Link to the previous thread FlyDubai B738 Crashes On Approach In Russia Part 2 (by 777ER Mar 19 2016 in Civil Aviation)

This is starting to smell a bit fishy to me .
Surely they would have released some news on the boxes .
Like i said before we are being kept in the dark on this one if there is a fault on the russians side im sure its going to be a while before anything is made public.

Quoting jumbojim747 (Reply 1): This is starting to smell a bit fishy to me . Surely they would have released some news on the boxes . Like i said before we are being kept in the dark on this one if there is a fault on the russians side im sure its going to be a while before anything is made public.

It takes time to analyze the data and get a clear picture of what went wrong, and it has just been a couple of days. There's absolutely nothing fishy about this.

Also, I can't see how the crash could have possibly been caused by a "fault on the Russian side". They weren't the ones flying the aircraft.

Want my guess of the cause? Pilot error in difficult weather conditions caused by fatigue, which in turn was caused by the airline making their pilots fly too much with too little rest.

Quoting jumbojim747 (Reply 1): This is starting to smell a bit fishy to me . Surely they would have released some news on the boxes . Like i said before we are being kept in the dark on this one if there is a fault on the russians side im sure its going to be a while before anything is made public.

The only obligation of the investigating agency is to release a preliminary report after ~1 month and the final report when it is done. Just because the investigators doesn't tweet every 10 minutes it does not mean there is coverup going on. I'd say most investigations don't release frequent updates especially not outside of North America and Europe.

/Lars

Quoting jumbojim747 (Reply 1): This is starting to smell a bit fishy to me . Surely they would have released some news on the boxes . Like i said before we are being kept in the dark on this one if there is a fault on the russians side im sure its going to be a while before anything is made public.

The general policy in almost all countries as to disclosure of contents of flight recorders is for the investigators to review them thoroughly, do their preliminary work which may take weeks or months, examine debris and human remains to make sure of an accurate result. Too many of us expect the data to be available in hours after recovery, but to disclose info too early from the recorders may distort the investigations, make people reluctant to participate and be truthful, wrongly place blame prematurely. Language issues could also make the review of the CVR take longer. Of course, some governments (including Russia) are not transparent as trying to keep blame and financial liability with its political ramifications from their side. Insurers and all parties also need accurate investigations to properly distribute liability costs. A lot more needs to be coordinated between the info on the recorders and the remains of the aircraft.
Let the investigations continue, they will be done in due time and right so all parties can learn and improve safety.

Quoting larshjort (Reply 3): The only obligation of the investigating agency is to release a preliminary report after ~1 month and the final report when it is done.

The investigating agency is actually not under obligation to make the preliminary report public. They must present it to ICAO, the state of registry, manufacturer and occurrence within 30 days however.

I just saw a reportage on Russia Today how they focus on the working environment in Emirates and FlyDubai. Both airlines facing heavy criticism. It's a little bit odd because they are just doing what everyone else in the industry is doing. Most airlines in Europe push their pilots to the limit now and it's not yet being mentioned. 900 hours a year with very little time off is becoming normal.

Anybody knows the annual limits in ME3?

Just found this...

The NPA reads as follows :-

CAR-OPS 1.1125 Absolute Limits on Flying Hours

(a) No person shall act as an operating crew member of the flight crew of an aircraft if at the beginning of the flight the aggregate of all his previous flight times;

(1) during the period of 28 (twenty eight) consecutive days expiring at the end of the day on which the flight begins exceeds 100 (one hundred) block hours: or
(2) during the period of 12 (twelve months) expiring at the end of the previous month exceeds 900 (nine hundred) block hours:

(b) The maximum cumulative duty hours for Flight crew of an aeroplane shall not exceed;

(1) 55 hours in one week, but may be increased to 60 hours, when rostered duty covering a series of duty periods, once commenced, is subject to unforeseen delays.
(2) 95 hours in any 2 consecutive weeks, and;
(3) 190 hours in any 4 consecutive weeks.
(4) 2000 Hours in 12 consecutive months

Note 1: in relation with the 12 consecutive months cumulative limits, on the first day of January, April, August and November, a 25% of the GCAA accepted or approved mandatory regulatory footprint for On-line training or CBT courses, making 100% in total. Courses than can be conducted on remote and/or in flexibility schedule, are also included in this requirement.

Note 2: Post holders and managerial staff, as included in the OM A, that simultaneously maintain an operating flight crew member status, are limited on actual 12 consecutive months to 450 block hours , but their managerial activities are not considered administrative work “for duty” limits.

Note 3. A crew member is not considered Operating Crew Member, during the time spent at his/her rest period in an acceptable in-flight rest facility, or its equivalent under unforeseen circumstances, which will be reported to the GCAA. The duration of the flight rest time is not to be included in the flight time cumulative limits, but will be included in the Flight Duty Period Duty Time for cumulative limits consideration.

Issue: 04 Page 288 of 513 Issue Date: October 2014 Rev. 00 Revision Date: October 2014


Do I read this correctly? Time in crewrest doenst count?? Just tell your body to go on stand by!!?? Great!

[Edited 2016-03-25 05:25:56]

Quoting larshjort (Reply 3): The only obligation of the investigating agency is to release a preliminary report after ~1 month and the final report when it is done.

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 5):

I don't like nitpicking, and I'm sorry if it comes across that way. The obligation under ICAO to the public is presenting the final report within 12 months, and if not finished, one interim report every year. But if you want to build up trust, there's no danger in publishing the preliminary report.


David

Quoting galleypower (Reply 7):

It's still counted as duty time. But it's true that the pilots block time is only counted when they are behind the controls. Which means on an ULH flight, a pilot may only be able to count - at best - 50% of the block time in his block time as there will be two separate crews.

[Edited 2016-03-25 06:03:54]

Quoting jumbojim747 (Reply 1): This is starting to smell a bit fishy to me .

Personal hygiene ...  

Quoting AIRWALK (Reply 5):

Quoting flyingturtle (Reply 8):

So about that, but the point still sat MAK don't have an obligation to release information every 10 minutes.

Actually I have read that the flight voice recorders were damaged and need restoration work. The data recorders aren't in such bad shape. Also, I people from multiple countries are involved in the investigation. It will take time, it hasn't even been a week.

Whenever there is a major accident there are always people here saying there will be a cover up. Why? What is there to gain by a lie that will be completely transparent and obvious, people aren't really that stupid.

I don't know if this ATC communications video has been posted before, but at the end of video there is a good visualization of the flight path

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRUVDZjBAAs

Quoting galleypower (Reply 7): (3) 190 hours in any 4 consecutive weeks.

What?!? Too much for a pilot. Unless they only fly 7am to 7pm. Any off natural sleep pattern flying.... Cut that quantity.

IMHO, every flight that crosses 2am to 5am, home base time, should add 3 hours to the effective weekly/monthly/year duty time. (Ok for daily limits to stay as is). For flights that cross 10pm to 2am, add an hour.

Yea, I have 'butted heads' with pilots on this forum, but not adding rules that reflect natural sleep patterns is silly.

Also add hours if the sleep period shifts more than say 3 hours...

Lightsaber

Quoting Finn350 (Reply 13): but at the end of video there is a good visualization of the flight path

Isn't it a bit risk to produce some visualisation based on invented data?
the flight path and attitude are not known yet.

Quoting lightsaber (Reply 14): Quoting galleypower (Reply 7): (3) 190 hours in any 4 consecutive weeks. What?!? Too much for a pilot. Unless they only fly 7am to 7pm. Any off natural sleep pattern flying.... Cut that quantity.

Duty hours in other FTLs:
EASA FTL: 190 duty hours in any 28 consecutive days, spread as evenly as practicable throughout that period.
FAA FTL (part 117): 190 flight duty period hours in any 672 consecutive hours. (i.e. 28 days)

http://understandingeasa2016ftl.word...210-flight-times-and-duty-periods/
http://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/117.23

In other words, it's pretty much an industry standard. And it isn't flying, it's all duties. Flying is limited at 100 block hours per 28 days.

Quoting WIederling (Reply 15): Isn't it a bit risk to produce some visualisation based on invented data? the flight path and attitude are not known yet.

So you think ADS-B data collected by FR24 is invented?

There’s a news report in Russian that revealed some unofficial info on CVR recordings. http://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2735707&tid=109551 No audio, but a few phrases were translated into Russian, so I’ve tried to translate them back (sorry for possible mistakes).

01:40:00 Go around
01:40:05 Climb FL 50
01:40:05 Climb FL 50 (confirmation)

However, before reaching FL 50, the autopilot was disengaged, and few seconds later the aircraft pitched violently down. According to some speculations, the position of horizontal stabilizer was changed to a nose-down position (accidentally? runaway stabilizer?) that would lead to a steep uncontrollable nosedive.

01:40:40 Don't worry
01:40:45 Don't try it! (several times)
01:40:50 Pull up!
01:40:54 (shout)

[Edited 2016-03-25 12:31:36]

Quoting Finn350 (Reply 17): So you think ADS-B data collected by FR24 is invented?

Tends to be incomplete, interpolated and lacks IMU attitude information and a couple of other
interesting things.

Quoting dmsolovyev (Reply 18): runaway stabilizer?

After the video surfaced showing them nosing over almost instantly, that is what I thought as well.

Was the possible tail strike ruled out? Is it possible for the A/P to keep the plane flying with a runaway elevator?

I saw something earlier but don't recall, what happens when an elevator is in runaway mode?

Thank you.

RIP

Quoting barney captain (Reply 20): Quoting dmsolovyev (Reply 18): runaway stabilizer? After the video surfaced showing them nosing over almost instantly, that is what I thought as well.

Just a guess, based on no data at all, but a "whip-stall" might also have the same effect, with the aircaft pitching to an unsustainable, extreme nose high position, followed by the nose dropping through to an extreme nose low attitude, with insufficient altitude to recover. Such a scenario might explain the transition from a rapid climb to a rapid descent.

SLCPilot

Quoting barney captain (Reply 20): Quoting dmsolovyev (Reply 18):runaway stabilizer? After the video surfaced showing them nosing over almost instantly, that is what I thought as well.

If true would this be strictly a mechanical issue?

Quoting intsim (Reply 21): Is it possible for the A/P to keep the plane flying with a runaway elevator? I saw something earlier but don't recall, what happens when an elevator is in runaway mode?

The discussion is regarding a "runaway horizontal stabilizer," not a "runaway elevator."

Quoting intsim (Reply 21): Was the possible tail strike ruled out?

Unfortunately they never got that close to landing.

[Edited 2016-03-25 14:27:03]

Quoting hivue (Reply 23): The discussion is regarding a "runaway horizontal stabilizer," not a "runaway elevator."

Thank you. Of course that is what I meant and was thinking but failed to double check my verbiage.

From that rumor board:

Today revision "Vesti" program has at its disposal information that leads us back to the recent disaster, "Boeing" in Rostov-on-Don. This interpretation of the last words from the CVR, a minute before the collision with the ground. The document is not official, from sources in the commission of inquiry, which shifted voice recorder information on paper. Without claiming to be the truth - it is only the investigation findings - Now we try to simulate the situation that prevailed before the disaster aboard.
Thus, Boeing-737-800 company FlyDubai in harsh weather conditions was not able to land in Rostov and the aircraft commander - 37-year-old Aristos Socratous decides to try to land a 2nd time. At this time, the autopilot is engaged. Time 1 hour 40 minutes 00 seconds GMT.

CVR transcript:
-‘Going around’
-‘Climbing to 50’
-‘Climbing to 50’

"Climbing to 50" – means climbing to height of 1500 meters. Boeing climbed at an angle of 15 degrees, it is normal mode. In these shots we see how the plane goes up, going beyond the view of the camera. Climbing continues on autopilot for 40 seconds. Before reaching this height, the commander disengages the autopilot. The reason is not yet clear.
Maybe the plane ran into atmospheric scissors (pilot slang), which could violently shake it. But exactly after this second, after the autopilot disconnect the Boeing dives to the ground.
And these are the words of transcripts translated us into the Russian language for clarity
01:40:40GMT“Do not worry, do not worry, do not worry!”
01:40:45GMT “Don’t do this, don’t do this, don’t do this!”
01:40:50GMT ‘Pull! Pull! Pull!
01:40:54GMT ‘Aaaaaa’

That is, the pilots could not do anything with the aircraft, which flew nose to the ground, such is the version of the experts.

By disabling the autopilot, pilot tried to bring "Boeing" in horizontal flight, but at this moment the stabiliser which is located at the keel went into ‘dive mode’. In this mode, the elevator is no longer effective and practical does not respond to control inputs. The pilots apparently did not realize that the sharp dive is responsible by the stabilizer.
The question is- why has the stabiliser switched to ‘dive mode’? This mode is activated by a button the pilots call ‘Knyupel’ That is, during turbulence by going into manual mode, the pilot could have accidentally activated the ‘knyupel’, and he did not notice, as he complained before about chronic fatigue. Otherwise - it is an unprecedented surprise from the automatic system.
During the last six seconds of the recording, according to our source, the screams heard were inhumane. We chose not to play them.
Plane crashes with acceleration at 1 hour 41 minutes and 00 seconds GMT killing all 62 people. Once again, the official conclusions about the causes of the disaster can only be made after the results of the investigation.

In the case of runaway stab, what happens to the trim wheels? Is there a way to disengage them electronically or even manually? Perhaps the "don't try it".

Quoting caoimhin (Reply 26): In the case of runaway stab, what happens to the trim wheels? Is there a way to disengage them electronically or even manually? Perhaps the "don't try it".

Our procedure is -

1. Control column ............... Hold firmly

2. Autopilot...........................Disengage

Do NOT re-engage the autopilot
Control pitch attitude manually with
control column and main elec trim as needed.

3. Autothrottle.......................Disengage

4. If the runaway stops after the autopilot is disengaged............ Go to QRH


5. If the runaway continues after the autopilot is disengaged

Stab Trim Cutout Switches (Both)..................Cutout

If the runaway continues:
Stab trim wheel............................................Grasp and hold. Trim manually

Go to QRH.

Basically if you override the trim with the control column (in this case pull back) while disengaging the autopilot, that should stop most runaways. There are two electric motors controlling the stab, one for the AP, one for the elec trim switch on the yoke. If that doesn't stop it, disengaging the electric motors to both should stop it, if not, pull like hell. All this would happen very quickly, and in a fatigued state (if they were) and that close to the ground, there would be very little time to react.

Horrifying to say the least.

Quoting klwright69 (Reply 12): Actually I have read that the flight voice recorders were damaged and need restoration work.

Days ago, the Russians said that they were successful in reading both out, and then were going to confer with the parties to the investigation to assemble a transcript, etc.

So is it a fair guess that they disengaged the autopilot prior to FL50 *because* they perceived a runaway stab trim? And then when that didn't fix the problem, they didn't follow through with the subsequent procedures (trim switch, disengage motors, pull when all else fails)? It's all happening crazy-fast, but if the "transcript" is correct, nobody says "pull with me" or commands/suggests any particular action.

I don't follow the discussion of a "dive switch". Were this a submarine, I would understand.

Gosh I wish the CNN folks would call Barney Captain instead of Scary Mary when this kind of stuff happens.

Looks like Scary Mary's speculation was wrong again!!

Quoting wjcandee (Reply 29): I don't follow the discussion of a "dive switch". Were this a submarine, I would understand.

An "emergency decent mode" in case of, e.g., a pressurization accident?

Quoting barney captain (Reply 27): Our procedure is - 1. Control column ............... Hold firmly

     

Quoting LTC8K6 (Reply 25): The pilots apparently did not realize that the sharp dive is responsible by the stabilizer. The question is- why has the stabiliser switched to ‘dive mode’? This mode is activated by a button the pilots call ‘Knyupel’

Best one I've heard all day. "Dive" switch, right!

Quoting LTC8K6 (Reply 25): went into ‘dive mode’.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 31): Best one I've heard all day. "Dive" switch, right!

Bad translation from Russian into English.

Here's the original from the Vesti article:
"режим пикирования" ("regime pikirovaniya")

A little Russian lesson:
The state of pitching nose up has a word for it in Russian - кабрирование (kabrirovaniye), as opposed to saying "pitching up" or "nose up" like we would say in English. Don't confuse this with "climbing", as we know an aircraft can be pitching up and descending like a rock.

The state of pitching nose down also has a word for it in Russian - пикирование (pikirovaniye), which comes from the word "пикировать" (pikirovat')

Now the verb "пикировать" (pikirovat') means "to dive".

One word comes from the other but they mean different things.

So the proper translation should be "the stabiliser changed to nose down state/position".

Quoting tu204 (Reply 32): A little Russian lesson:

That was actually amazingly-informative. I appreciate the detail in addition to the excellent translation.

Just read the version from Spuniknews puts it into a better perspective on the language translation issue...
http://sputniknews.com/russia/201603...41/fly-dubai-voice-recordings.html

Quoting tu204 (Reply 32):

Tu204 thanks for that very informative.
Also love the tu204 lovely bird.

[Edited 2016-03-26 04:11:08]

Quoting hivue (Reply 30): Quoting wjcandee (Reply 29):I don't follow the discussion of a "dive switch". Were this a submarine, I would understand. An "emergency decent mode" in case of, e.g., a pressurization accident?

Just to be clear, there is no "dive" switch in any Boeing airplane.

Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 36): Just to be clear, there is no "dive" switch in any Boeing airplane.

Now that this switch - whatever its function - is implicated in the sudden dive, perhaps we can get some clarification on its location and use.

There's this concept that the PF hit something by mistake after disengaging the autopilot. In the 737-800 cockpit, it that really possible, or is this just the 'theory of the week' regarding the cause of this crash? From a pure design/ergonomic standpoint, it sounds iffy: push a button, get radical elevator-down, and go into a dive.

Quoting CF-CPI (Reply 37): Quoting 7BOEING7 (Reply 36): Just to be clear, there is no "dive" switch in any Boeing airplane. Now that this switch - whatever its function - is implicated in the sudden dive, perhaps we can get some clarification on its location and use. There's this concept that the PF hit something by mistake after disengaging the autopilot. In the 737-800 cockpit, it that really possible, or is this just the 'theory of the week' regarding the cause of this crash? From a pure design/ergonomic standpoint, it sounds iffy: push a button, get radical elevator-down, and go into a dive.

There is no "dive switch"......

Could someone shed some light on how these "dive" crashes are experienced physically? Is there a moment of weightlessness? G forces? Do passengers have a feel for the direction in which they are going?

Do pilots even have a decent situational awareness (including clear visual of instruments) when turbulence and attitude "shakes" them around?

[Edited 2016-03-26 09:21:38]

Quoting Whiteguy (Reply 38): There is no "dive switch"......

Right. But have we determined that there really IS or is NOT some button/switch that the PF may have activated by mistake, whose consequence was to pitch the aircraft nose down? This seems to be the theory du jour.

Quoting CF-CPI (Reply 40): Right. But have we determined that there really IS or is NOT some button/switch that the PF may have activated by mistake, whose consequence was to pitch the aircraft nose down? This seems to be the theory du jour.

Probably referring to the trim switches on the yoke

Quoting klwright69 (Reply 12): Whenever there is a major accident there are always people here saying there will be a cover up. Why? What is there to gain by a lie that will be completely transparent and obvious, people aren't really that stupid.

I suspect the propaganda, disinformation, and outright lies the Russians perpetrated about MH 17 might lead some people to question their veracity on any future issues.

Quoting CF-CPI (Reply 40): Right. But have we determined that there really IS or is NOT some button/switch that the PF may have activated by mistake, whose consequence was to pitch the aircraft nose down? This seems to be the theory du jour.

There is not.

There is on electric trim switch on the yoke that is used to trim the stab when the A/P is off (activating it will also disconnect the A/P).

There is a separate electric motor used by the A/P to trim the stab.

Both of these have cutout switches that disconnect them in the event of a runaway. They are located on the lower right of the thrust lever quadrant - just above the engine fire switches.

Additionally, manual trim is available as a backup via the stab trim wheel on both side of the console.

The only thing remotely like a "dive switch" would be the manual electric trim switch on the yoke. If, during a GA, that trim was activated nose down, the A/P would disconnect and the A/C would rapidly pitch over - but the trim switch would have to be held in that position (assuming no runaway). Highly unlikely in my mind. If the stab trim did runaway, applying opposite control column force (pulling) would have disconnected the A/P electric trim. But again, it looked like it all happened so horribly fast......

Quoting barney captain (Reply 43): There is not.

OK thanks. I wonder where that website, which published useful info, got the idea that what 'must have' happened was activation of some sort of switch.

We started all this with the idea of disorientation, but this all happened so fast, as you said, and was so violent, that it must have involved deliberate activation of control systems through PF command or mechanical/electrical.

Quoting wjcandee (Reply 29): Gosh I wish the CNN folks would call Barney Captain instead of Scary Mary when this kind of stuff happens.

Thanks for the kind words -  

I agree on your assesment of Mary, not one of my favorite people in the media - but she does provide the wanted sound bites.   

This is starting to look more and more like a stab issue. Let's hope we get some more detailed information soon.

Quoting CF-CPI (Reply 37): There's this concept that the PF hit something by mistake after disengaging the autopilot. In the 737-800 cockpit, it that really possible, or is this just the 'theory of the week' regarding the cause of this crash? From a pure design/ergonomic standpoint, it sounds iffy: push a button, get radical elevator-down, and go into a dive.

What is possible is the aircraft was trimming to maintain speed and vertical speed during the climb, and trimmed to the full trim movement available to the point where the autopilot disengaged. At that point the pilots would have had limited control at the trim was at the stop. That is just speculation on my part to explain what is being reported.

Food for thought

Quote: 17 Nov 2013 - VP-BBN 737-500 Loss of control after go-around The Russian MAK have just published their final report into the accident on 17 Nov 2013 in which Tatarstan Airlines 737-500, VP-BBN, (24785/1882) was written off after losing control during a go-around at Kazan following an unstable approach due to a map shift. All 50 occupants died. The aircraft (non-GPS) had developed a 2nm map shift during the flight. This was attributed partly to incorrect data entered before departure from Domodedovo and partially due to normal IRS drift. FMC position is normally a mixture of IRS position and navaid position where available. The map shift became critical during the initial approach taking them 2nm North of waypoint MISMI. This deviation was pointed out to the crew once by ATC but was not corrected by the crew and nor did ATC offer vectors. The self positioned procedural turn left the aircraft far to the right (north) of the centreline. By the time they had intercepted the localiser they were very high on profile and at 900ft aal went around. The autopilot disconnected but this was not noticed. The report stated that the crew was probably “not psychologically ready” for a missed approach and disconnection of the autopilot was “not recognised” due to high stress levels. The workload was further increased by an unnecessary 20sec communication by the F/O with ATC over the missed approach altitude. The aircraft pitched up due to the thrust couple (the A/P was not engaged and nobody had control) the aircraft reached 2300ft and the IAS decayed from 150 to 117 KIAS. The crew now applied full forward pressure and entered a steep dive and impacted the ground 75 degrees ND, 45 secs after initiating the go-around and 20 seconds after reaching the maximum height.

[Edited 2016-03-26 15:08:35]

Quoting zeke (Reply 46): and trimmed to the full trim movement available to the point where the autopilot disengaged.

So there are situations where the autopilot can disengage and dump the airplane in the pilots' laps with full nose-down (or -up) trim?

EDIT: Actually, I thought it through and it makes sense. Airplane trying to pitch up due to TOGA power for the go around. The AP trims for increasing pitch down to control the flight path. The stabilizer hits its limit and the AP disengages due to no pitch trim authority left. The pilots suddenly have on their hands an airplane not far from the ground with full nose-down trim on.

[Edited 2016-03-26 19:08:43]

Quoting hivue (Reply 47): So there are situations where the autopilot can disengage and dump the airplane in the pilots' laps with full nose-down (or -up) trim?

Well...that's one time that the autopilot *does* disengage -- when it says, "yeah, I have done all I can do now -- you deal with it".

Quoting hivue (Reply 47): So there are situations where the autopilot can disengage and dump the airplane in the pilots' laps with full nose-down (or -up) trim?

No

Quoting zeke (Reply 46): What is possible is the aircraft was trimming to maintain speed and vertical speed during the climb, and trimmed to the full trim movement available to the point where the autopilot disengaged.

To my knowledge the autopilots will not disengage when full autopilot trim limit is encountered. As for the Tartarstan 737 accident, they were operating with only one autopilot engaged prior to the go-around and if you push the TO/GA switch with a single autopilot engaged it will disengage. A dual channel go-around with even a light airplane is a non event because unless you push the TO/GA switch twice the autothrottle only provides thrust to maintain 1000 to 2000 fpm climb so you're not getting full thrust causing the airplane to pitch up drastically