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Max Q
Posts: 9067
Joined: Wed May 09, 2001 12:40 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 1:00 am

BravoOne wrote:
Boeing SOP calls for manaul deployment of the speedbrakes in the event of an RTO, followed up by reverse thrust. It's that way for a lot of years now.




Not our procedure, not since the 727.



Speed brakes should deploy automatically
with reverser deployment, if they don’t then the Captain will deploy them manually


Saves time when time is critical


FO should call out any abnormalities during
take off but Captain makes the abort decision, you can’t have a debate in that
situation
 
BravoOne
Posts: 4094
Joined: Fri Apr 12, 2013 2:27 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 1:13 am

Does not save time and leaves you exposed to other failures. Boeing does not just sit back and make this tuff up without serious evaluations. There have been numerous articles to support the Boeing procedures and frankly without seeing CAL/UAL boiler plate I don't believe your statements as it is contrary to all historic data. FWIW, failure to manully reply the speed brakes is probably the number one error observed during check rides. Maybe you should read the AA 757 overrun up in Jackson Hole for some enlightenment.

Your reading comprehension is poor. No one has suggested that only the Captain can call for the reject, but only the Capt can execute the reject based on circumstances that exist at the time it is called. Why do you think this being debated??

Not your procedures? You mean CAL or UAL, BTW when did you first start work at one of these airlines?
 
Max Q
Posts: 9067
Joined: Wed May 09, 2001 12:40 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 2:13 am

BravoOne wrote:
Does not save time and leaves you exposed to other failures. Boeing does not just sit back and make this tuff up without serious evaluations. There have been numerous articles to support the Boeing procedures and frankly without seeing CAL/UAL boiler plate I don't believe your statements as it is contrary to all historic data. FWIW, failure to manully reply the speed brakes is probably the number one error observed during check rides. Maybe you should read the AA 757 overrun up in Jackson Hole for some enlightenment.

Your reading comprehension is poor. No one has suggested that only the Captain can call for the reject, but only the Capt can execute the reject based on circumstances that exist at the time it is called. Why do you think this being debated??

Not your procedures? You mean CAL or UAL, BTW when did you first start work at one of these airlines?




Automatic deployment of speed brakes
most certainly saves time in a time critical
scenario such as a rejected take off


It means one less action, in the old days
on the 727 for example it was throttles idle
then manually extend speedbrakes while simultaneously applying maximum brakes manually then max reverse


On newer aircraft with auto brakes, throttles to idle above 80 knots will give
you RTO braking, one less action for the Captain, engaging reverse will deploy spoilers, saving time and another action by not having to manually deploy them when seconds count


If they don’t deploy automatically then they
can be extended manually


You might want to review your reading skills, at my airline it is the Captains decision alone to initiate and accomplish a rejected take off
based on all available input which certainly includes the FO



You can’t have a debate at 140 knots and accelerating
 
stratclub
Posts: 1382
Joined: Fri Jan 05, 2018 10:38 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 2:41 am

BravoOne wrote:
Don't think stratclub is a pilot based on his posts.

You are correct sir. Just an AMT that is responsible to the best of my ability for giving you guys an airworthy aircraft when it's go time. I do have a fair amount of heavy aircraft experience in manufacturing, validation testing, modification and operations and have traveled and worked abroad enough to observe and understand how Americans, with not even knowing or caring, quite often disrespect other cultures.

My apologies if I post hurt anyones feelings. I had hoped that what I posted would give some a better understanding about cultural differences and how people perceive those differences. I thought it tied into the reasoning behind why declaring an RTO with the single word "stop" is not that strange of an idea being aviation is a world wide industry.
 
stratclub
Posts: 1382
Joined: Fri Jan 05, 2018 10:38 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 3:05 am

747Whale wrote:
stratclub wrote:
anti-"american" bullshit


Thanks. Noted.

Go fly something else.

I will take your complete misrepresentation in quoting my post as you disagreeing with my point of view. Thank you for your response. I was just relating to what I have seen in my travels. Since the jet age, we have become a world community that requires mutual respect and understanding of cultures different then ours.
 
BravoOne
Posts: 4094
Joined: Fri Apr 12, 2013 2:27 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 2:09 pm

Maybe we should start another thread as this one seems to be drifting off the OP's original subject. Stratclub usually has good info in his/her posts, so nothing to be gained by disparaging the contributions. Not sure what caused his little put down of Americans but it seem to be a popular theme these days. I guess he thinks pilots have not traveled much in their careers?
 
BravoOne
Posts: 4094
Joined: Fri Apr 12, 2013 2:27 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 2:11 pm

Max Q wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
Does not save time and leaves you exposed to other failures. Boeing does not just sit back and make this tuff up without serious evaluations. There have been numerous articles to support the Boeing procedures and frankly without seeing CAL/UAL boiler plate I don't believe your statements as it is contrary to all historic data. FWIW, failure to manully reply the speed brakes is probably the number one error observed during check rides. Maybe you should read the AA 757 overrun up in Jackson Hole for some enlightenment.

Your reading comprehension is poor. No one has suggested that only the Captain can call for the reject, but only the Capt can execute the reject based on circumstances that exist at the time it is called. Why do you think this being debated??

Not your procedures? You mean CAL or UAL, BTW when did you first start work at one of these airlines?




Automatic deployment of speed brakes
most certainly saves time in a time critical
scenario such as a rejected take off


It means one less action, in the old days
on the 727 for example it was throttles idle
then manually extend speedbrakes while simultaneously applying maximum brakes manually then max reverse


On newer aircraft with auto brakes, throttles to idle above 80 knots will give
you RTO braking, one less action for the Captain, engaging reverse will deploy spoilers, saving time and another action by not having to manually deploy them when seconds count


If they don’t deploy automatically then they
can be extended manually


You might want to review your reading skills, at my airline it is the Captains decision alone to initiate and accomplish a rejected take off
based on all available input which certainly includes the FO



You can’t have a debate at 140 knots and accelerating


You remain clueless Max and I'm surprised.
 
TTailedTiger
Posts: 2953
Joined: Sun Aug 26, 2018 5:19 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 2:25 pm

747Whale wrote:
It really depends on the operator. My last two large operators, it was only the captain's decision to reject. In fact, the F/O portion of the briefing, when the F/O was the pilot flying, was "in the event of a malfunction, it's your decision to reject, I will back you up on the speed brakes and notify the tower." At that point, the captain could enter with his reject criteria.

It's a bit presumptuous to say "any competent airline," given that procedures and practices vary considerably.


I do find this a bit strange. I realize the captain is the primary authority but pilots are supposed to work as a team. Both pilots are required to have an ATP and with industry ups and downs that FO could very well have been a captain on that aircraft type but was downgraded due to furloughs. I can't really see the value in dismissing the FO's input. Sometimes the captain is making a mistake that is quickly becoming fatal as in the crash of Korean 8509 and United 173. The FO and FE knew exactly what was about to happen but didnt/couldn't do anything to stop it due to conflicts in culture at the time. If a certain KLM first officer had the authority to reject a takeoff we likely wouldn't have lost over 500 people in Tenerife. He knew what was up.
 
747Whale
Posts: 725
Joined: Fri Dec 07, 2018 7:41 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 6:02 pm

TTailedTiger wrote:

I do find this a bit strange. I realize the captain is the primary authority but pilots are supposed to work as a team. Both pilots are required to have an ATP and with industry ups and downs that FO could very well have been a captain on that aircraft type but was downgraded due to furloughs. I can't really see the value in dismissing the FO's input. Sometimes the captain is making a mistake that is quickly becoming fatal as in the crash of Korean 8509 and United 173. The FO and FE knew exactly what was about to happen but didnt/couldn't do anything to stop it due to conflicts in culture at the time. If a certain KLM first officer had the authority to reject a takeoff we likely wouldn't have lost over 500 people in Tenerife. He knew what was up.


Both pilots do work as a team. A team must have designated leader, and every flight has a pilot in command, who makes the final decision and has the ultimate authority and the ultimate responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight.

There's a big difference between two pilots wrestling for control of air aircraft because they're making different calls, and a F/O who advocates for the safety of the flight. In a number of historical mishaps, we see cases in which the F/O was not vocal enough and who did not over ride the captain. We see Asiana crashing into a sea wall in San Fransisco with multiple crewmembers on the flight deck, including check airmen, who said nothing, despite being below the glidepath. This was a cultural issue. Not an authority issue.

If a First Officer is performing a takeoff, and the airline determines that the Captain will reject takeoffs, it's up to the captain to make the call and take control. This is typically how the rejected takeoff is done. The First Officer taking off may be focused on the outside visuals, making quick references inside, while the nonflying pilot (the captain in this case) makes the airspeed calls, and the F/O acknowledges them. The captain might notice airspeed stagnating and call "Airspeed" alerting the F/O to scan inside. Immediately the captain might note a windshear issue and call "Reject, Reject, Reject, I have the controls!" at which point the captain will retard the thrust levers to idle, deploy the speed brakes, achieve max manual braking and full reverse, etc, while the F/O ensures max speed brake deployment, calls out speeds, and notifies the tower that the flight has rejected the takeoff, where they'll be exiting, and the nature of assistance required.

The issue at Tenerife was not one factor, but. multiple, and yes, the first officer's (both) should have been more vocal. What is not needed is a captain attempting to take off while a first officer fights him on the controls to reject. A rejected takeoff is perhaps the single most dangerous thing one can do in a large airplane, and fighting for control while attempting to perform that maneuver is far and away more dangerous by orders of magnitude.

The first officer might be more experienced. I have flown as a first officer with captains who are nearly half my age, with a fraction of my flight time and almost no experience. That doesn't make me the captain on the flight. A good captain will avail himself of the first officers training and experience, but a good captain doesn't abdicate his job, either. I've flown as a captain with first officers who are more experienced than me. I don't simply defer to them because they have more years, more hours, more ratings, etc. I'm the captain. I have the final responsibility. What I do, however, is work as a team, use their experience, consider their input, listen to them, and keep an open mind, because it's what a good captain does. What a good first officer does, too.

A typical departure briefing will include all the basic elements. "We're starting at gate C1, and will be taxiinig to runway 18R via taxiways alpha, echo, and zulu, for a zulu-one departure. We will hold short of 27L and get a clearance, regardless of our taxi clearance. There is a hot spot at the intersection of echo and bravo. For the takeoff, we will consider any malfunctions prior to eighty knots. Between eighty and V1, we will reject for engine fire, failure, loss of directional control, or any malfunction that makes us unable to fly. If we do reject, it will be throttles idle, max braking with speed brakes deployed, and full reverse. Back me up on the speed brakes and notify the tower, and apply forward pressure to the control column. Above V1, we will take it airborne and treat it as an airborne emergency. Above 400' I'll call for autoflight. Left turn at 1,000 to one two zero, clean up at 1800. Notify tower we're flying one two zero and will get back to them. ILS is set for 18R for a quick return, and #2 on 09L if we're on fire. Departure procedure is the Tandy six, flown off the box, initial to ZEBBY, at or below four thousand. Minimum safe altitude is 2600, transition is one eight zero. Any thoughts or questions?"

That last sentence may be the most important of the takeoff briefing. It's asking for input, and is usually open to the rest of the cockpit, as is the briefing. A good captain will not only be soliciting input from the crew, but be listening for it, and using it. That listening doesn't begin or end at that point, either. Other crewmembers are welcome, and EXPECTED to speak up with concerns, observations, etc. They are not expected to assume control of the aircraft or take over as captain. If a crew is so dysfunctional as to be unable to work within the framework of captain and crew, then there are much larger issues and the flight should not depart, and any crewmember viewing or knowing of such a problem needs to speak out and has a responsibility to do so.

I flew with a new captain in a Learjet many years ago. He was a very weak captain. I was considerably more experienced than he was, and was asked to fly in the right seat on his first trip to LAX. As we taxied out of the FBO, we were directed to cross the runway. ON the runway he froze, stopped in place, and didn't go. He was unsure what to do, and wasn't listening. The controller yelled to clear the runway. Understand that LAX is one of the few places that is so busy that pilots don't read back any of their clearance except the transponder code. It's that busy. Now, stopped on a runway, the controller was fit to be tied (upset). He asked if we could depart present position. I replied yes. I told the captain to turn left and ran the takeoff checklist. He was behind the airplane, but he was also, as said before, known for being a weak captain, which is why I was sent with him.

During the takeoff roll, I got a door light, which meant the main cabin door. For the door to open would be extremely dangerous, and grounds to reject the takeoff. From my position in the right seat, I could see the door handle, forward and in place. The handle in place meant that the locking lugs were all in place, and I knew the airplane well enough to know that the light was activated by a small plunger below the handle, and any trim or a bit of carpet below the handle could prevent plunger activation. I could see the door was locked, and knew it was an indication problem. Never the less, I pointed to the light and prior to 80 knots announced "Door light." The captain was focused down the runway, did not acknowledge or show signs of stopping, and I was not about to fight him for control at that point. That would have been creating an emergency. I made the speed calls, he rotated, and we climbed away. I called positive rate, no response, called it again, and raised the gear. Once the airplane was cleaned up, I pointed to the light again and asked if he was aware that we had a door light.

He freaked out.

He tried to roll 90 degrees and pull, and I took the airplane away from him. He began shrieking that we had to return, and tried to make an emergency call. I told him we weren't about to turn back into departing traffic for a light. He asked what we should do. I told him we'd continue the climb past Seal Beach to the enroute structure, and then I'd verify the handle. I was able to reach back and poke the handle with my finger, and the light went out. No possibility of the door ever being an issue.

On another occasion, approaching to land at a Pacific Northwest airport, we were given a clearance to slow to 210 knots and descend and maintain 12,000'. He deployed speed brakes, retarded power to idle, and started down. Our minimum speed was 180 knots clean. As he approached 180 knots, he showed no signs of retracting the speed brakes or increasing power, and he did neither. We continued to slow. We were approaching 12,000 with tall mountains in the area, and he showed no signs of arresting the descent. I called out altitude, and airspeed with no response, several times. He passed through 180 knots as I pried his hand off the speed brake switch and pushed up the power; he reapplied the speed brakes and pulled power to idle. I took the aircraft away from him forcibly; he was nearly catatonic, not responding to anything, apparently locked in on his go-down and slow-down mentality. He very slowly turned to me and said "You don't need to yell." I said I did, that I had the aircraft, and we proceeded to the approach and landed.

Those two times taking control are extreme rarities and something most pilots won't experience once in their career outside of flight instructing. That I experienced it twice is attributable to flying with that particular pilot, who should never have been assigned as captain (I refused to fly with him again). There shouldn't be a case in which crewmembers are taking control from the other, and on the runway during the most critical time, the first officer might announce the reason for the a reject (engine failure, fire, elephant on the runway, asteroid, monkeys), but it's the captain's call.

Tenerife wasn't something to be stopped last second by the First Officer; it was something that should have been done before the takeoff roll began. The mishap has been picked apart every way from sunday and is often discussed on every ground school, every recurrent, every training event for most pilots, for the rest of their natural lives. Speaking up early and a captain who can listen, are crucial in the cockpit environment; the sooner the better. It's the reason we have a "minimum fuel" call. It's the reason Air Florida went off the end, and numerous other cases, from departing on a closed runway to making a turn to the wrong NDB in Colombia. Everyone in the cockpit has a stake in the outcome; everyone arrives at the crash site within a very short time period, and everyone has a responsibility to speak out.

At most operations, the captain has the responsibility to reject the takeoff.
 
stratclub
Posts: 1382
Joined: Fri Jan 05, 2018 10:38 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 6:03 pm

BravoOne wrote:
Maybe we should start another thread as this one seems to be drifting off the OP's original subject. Stratclub usually has good info in his/her posts, so nothing to be gained by disparaging the contributions. Not sure what caused his little put down of Americans but it seem to be a popular theme these days. I guess he thinks pilots have not traveled much in their careers?

Thank you. Perhaps my outdated opinion is based more so on me growing up in the 50's/60's and having to work with people that still embrace the racist idea that Americans are Superior. The blatant racism, especially in the 50's was something that really bothered me growing up and I'm as white as Pat Boone. Kinda showing my age, I guess. I'm sure my remarks don't apply to long haul crews these days who do live internationally because of the job.
Last edited by stratclub on Sat Dec 22, 2018 6:27 pm, edited 2 times in total.
 
acmx
Posts: 28
Joined: Mon Aug 13, 2018 7:49 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 6:24 pm

I’m not a pilot, but I remember one trip in particular as a flight mechanic. We were taking off heavy out of Iquique, Chile in a 747-200. The FO was flying and he kept nodding approvingly at the yoke during the climb. I talked to him later over some coffee and he said he loved hand flying a loaded 747. He said it felt like it was on rails and did just what he wanted. I was just happy to be climbing haha. That runway started looking pretty short by the time we were rotating.
 
BravoOne
Posts: 4094
Joined: Fri Apr 12, 2013 2:27 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 7:19 pm

stratclub wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
Maybe we should start another thread as this one seems to be drifting off the OP's original subject. Stratclub usually has good info in his/her posts, so nothing to be gained by disparaging the contributions. Not sure what caused his little put down of Americans but it seem to be a popular theme these days. I guess he thinks pilots have not traveled much in their careers?

Thank you. Perhaps my outdated opinion is based more so on me growing up in the 50's/60's and having to work with people that still embrace the racist idea that Americans are Superior. The blatant racism, especially in the 50's was something that really bothered me growing up and I'm as white as Pat Boone. Kinda showing my age, I guess. I'm sure my remarks don't apply to long haul crews these days who do live internationally because of the job.


You sound like you're on some sort of liberal guilt trip? One of the benefits of aviation that that it serves to bring many people of all walks closer ,and this is particularly true of flight crews and technical operations. I think the open palms deal you speak of is a patt of the Boeing presentation for company travel? I was in and out of Vietnam many times during that war and not sure I ever recall hearing that one. Maybe that's why they were shooting at us? Now back to your regular ptpgraming:)
 
747Whale
Posts: 725
Joined: Fri Dec 07, 2018 7:41 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sat Dec 22, 2018 7:23 pm

acmx wrote:
I’m not a pilot, but I remember one trip in particular as a flight mechanic. We were taking off heavy out of Iquique, Chile in a 747-200. The FO was flying and he kept nodding approvingly at the yoke during the climb. I talked to him later over some coffee and he said he loved hand flying a loaded 747. He said it felt like it was on rails and did just what he wanted. I was just happy to be climbing haha. That runway started looking pretty short by the time we were rotating.


The 747, at least insofar as we flew it, was a whole-runway aircraft. Day one of ground school, the instructor said "get used to seeing red lights." He meant the lights at the departure end.

It does fly beautifully. It's all mass-management, and it seems like a hand full to view on the ramp; it seems so large, but the cockpit is fairly small, the controls are intuitive and the airplane hand flies very nicely. I almost always hand flew it from takeoff to cruise or at least to RVSM (27,000'+), and I did every other descent and approach by hand...mostly to stay in practice using automation because that was always my weakest area. There was never a sense with the 747 that it was too much or that it was going to run away. It's stable, balanced, has good feed back, responsive enough for an airplane that size, and handles its mass well; it doesn't feel like it's dragging or big. It flies like a big, heavy cub or 172.
 
TTailedTiger
Posts: 2953
Joined: Sun Aug 26, 2018 5:19 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Dec 23, 2018 12:41 am

747Whale wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

I do find this a bit strange. I realize the captain is the primary authority but pilots are supposed to work as a team. Both pilots are required to have an ATP and with industry ups and downs that FO could very well have been a captain on that aircraft type but was downgraded due to furloughs. I can't really see the value in dismissing the FO's input. Sometimes the captain is making a mistake that is quickly becoming fatal as in the crash of Korean 8509 and United 173. The FO and FE knew exactly what was about to happen but didnt/couldn't do anything to stop it due to conflicts in culture at the time. If a certain KLM first officer had the authority to reject a takeoff we likely wouldn't have lost over 500 people in Tenerife. He knew what was up.


Both pilots do work as a team. A team must have designated leader, and every flight has a pilot in command, who makes the final decision and has the ultimate authority and the ultimate responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight.

There's a big difference between two pilots wrestling for control of air aircraft because they're making different calls, and a F/O who advocates for the safety of the flight. In a number of historical mishaps, we see cases in which the F/O was not vocal enough and who did not over ride the captain. We see Asiana crashing into a sea wall in San Fransisco with multiple crewmembers on the flight deck, including check airmen, who said nothing, despite being below the glidepath. This was a cultural issue. Not an authority issue.

If a First Officer is performing a takeoff, and the airline determines that the Captain will reject takeoffs, it's up to the captain to make the call and take control. This is typically how the rejected takeoff is done. The First Officer taking off may be focused on the outside visuals, making quick references inside, while the nonflying pilot (the captain in this case) makes the airspeed calls, and the F/O acknowledges them. The captain might notice airspeed stagnating and call "Airspeed" alerting the F/O to scan inside. Immediately the captain might note a windshear issue and call "Reject, Reject, Reject, I have the controls!" at which point the captain will retard the thrust levers to idle, deploy the speed brakes, achieve max manual braking and full reverse, etc, while the F/O ensures max speed brake deployment, calls out speeds, and notifies the tower that the flight has rejected the takeoff, where they'll be exiting, and the nature of assistance required.

The issue at Tenerife was not one factor, but. multiple, and yes, the first officer's (both) should have been more vocal. What is not needed is a captain attempting to take off while a first officer fights him on the controls to reject. A rejected takeoff is perhaps the single most dangerous thing one can do in a large airplane, and fighting for control while attempting to perform that maneuver is far and away more dangerous by orders of magnitude.

The first officer might be more experienced. I have flown as a first officer with captains who are nearly half my age, with a fraction of my flight time and almost no experience. That doesn't make me the captain on the flight. A good captain will avail himself of the first officers training and experience, but a good captain doesn't abdicate his job, either. I've flown as a captain with first officers who are more experienced than me. I don't simply defer to them because they have more years, more hours, more ratings, etc. I'm the captain. I have the final responsibility. What I do, however, is work as a team, use their experience, consider their input, listen to them, and keep an open mind, because it's what a good captain does. What a good first officer does, too.

A typical departure briefing will include all the basic elements. "We're starting at gate C1, and will be taxiinig to runway 18R via taxiways alpha, echo, and zulu, for a zulu-one departure. We will hold short of 27L and get a clearance, regardless of our taxi clearance. There is a hot spot at the intersection of echo and bravo. For the takeoff, we will consider any malfunctions prior to eighty knots. Between eighty and V1, we will reject for engine fire, failure, loss of directional control, or any malfunction that makes us unable to fly. If we do reject, it will be throttles idle, max braking with speed brakes deployed, and full reverse. Back me up on the speed brakes and notify the tower, and apply forward pressure to the control column. Above V1, we will take it airborne and treat it as an airborne emergency. Above 400' I'll call for autoflight. Left turn at 1,000 to one two zero, clean up at 1800. Notify tower we're flying one two zero and will get back to them. ILS is set for 18R for a quick return, and #2 on 09L if we're on fire. Departure procedure is the Tandy six, flown off the box, initial to ZEBBY, at or below four thousand. Minimum safe altitude is 2600, transition is one eight zero. Any thoughts or questions?"

That last sentence may be the most important of the takeoff briefing. It's asking for input, and is usually open to the rest of the cockpit, as is the briefing. A good captain will not only be soliciting input from the crew, but be listening for it, and using it. That listening doesn't begin or end at that point, either. Other crewmembers are welcome, and EXPECTED to speak up with concerns, observations, etc. They are not expected to assume control of the aircraft or take over as captain. If a crew is so dysfunctional as to be unable to work within the framework of captain and crew, then there are much larger issues and the flight should not depart, and any crewmember viewing or knowing of such a problem needs to speak out and has a responsibility to do so.

I flew with a new captain in a Learjet many years ago. He was a very weak captain. I was considerably more experienced than he was, and was asked to fly in the right seat on his first trip to LAX. As we taxied out of the FBO, we were directed to cross the runway. ON the runway he froze, stopped in place, and didn't go. He was unsure what to do, and wasn't listening. The controller yelled to clear the runway. Understand that LAX is one of the few places that is so busy that pilots don't read back any of their clearance except the transponder code. It's that busy. Now, stopped on a runway, the controller was fit to be tied (upset). He asked if we could depart present position. I replied yes. I told the captain to turn left and ran the takeoff checklist. He was behind the airplane, but he was also, as said before, known for being a weak captain, which is why I was sent with him.

During the takeoff roll, I got a door light, which meant the main cabin door. For the door to open would be extremely dangerous, and grounds to reject the takeoff. From my position in the right seat, I could see the door handle, forward and in place. The handle in place meant that the locking lugs were all in place, and I knew the airplane well enough to know that the light was activated by a small plunger below the handle, and any trim or a bit of carpet below the handle could prevent plunger activation. I could see the door was locked, and knew it was an indication problem. Never the less, I pointed to the light and prior to 80 knots announced "Door light." The captain was focused down the runway, did not acknowledge or show signs of stopping, and I was not about to fight him for control at that point. That would have been creating an emergency. I made the speed calls, he rotated, and we climbed away. I called positive rate, no response, called it again, and raised the gear. Once the airplane was cleaned up, I pointed to the light again and asked if he was aware that we had a door light.

He freaked out.

He tried to roll 90 degrees and pull, and I took the airplane away from him. He began shrieking that we had to return, and tried to make an emergency call. I told him we weren't about to turn back into departing traffic for a light. He asked what we should do. I told him we'd continue the climb past Seal Beach to the enroute structure, and then I'd verify the handle. I was able to reach back and poke the handle with my finger, and the light went out. No possibility of the door ever being an issue.

On another occasion, approaching to land at a Pacific Northwest airport, we were given a clearance to slow to 210 knots and descend and maintain 12,000'. He deployed speed brakes, retarded power to idle, and started down. Our minimum speed was 180 knots clean. As he approached 180 knots, he showed no signs of retracting the speed brakes or increasing power, and he did neither. We continued to slow. We were approaching 12,000 with tall mountains in the area, and he showed no signs of arresting the descent. I called out altitude, and airspeed with no response, several times. He passed through 180 knots as I pried his hand off the speed brake switch and pushed up the power; he reapplied the speed brakes and pulled power to idle. I took the aircraft away from him forcibly; he was nearly catatonic, not responding to anything, apparently locked in on his go-down and slow-down mentality. He very slowly turned to me and said "You don't need to yell." I said I did, that I had the aircraft, and we proceeded to the approach and landed.

Those two times taking control are extreme rarities and something most pilots won't experience once in their career outside of flight instructing. That I experienced it twice is attributable to flying with that particular pilot, who should never have been assigned as captain (I refused to fly with him again). There shouldn't be a case in which crewmembers are taking control from the other, and on the runway during the most critical time, the first officer might announce the reason for the a reject (engine failure, fire, elephant on the runway, asteroid, monkeys), but it's the captain's call.

Tenerife wasn't something to be stopped last second by the First Officer; it was something that should have been done before the takeoff roll began. The mishap has been picked apart every way from sunday and is often discussed on every ground school, every recurrent, every training event for most pilots, for the rest of their natural lives. Speaking up early and a captain who can listen, are crucial in the cockpit environment; the sooner the better. It's the reason we have a "minimum fuel" call. It's the reason Air Florida went off the end, and numerous other cases, from departing on a closed runway to making a turn to the wrong NDB in Colombia. Everyone in the cockpit has a stake in the outcome; everyone arrives at the crash site within a very short time period, and everyone has a responsibility to speak out.

At most operations, the captain has the responsibility to reject the takeoff.


Thank you for taking the time to give a thorough and thoughtful response. My CRM professor was an NFO in the Navy and told us of a couple of occasions where she had to take control from a pilot who was unable to keep the aircraft straight and level. Having reviewed many aviation accident reports you will see them state that the first officer or other crew member should have been more assertive and take action when they blew something was wrong. I was just curious why an airline would directly inhibit that process. I felt bad for that AA first officer who was grilled after the LIT crash. He was publicly shamed for not demanding a go around. He says he did but company policy at the time may not have mandated a go around from the perspective of the FO. It seemed a bit unfair to lay any blame on him. He wasn't the pilot flying and from what I gather the captain was kind of an older jerk who didn't take any input.
 
Max Q
Posts: 9067
Joined: Wed May 09, 2001 12:40 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Dec 23, 2018 5:45 am

BravoOne wrote:
Max Q wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
Does not save time and leaves you exposed to other failures. Boeing does not just sit back and make this tuff up without serious evaluations. There have been numerous articles to support the Boeing procedures and frankly without seeing CAL/UAL boiler plate I don't believe your statements as it is contrary to all historic data. FWIW, failure to manully reply the speed brakes is probably the number one error observed during check rides. Maybe you should read the AA 757 overrun up in Jackson Hole for some enlightenment.

Your reading comprehension is poor. No one has suggested that only the Captain can call for the reject, but only the Capt can execute the reject based on circumstances that exist at the time it is called. Why do you think this being debated??

Not your procedures? You mean CAL or UAL, BTW when did you first start work at one of these airlines?




Automatic deployment of speed brakes
most certainly saves time in a time critical
scenario such as a rejected take off


It means one less action, in the old days
on the 727 for example it was throttles idle
then manually extend speedbrakes while simultaneously applying maximum brakes manually then max reverse


On newer aircraft with auto brakes, throttles to idle above 80 knots will give
you RTO braking, one less action for the Captain, engaging reverse will deploy spoilers, saving time and another action by not having to manually deploy them when seconds count


If they don’t deploy automatically then they
can be extended manually


You might want to review your reading skills, at my airline it is the Captains decision alone to initiate and accomplish a rejected take off
based on all available input which certainly includes the FO



You can’t have a debate at 140 knots and accelerating


You remain clueless Max and I'm surprised.



Merry Christmas B one,

To you and all your family
 
Nicoeddf
Posts: 1090
Joined: Thu Jan 10, 2008 7:13 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Dec 23, 2018 11:59 am

stratclub wrote:
BravoOne wrote:
Don't think stratclub is a pilot based on his posts.

You are correct sir. Just an AMT that is responsible to the best of my ability for giving you guys an airworthy aircraft when it's go time. I do have a fair amount of heavy aircraft experience in manufacturing, validation testing, modification and operations and have traveled and worked abroad enough to observe and understand how Americans, with not even knowing or caring, quite often disrespect other cultures.

My apologies if I post hurt anyones feelings. I had hoped that what I posted would give some a better understanding about cultural differences and how people perceive those differences. I thought it tied into the reasoning behind why declaring an RTO with the single word "stop" is not that strange of an idea being aviation is a world wide industry.


In my airline, "stop" is the proper and only proper word to abort/reject a takeoff. And while abort or reject would work just as well, after being trained, in my opinion calling "stop" is by far the best word. It describes what you actually doing, contrasts nicely with the "go" call 3kts prior V1 and falls in line with radioing "XY123, stopping (on the runway)".
Stop also implies automatic transfer of control to the CM1, if CM2 was the PF. Radios vv of course.

However, the FO is not supposed to call "stop", but call out the failure, leaving the final decision to the captain, which is sensible as well, simply from an experience point of view.

@747whale

Interesting posts, thank you. With what I don't agree however, is the lengthiness of your departure briefings. My airline handles those way shorter, which in my opinion has the benefit of actually being able to remember the important bits.

It will be more like "ALG9Y departure, RWY08L, QFU 080, After take off, Departure on 127.95, climb gradient such and such required, (compare FMS points), First Level 70, Nav Setting, Autopilot configuration."
Followed by a Take off briefing on the way to the runway "ALG9Y, RW08L, first turn to the right, speed max 210, acceleration 2500ft, transition 5000, first cleared FL70. Engine failure straight ahead, 25NM, MSA 3700 clmbing 5000. Standard takeoff/handflown raw data (mostly the latter)."

Taxi briefing will only be done at non-homebase complex airports. RTO briefing only with runways shorter 2400m, which is rarely the case.

@BravoOne, Max Q

Speedbrakes, while normally automatically deployed after TOGA activation followed by thrust reduction to idle, will be verbally confirmed and, if not deployed, will be manually deployed. Same by the way with most automatisms (max thrust activation after engine failure).
 
747Whale
Posts: 725
Joined: Fri Dec 07, 2018 7:41 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Dec 23, 2018 1:17 pm

A briefing isn't a memory test. It's a review of the upcoming events so everyone is on the same page. Memorization isn't necessary. Understanding and ensuring that all are aware and in agreement is.
 
Max Q
Posts: 9067
Joined: Wed May 09, 2001 12:40 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Dec 23, 2018 1:52 pm

The first five letters of ‘briefing’ should tell you something, once you start getting long winded it all blurs together


It’s brief for a reason, keep it short, simple and to the point


Essentials only
 
Nicoeddf
Posts: 1090
Joined: Thu Jan 10, 2008 7:13 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Dec 23, 2018 3:09 pm

747Whale wrote:
A briefing isn't a memory test. It's a review of the upcoming events so everyone is on the same page. Memorization isn't necessary. Understanding and ensuring that all are aware and in agreement is.


I absolutely disagree. My (whole) airline (group) does. Max Q does as well. But I am aware, that other operators handle it differently. I am not judging, just saying I have a different opinion.

For me and my environment, a briefing is there for putting upcoming events in your short term memory (and of course to be on the same page), so you can retrieve the immediate actions with ease in stressy situations.
Briefing your MAP, for example, means to be able to retrieve first turn, first speed, first altitude. You (and me) won't be able to keep the whole BSL MAP for RW33 in your mind.

I repeat Max' words: Essentials only
 
Nicoeddf
Posts: 1090
Joined: Thu Jan 10, 2008 7:13 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Dec 23, 2018 4:16 pm

CaptnSnow71 wrote:
For those who have flown them - we are talking anything from regional jets to the mighty 747. What does it feel like to control the aircraft via the yoke or sidestick, as compared to something like a C172? Does the operation feel heavy and unresponsive?

For those who've flown multiple types - are there certain aircraft that have handled better or worse? Do smaller jets handle more responsively than larger ones? Does Boeing's FBW aircraft feel similar to their conventional systems? How do sidesticks stack up to conventional yokes?

A lot of questions, I know. Just very curious! I've only had, and probably only ever will have, experience on small piston driven aircraft. Thanks in advance to your responses! :wave:


To your question: I wouldn't say heavy or unresponsive. But you certainly feel that you move tons and tons, rather than kilos around. You really learn to fine trim while flying a jet, in my experience. During everyday ops, the agility of the plane is more limited by pax and cabin crew comfort, than plane ability. For the CRJ for example, you would get excellent roll and pitch change rates; but you wouldn't want to use it normally, to not send your pax puking.

And I share the sentiment here: It is pure joy to handfly an airliner up to cruise and down to the ground, raw data, pitch&power, even with constraints of ATC, like given rates of descent. You learn to trust yourself that you can do it, if you have to. You learn to fly your plane with the tips of two fingers up high, where 0.5 degrees of change in pitch mean a world of a difference in vertical speed.
 
747Whale
Posts: 725
Joined: Fri Dec 07, 2018 7:41 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Mon Dec 24, 2018 8:36 am

Nicoeddf wrote:
747Whale wrote:
I absolutely disagree. My (whole) airline (group) does. Max Q does as well. But I am aware, that other operators handle it differently. I am not judging, just saying I have a different opinion.

For me and my environment, a briefing is there for putting upcoming events in your short term memory (and of course to be on the same page), so you can retrieve the immediate actions with ease in stressy situations.
Briefing your MAP, for example, means to be able to retrieve first turn, first speed, first altitude. You (and me) won't be able to keep the whole BSL MAP for RW33 in your mind.

I repeat Max' words: Essentials only


I couldn't give a stuff what he or she thinks; I put him on the ignore list.

If there's one chart and only one crewmember has access to it, that might be an issue, where everyone else on board must memorize the briefing. Our taxi, takeoff, and departure briefing is done before our first checklist is read, and covers the pushback, expected taxi, runway procedure, takeoff, and departure. We don't expect everyon to have it memorized. Both crewmembers will have the taxi page up for taxi, departure page up for departure. The engine-out procedure will be briefed, and I'll have the short notes on my pad on the column, as well as on the TOLD card forward of the throttles, and in our current operation, it's also on a performance page on the ipad, used to calculate the TOLD data.

Likewise, when flying the approach, the full procedure is briefed, noting the parameters set at the appropriate times (such as minimums). One crewmember will follow along in the FMC, verifying that it does indeed reflect what's being briefed. I'll also put the initial heading and altitude in the scratch pad on the third display.

I don't have the option to brief less; I have a briefing checklist which is required to be followed.
 
User avatar
Aaron747
Posts: 16031
Joined: Thu Aug 07, 2003 2:07 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Mon Dec 24, 2018 11:40 am

Max Q wrote:
stratclub wrote:
Maybe he got all the numbers wrong and meant this.

Image



What a great picture SC


Even with that frisbee on the top the 707
still looks great and it was truly a great, revolutionary aircraft, like the Comet it totally changed and improved air travel.


Technologically it was a step ahead of the
Comet though


I never flew it but I did have a couple of sessions in a 707 simulator, it was heavy on the controls and not that responsive


And engine out work was not easy, very high rudder pedal forces, especially with an outboard failure



As most of the flight controls were unpowered, like the DC8 that’s not surprising


It seems like Boeing wanted to make up for
any handling issues on their next aircraft and they certainly did with the 727


I think the ‘72 still sets the bar in that respect, it was just a delight to fly, stable
yet responsive


It was like it laid a set of railroad tracks in the sky ahead of it !


A family friend who helped raise me flew the 707 and Tristar with TW before retiring with 747 freighters at Flying Tigers. I still remember something he told me when I was 10 or 11 with a bellyful of laughter: "the 707 was my first jetliner, so Ioved flying her - even when she was trying to kill us on gusty days when both rudder and elevators never felt like enough. Then I moved on to the other two, realized she was never my friend, and never thought about her again."
 
BravoOne
Posts: 4094
Joined: Fri Apr 12, 2013 2:27 pm

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Mon Dec 24, 2018 2:51 pm

TWA and Tigers hmmmm?
 
User avatar
Aaron747
Posts: 16031
Joined: Thu Aug 07, 2003 2:07 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Mon Dec 24, 2018 4:04 pm

BravoOne wrote:
TWA and Tigers hmmmm?


Yeah, IIRC SF and then later LA-based.
 
reggiet
Posts: 107
Joined: Mon May 16, 2011 5:04 am

Re: Manual flight handling characteristics of airliners

Sun Jan 13, 2019 10:29 pm

747Whale wrote:
TTailedTiger wrote:

I do find this a bit strange. I realize the captain is the primary authority but pilots are supposed to work as a team. Both pilots are required to have an ATP and with industry ups and downs that FO could very well have been a captain on that aircraft type but was downgraded due to furloughs. I can't really see the value in dismissing the FO's input. Sometimes the captain is making a mistake that is quickly becoming fatal as in the crash of Korean 8509 and United 173. The FO and FE knew exactly what was about to happen but didnt/couldn't do anything to stop it due to conflicts in culture at the time. If a certain KLM first officer had the authority to reject a takeoff we likely wouldn't have lost over 500 people in Tenerife. He knew what was up.


Both pilots do work as a team. A team must have designated leader, and every flight has a pilot in command, who makes the final decision and has the ultimate authority and the ultimate responsibility for the safe outcome of the flight.

There's a big difference between two pilots wrestling for control of air aircraft because they're making different calls, and a F/O who advocates for the safety of the flight. In a number of historical mishaps, we see cases in which the F/O was not vocal enough and who did not over ride the captain. We see Asiana crashing into a sea wall in San Fransisco with multiple crewmembers on the flight deck, including check airmen, who said nothing, despite being below the glidepath. This was a cultural issue. Not an authority issue.

If a First Officer is performing a takeoff, and the airline determines that the Captain will reject takeoffs, it's up to the captain to make the call and take control. This is typically how the rejected takeoff is done. The First Officer taking off may be focused on the outside visuals, making quick references inside, while the nonflying pilot (the captain in this case) makes the airspeed calls, and the F/O acknowledges them. The captain might notice airspeed stagnating and call "Airspeed" alerting the F/O to scan inside. Immediately the captain might note a windshear issue and call "Reject, Reject, Reject, I have the controls!" at which point the captain will retard the thrust levers to idle, deploy the speed brakes, achieve max manual braking and full reverse, etc, while the F/O ensures max speed brake deployment, calls out speeds, and notifies the tower that the flight has rejected the takeoff, where they'll be exiting, and the nature of assistance required.

The issue at Tenerife was not one factor, but. multiple, and yes, the first officer's (both) should have been more vocal. What is not needed is a captain attempting to take off while a first officer fights him on the controls to reject. A rejected takeoff is perhaps the single most dangerous thing one can do in a large airplane, and fighting for control while attempting to perform that maneuver is far and away more dangerous by orders of magnitude.

The first officer might be more experienced. I have flown as a first officer with captains who are nearly half my age, with a fraction of my flight time and almost no experience. That doesn't make me the captain on the flight. A good captain will avail himself of the first officers training and experience, but a good captain doesn't abdicate his job, either. I've flown as a captain with first officers who are more experienced than me. I don't simply defer to them because they have more years, more hours, more ratings, etc. I'm the captain. I have the final responsibility. What I do, however, is work as a team, use their experience, consider their input, listen to them, and keep an open mind, because it's what a good captain does. What a good first officer does, too.

A typical departure briefing will include all the basic elements. "We're starting at gate C1, and will be taxiinig to runway 18R via taxiways alpha, echo, and zulu, for a zulu-one departure. We will hold short of 27L and get a clearance, regardless of our taxi clearance. There is a hot spot at the intersection of echo and bravo. For the takeoff, we will consider any malfunctions prior to eighty knots. Between eighty and V1, we will reject for engine fire, failure, loss of directional control, or any malfunction that makes us unable to fly. If we do reject, it will be throttles idle, max braking with speed brakes deployed, and full reverse. Back me up on the speed brakes and notify the tower, and apply forward pressure to the control column. Above V1, we will take it airborne and treat it as an airborne emergency. Above 400' I'll call for autoflight. Left turn at 1,000 to one two zero, clean up at 1800. Notify tower we're flying one two zero and will get back to them. ILS is set for 18R for a quick return, and #2 on 09L if we're on fire. Departure procedure is the Tandy six, flown off the box, initial to ZEBBY, at or below four thousand. Minimum safe altitude is 2600, transition is one eight zero. Any thoughts or questions?"

That last sentence may be the most important of the takeoff briefing. It's asking for input, and is usually open to the rest of the cockpit, as is the briefing. A good captain will not only be soliciting input from the crew, but be listening for it, and using it. That listening doesn't begin or end at that point, either. Other crewmembers are welcome, and EXPECTED to speak up with concerns, observations, etc. They are not expected to assume control of the aircraft or take over as captain. If a crew is so dysfunctional as to be unable to work within the framework of captain and crew, then there are much larger issues and the flight should not depart, and any crewmember viewing or knowing of such a problem needs to speak out and has a responsibility to do so.

I flew with a new captain in a Learjet many years ago. He was a very weak captain. I was considerably more experienced than he was, and was asked to fly in the right seat on his first trip to LAX. As we taxied out of the FBO, we were directed to cross the runway. ON the runway he froze, stopped in place, and didn't go. He was unsure what to do, and wasn't listening. The controller yelled to clear the runway. Understand that LAX is one of the few places that is so busy that pilots don't read back any of their clearance except the transponder code. It's that busy. Now, stopped on a runway, the controller was fit to be tied (upset). He asked if we could depart present position. I replied yes. I told the captain to turn left and ran the takeoff checklist. He was behind the airplane, but he was also, as said before, known for being a weak captain, which is why I was sent with him.

During the takeoff roll, I got a door light, which meant the main cabin door. For the door to open would be extremely dangerous, and grounds to reject the takeoff. From my position in the right seat, I could see the door handle, forward and in place. The handle in place meant that the locking lugs were all in place, and I knew the airplane well enough to know that the light was activated by a small plunger below the handle, and any trim or a bit of carpet below the handle could prevent plunger activation. I could see the door was locked, and knew it was an indication problem. Never the less, I pointed to the light and prior to 80 knots announced "Door light." The captain was focused down the runway, did not acknowledge or show signs of stopping, and I was not about to fight him for control at that point. That would have been creating an emergency. I made the speed calls, he rotated, and we climbed away. I called positive rate, no response, called it again, and raised the gear. Once the airplane was cleaned up, I pointed to the light again and asked if he was aware that we had a door light.

He freaked out.

He tried to roll 90 degrees and pull, and I took the airplane away from him. He began shrieking that we had to return, and tried to make an emergency call. I told him we weren't about to turn back into departing traffic for a light. He asked what we should do. I told him we'd continue the climb past Seal Beach to the enroute structure, and then I'd verify the handle. I was able to reach back and poke the handle with my finger, and the light went out. No possibility of the door ever being an issue.

On another occasion, approaching to land at a Pacific Northwest airport, we were given a clearance to slow to 210 knots and descend and maintain 12,000'. He deployed speed brakes, retarded power to idle, and started down. Our minimum speed was 180 knots clean. As he approached 180 knots, he showed no signs of retracting the speed brakes or increasing power, and he did neither. We continued to slow. We were approaching 12,000 with tall mountains in the area, and he showed no signs of arresting the descent. I called out altitude, and airspeed with no response, several times. He passed through 180 knots as I pried his hand off the speed brake switch and pushed up the power; he reapplied the speed brakes and pulled power to idle. I took the aircraft away from him forcibly; he was nearly catatonic, not responding to anything, apparently locked in on his go-down and slow-down mentality. He very slowly turned to me and said "You don't need to yell." I said I did, that I had the aircraft, and we proceeded to the approach and landed.

Those two times taking control are extreme rarities and something most pilots won't experience once in their career outside of flight instructing. That I experienced it twice is attributable to flying with that particular pilot, who should never have been assigned as captain (I refused to fly with him again). There shouldn't be a case in which crewmembers are taking control from the other, and on the runway during the most critical time, the first officer might announce the reason for the a reject (engine failure, fire, elephant on the runway, asteroid, monkeys), but it's the captain's call.

Tenerife wasn't something to be stopped last second by the First Officer; it was something that should have been done before the takeoff roll began. The mishap has been picked apart every way from sunday and is often discussed on every ground school, every recurrent, every training event for most pilots, for the rest of their natural lives. Speaking up early and a captain who can listen, are crucial in the cockpit environment; the sooner the better. It's the reason we have a "minimum fuel" call. It's the reason Air Florida went off the end, and numerous other cases, from departing on a closed runway to making a turn to the wrong NDB in Colombia. Everyone in the cockpit has a stake in the outcome; everyone arrives at the crash site within a very short time period, and everyone has a responsibility to speak out.

At most operations, the captain has the responsibility to reject the takeoff.



747Whale you're breadth of flying knowledge, thoroughly painted in your postings, is a wonderful thing to soak up. Thanks for the historic insight Sensei

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