reason that is a different story.

Had the intersection been chosen and programmed correctly, and no incident happened, but ops knew the intersection were chosen would they still have been fired. QR might have a blanket policy against this for that specific scenario.

Quoting peterjohns (Reply 61): So to everyone calling for the employees to be flamed and fired for making a mistake - I sure hope you never make a mistake on your job.

Wrong attitude.

Besides the fact that my mistakes don't put hundreds of lives at risk, as I and others have said, the true crime here was not returning to MIA when the pilots made the mistake. They compounded one near-fatal mistake with another potentially fatal mistake. They are exceptionally lucky. You shouldn't be so cavalier to forgive and forget.

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 75): The quote in question makes it sound like the SOPs don't allow intersection takeoffs if the full option is available.

If you ask me, the quote in question, from AAB, is from someone who has a much bigger mouth than he has aviation smarts. I took it with a grain of salt.

A few questions:

1. Is someone in ATC (?) responsible for helping aircraft navigate the airport? If so, wouldn't this person have noticed that the QR aircraft was not properly positioned when cleared for takeoff?

2. When the aircraft struck the runway lights did the crew notice? Sounds like "yes" since so many have commented that this was the pilot's second mistake. If so, did the pilot report back to ATC what happened?

3. If yes to #2 above, what was ATC's response?

Quoting Mir (Reply 34): To be totally fair, there's no appropriate time to say "overruns happen all the time".

It was in Indonesia when we had one a month   

Quoting jeffrey1970 (Reply 35): I think they should be given 48 hours rest not including travel time from the airport to the hotel.

The airline would say, sure, we'd take 24 hrs off from your time at Doha instead.

Quoting ual777 (Reply 37): Another interesting fact is that your single engine procedure can change depending on the intersection of the SAME runway.

It's something many people ignore, or refuse to accept, unfortunately.

Quoting sq_ek_freak (Reply 46): I've heard horror stories from QR crew of some of their layover rules and conditions. The ME3 all work their crew quite hard but QR seemed to be the worst by some distance.

I haven't heard horror stories, but QR seems to put its crew welfare on layovers in a different league than EY or EK. And yes, less layover photos from my QR friends in comparison to EY and EK...

Quoting offloaded (Reply 67): I'm sure he was going to work for EK, but then got refused as he'd been involved in an accident?

It could have been a crew insurance issue.
Regardless if it is your fault or not, if you're a pilot and have been involved in an air accident, your insurance rate can go up, depending on the insurer.

Quoting D L X (Reply 76): Besides the fact that my mistakes don't put hundreds of lives at risk, as I and others have said, the true crime here was not returning to MIA when the pilots made the mistake.

But that's not what it's stated they were fired for.

Also, they'd have to have reason to think there was damage to the aircraft in order for them being fired for not returning to make sense. We don't know that that's the case, as far as I know.

-Mir

Damage to the aircraft:

http://avherald.com/h?article=48c78b3a

http://dohanews.co/pilot-error-likel...e-to-qatar-airways-plane-in-miami/

Quoting mandala499 (Reply 78): Quoting ual777 (Reply 37): Another interesting fact is that your single engine procedure can change depending on the intersection of the SAME runway. It's something many people ignore, or refuse to accept, unfortunately.

Do you have an example? I've never seen a single engine procedure change because we're using an intersection for departure.....

Quoting Whiteguy (Reply 81): Do you have an example? I've never seen a single engine procedure change because we're using an intersection for departure.....

If you had asked me a month ago I would have been able to answer. I want to say SFO.

Quoting D L X (Reply 76): Quoting peterjohns (Reply 61): So to everyone calling for the employees to be flamed and fired for making a mistake - I sure hope you never make a mistake on your job. Wrong attitude. Besides the fact that my mistakes don't put hundreds of lives at risk, as I and others have said, the true crime here was not returning to MIA when the pilots made the mistake. They compounded one near-fatal mistake with another potentially fatal mistake. They are exceptionally lucky. You shouldn't be so cavalier to forgive and forget.

Why wrong attitude!?? Absolutely not. This attitude is wide spread in the western world and as I tried to point out, is in favor of safety.

I would however agree if the crew actually would have known to have had a ground strike- and then continue. This is not known, and everything about what the crew knew or said (to each other) is speculation.
My guess is- they were not aware of hitting anything (at least I hope so)

Quoting Flaps (Reply 72): In my eyes (for what that's worth) on an ultra long haul flight with a very heavy load I'm struggling with the fact that four flight crew members together failed to register a red flag at the mere thought of giving up 4000' of runway for departure

Exactly my thoughts. These guys must have done hundreds of take-offs and surely recognising the runway lights and even the tyre marks from landing planes just by looking out the window ! I know it was at night by even so.
Then they would have realised they were some 1300 mtrs from the end.

Quoting Mir (Reply 79): But that's not what it's stated they were fired for.

Again, Mir, context matters. I wasn't reasoning to anything about AAB's statement. I was addressing what I believe is a canard about how we shouldn't criticize lest we make a mistake someday.

Quoting peterjohns (Reply 83): Why wrong attitude!?? Absolutely not. This attitude is wide spread in the western world and as I tried to point out, is in favor of safety. I would however agree if the crew actually would have known to have had a ground strike- and then continue. This is not known, and everything about what the crew knew or said (to each other) is speculation.

When you rotate after leaving the runway, the possibility of damage is high. From earlier discussions, it was stated that the pilots had to have known they ran off the runway, and thus should have been aware that they may have had a ground collusion.

Quoting ual777 (Reply 82): If you had asked me a month ago I would have been able to answer. I want to say SFO.

No, that is not the case at SFO. All single engine procedures are the same there, regardless of starting point on the runway. Perhaps you are thinking about the point of engine failure ... as that will change the procedure followed. And, good airmanship will dictate that all possibilities are briefed before departure.

In fact looking at a lot of obstacle restricted or noise sensitive airports I fly, I can't think of any where engine out procedures change dependant on starting point on the runway.

Quoting thegman (Reply 65): If they had put the correct distance remaining in the FMS that would have crunched numbers and probably given them higher thrust to take off or told them it was not possible.

Please don't make comments on systems you know nothing about! The FMS does nothing with TOLD! The FMS doesn't "crunch the numbers". The OPS computes the TOLD, not the FMS. All the crew does is input the V speeds the FMS does nothing else except display the V speeds on the PFD.

I used to work for QR on the 777/787. I can proudly say I don't work there anymore. But, the culture there and in other ME airlines is very, very different from any civilized carrier I have worked for.

First of all, there are different ruled for different nationalities. Secondly, there is quite a bit of pressure on the flight deck to get the job done and in reality, there is no safety culture there at all.

Personally, I was very sad to see the pilots terminated, but not surprised at all. That is the solution to any incident in most carriers in that area. Rather than correct the problem, the culprits are removed and the situation will never happen again. Sadly, it doesn't work like that. The flight was a "perfect storm" of little things going wrong. I can assure you the 4 pilots were tired and were feeling the effects. From DOH, you can be rostered to fly east, have minimum rest, return to DOH, have minimum rest and the be rostered to fly west with minimum rest all over again. That is not very safe and the crews do feel the pressure. The company had adhered to the letter of the law, but there is no out for the crew as they cannot use fatigue as a reason to call in sick!

I think with the move to ULH flights in the ME, we are going to see a significant rise in "close calls". It will be exacerbated by fatigue, schedule pressure on the crews and a critical shortage of experienced pilots.

Quoting Mir (Reply 34):

Given the local time in Doha the crew won't sleep for 8-10 hours , circadian rythmn , body clock etc.
The 24hr rest period is well-known to be fatiguing esp for a ULR flight. OK the crew messed up but sleepiness will have played a part .

Quoting mmo (Reply 87): I used to work for QR on the 777/787. I can proudly say I don't work there anymore. But, the culture there and in other ME airlines is very, very different from any civilized carrier I have worked for.

So I've just added QR to the list of airlines I will not fly.

Let's assume for the sake of argument that one of the crew has committed a sackable offence. But if you then go on to sack another crew member, you are asserting one of two highly unlikely scenarios:

- that two entirely unrelated coincidental sackable offenses occurred - suggesting that QR's pilots are riddled with incompetence
- that the errors were related but the second error added a layer of "sackability" all of its own, which cannot be mitigated by the first error.

I don't for a moment believe either scenario actually explains what went on. Firing the crew is nothing more than a gesture. I had thought ME cultures had evolved beyond the "cut something off first and don't ask questions later" mentality; but it would appear not. Obviously though, there are procedural & safety issues at QR they are not addressing therefore they won't be getting my business.

Quoting longhauler (Reply 86): Quoting ual777 (Reply 82): If you had asked me a month ago I would have been able to answer. I want to say SFO. No, that is not the case at SFO. All single engine procedures are the same there, regardless of starting point on the runway. Perhaps you are thinking about the point of engine failure ... as that will change the procedure followed. And, good airmanship will dictate that all possibilities are briefed before departure. In fact looking at a lot of obstacle restricted or noise sensitive airports I fly, I can't think of any where engine out procedures change dependant on starting point on the runway.

There's one that was mentioned by an LCA to me but I can't remember because it's not a destination my fleet flies to, and I'm trying to avoid digging through charts all day haha. If I find it I'll let you know....and happy anet birthday!

Quoting gasman (Reply 89): I don't for a moment believe either scenario actually explains what went on. Firing the crew is nothing more than a gesture. I had thought ME cultures had evolved beyond the "cut something off first and don't ask questions later" mentality; but it would appear not. Obviously though, there are procedural & safety issues at QR they are not addressing therefore they won't be getting my business.

I'm not quite sure what you are asking in your two scenarios, so I will wait for your clarification. With respect to the "ME cultures having evolved" comments, I can only use my experience and the culture has not changed at all, I think. There is still a blame culture and an unwillingness to step forward and admit there might be problems within an organization.

QR, like the other ME airlines are expanding at a very fast rate. They are really having problems finding "experienced" cockpit crews. They really have no issues finding bodies, but that isn't really what you want. Again, my own personal opinion is, all of the ME 3 are suffering from the same disease. The QR incident is merely a symptom and there have been incidents at both EK and EY.

You mentioned "procedural & safety issues" and to some extent, I agree. However, the crews are working at the max they can and there is no let up at all. There is a culture of micromanagement at QR which does not help change. There is also a very big problem with how events would be perceived by the outside world. Public perception is extremely important to the senior managers and that flows downhill. I have seen people get fired for the most trival things and the cabin crew suffers the worst.

From what I know of the events that took place, there is enough blame to go around to everyone in and outside of the cockpit. Had the incident occurred with a more established western airline, I would think the aircraft would have returned the crew would have taken care of things then. Also, hopefully, the crew would have been debriefed by the airline, NTSB, FAA and others so lessons could be learned. Ideally, the crew would have received additional training, a OPC and some line training and a line check. Western airlines, hopefully, have moved on from the blame game and ensuring the guilty parties are drawn and quartered!

Quoting mmo (Reply 91): I'm not quite sure what you are asking in your two scenarios, so I will wait for your clarification

I wasn't asking anything - there was no question there. I was simply pointing out that to fire more than one crew member justifiably you'd have to believe one of the two ludicrous scenarios I presented.

The rest of your post I can't comment on, although I have no reason to disbelieve any of it. But to fire an entire cockpit crew for making a mistake, without looking at how and why the mistake was made demonstrates a level of institutional incompetence beyond that displayed in the cockpit.

From the report:

Quote: During the taxi, the crew conducted a take-off review as per the company SOP’s, the SOP’s did not require any reference to where on the runway the take-off roll would commence. The aircraft then joined taxiway S. Taxiway S parallels Runway 09 and is the taxiway from which the aircraft was expected to join the runway. At this point the commander was using his EFB, selected to the airport diagram plate, to assist with his navigation around the airfield. He had the screen ‘zoomed in’, so he could clearly see the names of the taxiways as he passed them, although the scale selected, the size of his screen and the position of the chart, meant he was unable to see where he was in relation to the runway threshold.

Quote: As they taxied along S the commander decided that the aircraft could depart from the runway intersection T1. He could not recall why he made that decision, but believed it may have been because the printed information displayed ‘Runway 09#T1’ in a compelling way. The printed information contained no reference to the fact intersection departures were not permissible from this runway (Figure 3), and contained the message ‘No NOTAM data found’. The commander requested the operating first officer to advise ATC that they were able to depart from intersection T1. The first officer glanced at his notes and saw he had written ‘09/(T1)#’, which made him believe that this was an acceptable line-up point for take-off, [therefore] he called ATC advising them that they were able to take T1 for departure from Runway 09. The aircraft was then cleared to line-up with another aircraft reported on final approach, requiring an expeditious departure. As this was not what relief crew recalled had been briefed, they queried T1. The commander made a hand gesture and said something which he thought was seeking reassurance from the crew that everything was OK. The operating first officer confirmed that he was content with T1, but the relief crew interpreted the commander’s communication as him confirming he was content with a T1 departure so, thinking they had missed the operating pilots recalculating the take-off performance from T1... did not voice any further concerns. At the time of this inter-crew exchange an aircraft landed on Runway 09. This aircraft landed close to their position and reassured them that T1 was close to the start of the runway. The touchdown point on Runway 09 was however displaced 411m from the threshold. From interviews with both crews, it was apparent that in the dark conditions, none of them had situational awareness of where T1 was in relation to the start of runway.

Job security isn't one of the reasons people move to the other side of the world and take a flying job with the ME3. It's for career advancement. Interestingly, the captain was less than 40 years old.

Quoting AABB777 (Reply 7): AAB is in denial about the seriousness of the MIA incident. As a CEO of a global airline, his comments are reckless and reflect the poor leadership and judgement of the top brass at QR. Mr Al Baker on Thursday reiterated "runway overruns happen very often in airports".

   Someone should tell him that it isn't always wise to open your mouth. Leadership, especially when it comes to important matters like safety, should come right from the top.

Quoting AABB777 (Reply 7): But he said passengers could rest assured the Miami incident was the "first and last" time it would happen at his airline. "At no time was there any harm or any major safety issue for the aircraft and its passengers," he said, emphasising the plane landed safely.

If collecting a whole lot of approach lights on departure isn't a safety issue, I don't know what is.

Quoting sq_ek_freak (Reply 10): I'll give you a hint...QF, CX, DL ULH layovers are longer

   I would speculate that the above airlines put a lot more effort into safety matters than QR. I know for a fact that two of those airlines you mention have world leading Safety Management Systems.....filing an OOR will result in follow up action of some kind, to address the safety issue. There are plenty of rumors online of such matters being completely disregarded at ME3 airlines, often with crew not filing such reports in fear for their job. Not a very good recipe for addressing safety issues.

Quoting longhauler (Reply 11): So were they fired for making the mistake ... or were they fired for flying all the way to DOH with possible structural damage?

Maybe fired for performing an intersection takeoff at an airport that their employer doesn't permit intersection takeoffs?
(just reading inbetween the lines)

[Edited 2016-03-06 02:22:21]

All I can say is that if you fire people for making mistakes, people naturally work harder to cover or hide their mistakes and overall safety suffers.

Quoting roseflyer (Reply 94): All I can say is that if you fire people for making mistakes, people naturally work harder to cover or hide their mistakes and overall safety suffers.

You also have some countries (like Brazil) where if a mistake is made that causes an airline crash, those that make them or can be blamed for them could face criminal charges and jail, so a greater tendency to cover up or shut up. That is why most countries don't allow criminal charges in but only the most extreme or deliberate cases of malfeasance causing a crash.

I brought this up earlier, other suggest it too, but I wonder if there are serious Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) issues with QR. Was the FO afraid to speak up to the PIC that a error was made in the take off point of the plane? Is there too much pressure to keep to schedule? Deciding to not return after what must have been a possible ground strike that could have caused serious damage to the plane?

There are also questions of ground ATC management others have brought up that didn't make sure the plane was in the right spot for takeoff.

I assume that the USA's NTSB is participating in the investigation and will make recommendations or take actions as to QR to improve their CRM as well as ground ATC at MIA and other airports.

The more I think of this I wonder?

ATC dare? Why would ATC even ask the longest flying segmented airplane to take a T1 takeoff? So Amerijet does not have to land in 8R and make the long taxi back.? With easterly flow, there where 3 arriving runways choices. Why ask QR to take a shorter option in the first place.

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 95): I brought this up earlier, other suggest it too, but I wonder if there are serious Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) issues with QR. Was the FO afraid to speak up to the PIC that a error was made in the take off point of the plane? Is there too much pressure to keep to schedule? Deciding to not return after what must have been a possible ground strike that could have caused serious damage to the plane?

The authority gradient in QR and the other 2 ME airlines is extremely steep. It is a factor of several things coming into play in those airlines. First being, the ME culture. A captain is a captain and that's the end of the story. Another issue is the amount of very inexperienced FOs hired by those airlines. Add to that is the risk of having a bad report from a Captain. That would squash any change of moving from the right seat to the left seat. So, there is a culture of not rocking the boat. There is a great deal of pressure to keep to schedule, but more important is a culture of cutting corners.

I think the decision to continue was directly impacted, no pun intended, by the hope there was no damage to the aircraft. Had there been no damage, the entire event would have blown over...

Quoting ltbewr (Reply 95): There are also questions of ground ATC management others have brought up that didn't make sure the plane was in the right spot for takeoff.

Quoting xdlx (Reply 96): ATC dare? Why would ATC even ask the longest flying segmented airplane to take a T1 takeoff? So Amerijet does not have to land in 8R and make the long taxi back.? With easterly flow, there where 3 arriving runways choices. Why ask QR to take a shorter option in the first place.

There seems to be a segment of this forum who are opposed to intersection takeoffs. Fundamentally, there is no issue with doing an intersection takeoff. If the performance allows you to do it, you are safe to go. The performance is predicated on obstructions, losing an engine, headwinds or tailwinds, TOW and many other factors. At the end of the day, if you have the performance to do the takeoff, it is safe. In many cases, doing an intersection takeoff is a smart move; shorter taxi route, less delays or easier for ATC. But, the bottom line is you have to know where you are when you enter the runway. If you enter at the wrong point, then all bets are off, as the crew found out.

It's not ATC's responsibility to question the crew. ATC is not questioned when they give landing clearance if spacing is satisfactory. Both pilots and controllers are professionals and they don't question the other's competence. Where would it end, on a contaminated runway would ATC ask if the crew has taken Vmca into account? Again, this issue of intersection takeoffs is coming out.

Quoting xdlx (Reply 96): Why would ATC even ask the longest flying segmented airplane to take a T1 takeoff?

I don't believe ATC asked. I believe the crew asked, and if the crew asks ATC has no reason to deny them unless the airport has some policy requiring full-length takeoffs for some reason (usually noise).

-Mir

Quoting zkojq (Reply 93): It's for career advancement. Interestingly, the captain was less than 40 years old.

There are a number of issues at play here. Age, and by inference experience, is not one of them.

Quoting mmo (Reply 97): The authority gradient in QR and the other 2 ME airlines is extremely steep.

It isn't necessarily the same at the other two. Flight management at the others is still largely expat and if they do speak their mind or raise concerns, they don't lose their head. Of course, the objective is to ultimately replace expats with locals. That's not an issue if the locals are adequately trained, competent and experienced (see SQ for example) and encourage a safety culture, but if you speed things up and start taking short cuts, holes start to appear. Unfortunately, it would seem the mistakes that were made at Gulfair are being repeated at QR. The buffoon running flight ops at Gulfair in the run up to the A320 crash later found tenure with Jet in India.

Quoting mmo (Reply 97): First being, the ME culture. A captain is a captain and that's the end of the story. Another issue is the amount of very inexperienced FOs hired by those airlines. Add to that is the risk of having a bad report from a Captain. That would squash any change of moving from the right seat to the left seat. So, there is a culture of not rocking the boat. There is a great deal of pressure to keep to schedule, but more important is a culture of cutting corners.

Not just the ME. This applies to most of Asia, Turkey through to Korea.