Moderators: richierich, ua900, PanAm_DC10, hOMSaR
neomax wrote:if all 747's following TWA800 were required to have this, then how come airlines such as DL and UA were allowed to fly without it and thus retired their fleet once they were required to fit it?
SuseJ772 wrote:What I have always wondered is where does the Nitrogen come from? Are there tanks? When / how are they refilled? Or is there a extraction device that pulls it from the atmosphere?
CRJ900 wrote:Are CRJs, E-jets, A220, Superjet etc exempted as their MTOW is lower than the B737s and A32X?
XAM2175 wrote:As VetteDude notes, inerting systems prevent the build-up of dangerous fuel-air mixes in partially-full fuel tanks, and most do this by replacing the air in the tank with nitrogen, which is not flammable.neomax wrote:if all 747's following TWA800 were required to have this, then how come airlines such as DL and UA were allowed to fly without it and thus retired their fleet once they were required to fit it?
The rule was not implemented immediately - first the NTSB had to complete their investigation of the TW800 incident and definitively find fuel vapour as a probable cause, then the FAA had to take their actions from the NTSB findings and develop a proposed rule, circulate it, etc etc, and then finally issue it - which didn't occur until 21 Jul 2008, and the deadlines for compliance were yet later.
It should also be noted the rules applies to many more aircraft than 747s. For example, an inerting system is required to be installed on all 737s, 747s, 767s, 777s, A320-series, A330s, and A340s produced after 27 Dec 2010, plus all of those models and also 757s, A300s, and A310s (all regardless of age) if they are operated past the relevant airline's full-compliance deadline. On the other hand, full exemptions from compliance apply to aircraft certified for cargo only, aircraft below a certain MTOW, aircraft that use fuel systems that demonstrate an equivalent or greater level of safety by other means (such as the A380), and all L-1011s, DC-9s, DC-10s, and 727s on the basis that the numbers in use and the time they were expected to remain in use made compliance an unreasonable burden on operators.
The deadline for full compliance ended up being 27 Dec 2017* - hence the flurry of retirements leading up to that date.
(* = provisions apply for extension to 27 Dec 2018 based on specific circumstances).
The FAA Advisory Circular is a tough read but does explain the rule comprehensively: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/med ... 20-98A.pdf
MassAppeal wrote:What is it about the A-380, L-1011, etc that they don't need this. This is interesting.
OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
stratclub wrote:A very interesting read: https://www.scribd.com/document/2870495 ... udent-Book
According to the linked document, the NGS system works with a maintained air temperature (170F) delivered to the ASM's (Air Separation Modules) that is well above the flash point of Jet A fuel which according to Wikipedia is 100F. There is no additional
OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
Dalmd88 wrote:OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
Every time I worked on one of the AD related cards I would think, "This will prevent it from exploding when the missile hits." I also don't buy the TWA 800 fuel vapor story. Planes were flying around for decades with this pack/tank combo with zero incidents.
For me these AD's were a money maker so I can't complain.
when an overheated fuel pump caused an explosion in the aft fuel tank
WIederling wrote:stratclub wrote:A very interesting read: https://www.scribd.com/document/2870495 ... udent-Book
According to the linked document, the NGS system works with a maintained air temperature (170F) delivered to the ASM's (Air Separation Modules) that is well above the flash point of Jet A fuel which according to Wikipedia is 100F. There is no additional
* Flash point is not autoignition.
* Flash point is determined for 21% O2 at 1000mbar.
* The gas flow into the tank is equivalent to the fuel outflow.
* Adding 100°F slow gas flow to a much larger gas volume will not change the larger volumes temperature in any meaningful way.
* The gas volume above the fuel already is "inerted".
XAM2175 wrote:As VetteDude notes, inerting systems prevent the build-up of dangerous fuel-air mixes in partially-full fuel tanks, and most do this by replacing the air in the tank with nitrogen, which is not flammable.neomax wrote:if all 747's following TWA800 were required to have this, then how come airlines such as DL and UA were allowed to fly without it and thus retired their fleet once they were required to fit it?
The rule was not implemented immediately - first the NTSB had to complete their investigation of the TW800 incident and definitively find fuel vapour as a probable cause, then the FAA had to take their actions from the NTSB findings and develop a proposed rule, circulate it, etc etc, and then finally issue it - which didn't occur until 21 Jul 2008, and the deadlines for compliance were yet later.
It should also be noted the rules applies to many more aircraft than 747s. For example, an inerting system is required to be installed on all 737s, 747s, 767s, 777s, A320-series, A330s, and A340s produced after 27 Dec 2010, plus all of those models and also 757s, A300s, and A310s (all regardless of age) if they are operated past the relevant airline's full-compliance deadline. On the other hand, full exemptions from compliance apply to aircraft certified for cargo only, aircraft below a certain MTOW, aircraft that use fuel systems that demonstrate an equivalent or greater level of safety by other means (such as the A380), and all L-1011s, DC-9s, DC-10s, and 727s on the basis that the numbers in use and the time they were expected to remain in use made compliance an unreasonable burden on operators.
The deadline for full compliance ended up being 27 Dec 2017* - hence the flurry of retirements leading up to that date.
(* = provisions apply for extension to 27 Dec 2018 based on specific circumstances).
The FAA Advisory Circular is a tough read but does explain the rule comprehensively: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/med ... 20-98A.pdf
MatthewDB wrote:There are hardly "no events" of tanks blowing up. There is this one too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippin ... Flight_143
Jet fuel is quite a bit more dangerous to handle than gasoline or diesel. Gasoline in a closed tank at most outdoor temperatures won't burn because the gasoline fumes displace enough oxygen that it can't explode. Diesel has so little fuel vapor, it won't. A tank partially full of Jet A on a warm day is a bomb save for a lack of an ignition source.
In most aircraft the fuel never gets that warm. Leftover fuel is very cold, and fuel loaded is around ground temperature and it cools shortly after takeoff. If a plane is parked in hot weather, it can be dangerous for a while after takeoff, but that's rare. It is center tanks that aren't being used, just like TWA800, that are particularly dangerous. They can linger for long times in a dangerous state as they aren't chilled fast like a wing tank would be.
Dalmd88 wrote:CRJ900 wrote:Are CRJs, E-jets, A220, Superjet etc exempted as their MTOW is lower than the B737s and A32X?
They are exempt do to their fuel tank configurations. All of the AD effected airframes have the air conditioning packs under the center fuel tank. The heat from the pack area raises the temp of the center tank making an empty or near empty tank more likely to explode if there is a spark. Along with the NGS system there were various wiring mods that had to be done in the tank areas to lessen the chance of a spark. I spent many hours putting Teflon sleeving over wire bundles running outside of the tanks. I also replaced a lot of fuel shutoff valves and boost pumps to comply with the AD's.
stratclub wrote:MatthewDB wrote:There are hardly "no events" of tanks blowing up. There is this one too:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippin ... Flight_143
Jet fuel is quite a bit more dangerous to handle than gasoline or diesel. Gasoline in a closed tank at most outdoor temperatures won't burn because the gasoline fumes displace enough oxygen that it can't explode. Diesel has so little fuel vapor, it won't. A tank partially full of Jet A on a warm day is a bomb save for a lack of an ignition source.
In most aircraft the fuel never gets that warm. Leftover fuel is very cold, and fuel loaded is around ground temperature and it cools shortly after takeoff. If a plane is parked in hot weather, it can be dangerous for a while after takeoff, but that's rare. It is center tanks that aren't being used, just like TWA800, that are particularly dangerous. They can linger for long times in a dangerous state as they aren't chilled fast like a wing tank would be.
Pardon my attempt at humor. Your post does add some credibility to a CWT explosion on Flight 800. The aircraft may have sat at the gate during the hottest part of the day (July 17, 1996) for several hours after refueling with the APU and packs running. So it would be possible the the CWT fuel was heated above flash point and with having some airspace in the CWT after taxi and take off and possibly an electrical short or spark occurred because of frayed wiring, an explosion could have resulted. N93119 was almost 25 years old at the time of the crash.
If there was a cover up, it would have been one of the best cover ups in history....................
wpnstroop wrote:It doesn’t prevent missile attacks
stratclub wrote:The aircraft may have sat at the gate during the hottest part of the day (July 17, 1996) for several hours after refueling with the APU and packs running. So it would be possible the the CWT fuel was heated above flash point and with having some airspace in the CWT after taxi and take off and possibly an electrical short or spark occurred because of frayed wiring, an explosion could have resulted..
XAM2175 wrote:On the other hand, full exemptions from compliance apply to aircraft certified for cargo only, aircraft below a certain MTOW, aircraft that use fuel systems that demonstrate an equivalent or greater level of safety by other means (such as the A380)
mikeinatlanta wrote:Keep your eye on the ball people. 230 people died and it wasn't a missile, it was us.
mikeinatlanta wrote:There is fuel quantity indication system wiring and pump wiring within the tank. In the fuselage that wiring is bundled with a wide range of other wiring. The only thing not definitive with the investigation is exactly which one of those wires shorted with the other. The reason for conspiracy theories is the twisted satisfaction it provides some people. That's fine for the tin foil hat crowd, but we aviation professionals should take responsibility for our part and never let it happen again. IMO of course.
mikeinatlanta wrote:A. During heavy maintenance, and in an effort to reduce costs, floor panels and other open up would be performed by inexperienced personnel. These personnel will be under extreme pressure to the job as quickly as possible, and will essentially do nothing to keep metal shavings and other debris out of wire harnesses while they work.
Dalmd88 wrote:CRJ900 wrote:Are CRJs, E-jets, A220, Superjet etc exempted as their MTOW is lower than the B737s and A32X?
They are exempt do to their fuel tank configurations. All of the AD effected airframes have the air conditioning packs under the center fuel tank. The heat from the pack area raises the temp of the center tank making an empty or near empty tank more likely to explode if there is a spark. Along with the NGS system there were various wiring mods that had to be done in the tank areas to lessen the chance of a spark. I spent many hours putting Teflon sleeving over wire bundles running outside of the tanks. I also replaced a lot of fuel shutoff valves and boost pumps to comply with the AD's.
stratclub wrote:wpnstroop wrote:It doesn’t prevent missile attacks
It must be pretty effective because only one plane has been shot down by a missile since NGS systems have become a requirement. Statistics never lie................https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_a ... _incidents
For those that like a well executed cover up theory: http://plane-truth.com/fatigue_details.htm
OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
wpnstroop wrote:stratclub wrote:wpnstroop wrote:It doesn’t prevent missile attacks
It must be pretty effective because only one plane has been shot down by a missile since NGS systems have become a requirement. Statistics never lie................https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_a ... _incidents
For those that like a well executed cover up theory: http://plane-truth.com/fatigue_details.htm
TWA 800 was not a NGS issue. I, nor any other former TWA employee believe anything other than a missile took that plane down. At my current employer, 737’s fly with the NGS on MEL ALL THE TIME....can’t be THAT important.
strfyr51 wrote:OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
, so do I The story was fishy on it's face! It was a cover-up and it was as bogus then? As it is now!
It would be nearly impossible to inert the B747-400's center tank with Nitrogen in a serviceable installation. I can stand up in the damn thing and I'm 5'9".
strfyr51 wrote:OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
, so do I The story was fishy on it's face! It was a cover-up and it was as bogus then? As it is now!
It would be nearly impossible to inert the B747-400's center tank with Nitrogen in a serviceable installation. I can stand up in the damn thing and I'm 5'9".
Dalmd88 wrote:OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
Every time I worked on one of the AD related cards I would think, "This will prevent it from exploding when the missile hits." I also don't buy the TWA 800 fuel vapor story. Planes were flying around for decades with this pack/tank combo with zero incidents.
For me these AD's were a money maker so I can't complain.
TTailedTiger wrote:That is way too much time to give airlines to retrofit fleets. Safety comes before profits. They should have been forced to slash schedules or fly with full fuel tanks until the entire fleet is outfitted. No one should have to worry if their flight is going to spontaneously explode.
GalaxyFlyer wrote:I like a good conspiracy story, but it’s a little hard to believe a group of USN sailors shot down an airliner, escaped, then the NTSB, CIA and FBI covered it all up. Hundreds of witnesses told their stories and then shut up. That’s a lot of conspirators in tha act, most of which have no incentive to participate. The USS Vincennes shot down an airliner and the world knew who did it within hours.
747Whale wrote:. SoDalmd88 wrote:OneSexyL1011 wrote:All this because a 747 was shot down.
Yes, I refuse to believe the story of TWA800
Every time I worked on one of the AD related cards I would think, "This will prevent it from exploding when the missile hits." I also don't buy the TWA 800 fuel vapor story. Planes were flying around for decades with this pack/tank combo with zero incidents.
For me these AD's were a money maker so I can't complain.
Anyone who knows the fuel system on the 747 Classic knows that the official accounting of TWA 800 is ridiculous and not true. There wasn't a single peer in the Classic whether captain, f/o, FE, mechanic, or loadmaster who remotely entertained the official story as being true; we all knew better.
The CWT did not rupture internally due to arcing or an overheated fuel pump, particularly as the fuel pumps weren't on and the CWT wasn't in use on that flight. Given that wing tanks hold 230,000 lbs, more than needed for the crossing, CWT fuel was unneeded and for the bit remaining would have required only the scavenge pump anyway. Forget the fact that the CWT tests that attempted to cause an explosion in the mockup models were 100% unsuccessful; they couldn't create a fire or explosion, even flooding the tank with propane and using aircraft ignitors failed to cause the explosion; it took numerous tries and a combination of air injection and various flammable vapor, none of which is found in the 747 fuel system, to eventually cause an explosion, which did not cause the type of catastrophic rupture and failure predicted.
Three operating packs, however, forward of the CWT, produce an attractive heat signature, and the El Al 747 Classic that was about to takeoff turned back to the gate, TWA 800 taking off instead. Thousands saw the streak upward, radar recorded a rapid boat egress from the launch site, hundreds of witnesses were interviewed who saw the same thing, not nearly as easily discounted as attempted in the official explanation. The US had a lot to lose by admitting to a shootdown.
TWA 800 did not simply "blow up," and the CIA video was laughingly unbelievable and tenth rate cartoonish in its defiance of physics and the flight data.
The aircraft was shot down.