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1011Fan
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Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Mon Jan 25, 2021 6:51 pm

Download the PCA Aircraft Accident Report dated 16 January 1982 and follow along to find overlooked information contained in this report.
[url][https://www.aviation-accidents.net/saudi-arabian-lockheed-l1011-hz-ahk-flight-sv163]

Go to chart on Page 9, Figure 3, "Sequence of events during approach to Riyadh and after landing." (Touchdown was 18:36:15 GMT)
- At 18:37 follow the vertical line down and to the left: It reads: "1 & 3 TR Deployed" (This was the initial deployment at touchdown)
- At 18:37 skip over one line and follow the vertical line down and to the left: It reads: "1 & 3 TR Stowed" (This was after landing reverser cancellation)
- At 18:38 follow the vertical line up and to the right: It reads: “1 & 3 TR Deployed” (This was during the turnoff to the taxiway)
- At 18:38 skip over one line and follow the vertical line up and to the right: It reads: “1 & 3 TR Stowed” (This was the final resting stop on the taxiway)

The report identifies that prior to and at touchdown smoke was trailing from the rear of the aircraft. Witnesses throughout the PCA report state smoke was exiting from the bottom rear of the aircraft but stopped when the aircraft touched down.
- Page 6 – “Witnesses observed “SV163 to make a normal landing; however, smoke was coming from the rear of the aircraft.”
- Page 145 – “There were two fire trucks between him and the aircraft but he could see the aircraft clearly and was surprised to see no smoke coming out the bottom of the aircraft. While going down the runway he heard reverse thrust applied but aircraft was too far away to tell when smoke stopped or extent of smoke during the landing roll.”
- Page 45 – “Post-accident inspection of the aircraft revealed the forward outflow valve closed, the aft outflow valve substantially closed, and all cool air overboard valves closed. Such valve positions are unusual after touchdown.”

What can be inferred by this information.
- Both outflow valves closed on landing instead of opening when weight was on the wheels.
- After landing the aircraft taxied the entire length of the runway and when approaching the end of the runway Captain Khowyter needed to deploy both wing reversers to aid in the 180 degree turn onto the taxiway.

More later .....
 
1011Fan
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Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis - Part II

Tue Jan 26, 2021 8:20 pm

Continuation of Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Refer to:
https://www.aviation-accidents.net/saudi-arabian-lockheed-l1011-hz-ahk-flight-sv163

From Page 29 on the PCA Report
“Review of the CVR and DFDR indicates that there were two control system anomalies during the descent and approach to Riyadh. These were a "stuck" engine No. 2 throttle and a slow retraction of No. 4 left spoiler.
"Testing revealed that the slow retraction of No. 4 spoiler was associated with the decay of “B" hydraulic system pressure after the shut down of No. 2 engine." Note: For emphasis I underscored the last sentence.

The No. 4 left spoiler position is monitored by the Surface Position Indicator located in the cockpit and its position signal also records on both the DFDR and QAR. LH4 spoiler’s only source of hydraulic power is from “B” system. The only conclusion one can reach is that during approach “B” hydraulic system pressure was lost. (This will be addressed in a subsequent post.)

Number two engine has two hydraulic pumps, “B” and “C”, each of these pumps has an Air Turbine Motor backup as well as two AC powered pumps. By procedure, with engines running, the two ATM pumps are always in the “Auto” position which causes them to cycle on-and-off during low pressure sensing of their respective “B” or “C” engine driven pump. The emergency procedure for #2 engine shutdown is to place both “B” and “C” ATM’s to ON (this avoids the pressure cycling on-and-off while in AUTO) and on final to turn-on both AC pumps for added system flow. There should never not be loss of hydraulic “B” or “C” pressure with the #2 engine shutdown as the emergency procedure for engine shutdown states that prior to shutdown:
For engine 1 or 3, turn on PTU. For engine 2, place both ATMs to ON and, during the approach, turn on both AC pumps.”

Looking further in the PCA Report on Page 63 (underlined for emphasis):
“When the engine was shut down, the engine-driven B-system hydraulic pumps began to run down which caused the low B-system pressure during the last portion of the approach to the landing. The fire also resulted in the [u]burst of the B-system suction line and the duct over-heat signal that came on late in the flight.”

Why doesn’t the report mention that when “engine-driven B-system hydraulic pumps” (notice the plural of “pump”) that engine-driven “C” would also be affected with engine loss and it too would also run down. There are two pumps on #2 engine so if we are to believe “B” pressure decayed then we must also believe “C” system decayed too. This is absurd as the purpose of the two ATMs is to ensure “B” and “C” hydraulic systems remain pressurized. (Remember that per the report “B” system suction line had burst during flight. This perhaps should have been attributed to loss of B pressure not the engine running down.)

Review of the CVR transcript shows there is no mention that Captain Khowyter used the “Engine Shutdown” checklist as required. Without this checklist being performed it could be concluded that dyslectic F/E Curtis likely did not place the “B” and “C” ATM switches to ON nor subsequently place the “B” and “C” AC pumps to ON during approach per the #2 engine shutdown procedure.

Khowyter was faced with a stuck #2 engine throttle which required engine shutdown on final. When the engine was shutdown he lost two of the four engine hydraulic pumps (B and C) and #2 engine pneumatic system. At this time “B” system hydraulic suction line burst which caused its pressure to decay as indicated by the action of LH4 spoiler as recorded on the DFDR.

With the APU previously placarded inoperative, Khowyter was left with only two sources of bleed air, two generators for power and A, C, and D hydraulic systems.

More later….
 
1011Fan
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Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part III

Thu Jan 28, 2021 2:20 pm

Continuation of Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

The L1011 aft cargo compartment (C-3) generally referred to as bulk cargo compartment is normally loaded with mail, last-minute luggage, and rejected passenger carry-on items amongst other items. The fire certification level of the compartment is Class D. HZ-AHK’s C-3 compartment was configurated for live animal transport and had a dual smoke detection system installed. Warning lights showing the status of the two smoke sensors were located on the F/E Station. The method of fire containment would close the C-3 fresh air valve and C-3 air exhaust valve effectively creating a sealed compartment depleting the area of oxygen and extinguishing the fire.

During climb at about 15,000 feet the “B” alarm detected smoke then at 18,000 the “A” smoke alarm detected smoke. The Saudia Flight Manual EMERGENCY Procedure for a System “A” and “B” alarm is unambiguous and recommends a return to Riyadh airport. The procedure listed below does not require periodic cargo smoke detection system tests or multiple cabin visits to check for flames or smoke.

AFT CARGO SMOKE
1. AFT CARGO HEAT SWITCH, OUT …………. OUT
Unlatching the Aft Cargo Heat switch deenergized the cargo compartment recirculating fan, removing a possible source of electrical smoke.
2. CONSIDER LANDING AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE AIRPORT

A discussion ensured between crew members regarding the proper course to take for an aft cargo smoke warning. A search of the ABNORMAL Procedures was undertaken and one not found. The Aft Cargo Smoke Procedure is properly located in the EMERGENCY procedure in the Flight Manual. While not discussed by the crew there is also an EMERGENCY Procedure for cabin smoke removal. This procedure requires the pressurization Cabin Altitude Selector to be set to 10,000 feet, all Cabin Exhaust Valves to OPEN and to position the Cabin Pressure Rate Selector so both outflow valves move toward open. The Smoke Removal procedure ensures the highest possible air outflow rate under automatic pressurization control. (Note: The Forward Outflow Valve was found in the closed position. Speculation was Curtis closed this valve manually from the Pressurization System Control Panel.)

The L1011 cockpit, with entry door closed, is designed to maintain a positive pressure with the passenger cabin. This positive pressure provides that no cabin air will contaminate the cockpit. The cockpit door remained open throughout the approach and touchdown negating this safety feature. The crew also had available individual smoke goggles and a crew oxygen system separate from the passengers. None of the flight crew donned the goggles or used their oxygen system. All three flight crew members were found in their seats. Curtis was the only flight crew member autopsied; his trachea had soot present with his blood CO level 48%. At this level of CO Curtis was have been incapable of exertion, confused bordering on unconsciousness.

Failure to take appropriate emergency action for a C-3 compartment smoke alarm will have tragic consequences.

More later .....
 
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SAAFNAV
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part III

Thu Jan 28, 2021 4:53 pm

Ok, I'll bite.

What is your angle here? As you've probably noticed, there is not a great polemic going on.
I'm sure most people here that would be interested in the accident have already read the report - the one you are reciting now.

If you start people telling what you busy uncovering etc, you might have more interest.
ex L-382G Loadmaster, ex C-130B Navigator, Möchtegern Flugzeugführer
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part III

Thu Jan 28, 2021 6:06 pm

You'll just have to wait
 
Leej
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part III

Fri Jan 29, 2021 12:31 pm

Okay, I'll bite too. A theory for MAS370?
 
1011Fan
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Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part IV

Fri Jan 29, 2021 2:26 pm

F/E Bradley Curtis was widely reported as dyslectic. An instructor flight engineer observing Curtis during simulator training confirmed he had difficulty with scanning, sequencing and tardiness.

On touchdown the forward and aft outflow valves should automatically fully open to equalize cabin pressure to the Riyadh 2082’ field elevation. Both valves were found closed. Eyewitnesses saw smoke trailing from the aircraft while in flight but stopping when the aircraft touched down. One witness stationed directly across from the landing zone reported observing smoke trailing from the “little window” under the rear of the aircraft and as the aircraft touched down the smoke from this “window” stopped. Other exhaust valves which would normally open on touchdown the Forward Electrical Service Center, Mid Electrical Service Center, and Galley Venting/Exhaust valves were also found closed.

From Page 20 of the PCA Report
The controllable exhaust and outflow valves and their positions were found as:
Forward electrical service center - Closed
Mid electrical service center - Closed
Galley venting - Closed
C-3 cargo venting - Closed
Forward out-flow valve - Closed
Aft outflow valve - Slightly Open

The cabin pressure control panel was recovered. Some of the Indicator positions were found as follows:
Altitude Set: 26,000 flt / 2000 ft. cabin alt.
Baro Set: 29.9 in Hg / 1012 mb
Mode Set: Standby
Manual Select: Manual

The L-1011 pressurization system has three operational modes: NORMAL, STANDBY, and MANUAL. MANUAL permits the flight engineer to use toggle switches, one for each valve, to manually position each outflow valve to open to close and any position in-between. The STANDBY system is similar to NORMAL except it bypasses the aircraft ground sense relays so both outflow valves would not automatically go full open on touchdown. Only when operated in the NORMAL mode will both valves automatically go full open on touchdown.

From Page 109 of the PCA Report – CVR Transcript
CAM-2 Six point eight the QNH
CAM-2 One Zero Zero Six Decimal Eight
CAM-1 Okay Zero Six Decimal Eight

At 18:26 First Officer Hassani reports QNH. HZ-AHK at 1300’ AGL RUH; ten minutes to touchdown. Flight Engineer Curtis does not respond to CAM-2 by adjusting the Baro Correction Knob to the new setting which indicates the pressurization system in STANDBY mode.

The fate of the passengers and crew aboard SV 163 is now SEALED!


More later .....
 
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hOMSaR
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Fri Jan 29, 2021 3:35 pm

Posts have been merged into one thread. Please do not create a separate thread for each post on the same topic.
I was raised by a cup of coffee.
 
Max Q
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part IV

Fri Jan 29, 2021 5:09 pm

1011Fan wrote:
F/E Bradley Curtis was widely reported as dyslectic. An instructor flight engineer observing Curtis during simulator training confirmed he had difficulty with scanning, sequencing and tardiness.

On touchdown the forward and aft outflow valves should automatically fully open to equalize cabin pressure to the Riyadh 2082’ field elevation. Both valves were found closed. Eyewitnesses saw smoke trailing from the aircraft while in flight but stopping when the aircraft touched down. One witness stationed directly across from the landing zone reported observing smoke trailing from the “little window” under the rear of the aircraft and as the aircraft touched down the smoke from this “window” stopped. Other exhaust valves which would normally open on touchdown the Forward Electrical Service Center, Mid Electrical Service Center, and Galley Venting/Exhaust valves were also found closed.

From Page 20 of the PCA Report
The controllable exhaust and outflow valves and their positions were found as:
Forward electrical service center - Closed
Mid electrical service center - Closed
Galley venting - Closed
C-3 cargo venting - Closed
Forward out-flow valve - Closed
Aft outflow valve - Slightly Open

The cabin pressure control panel was recovered. Some of the Indicator positions were found as follows:
Altitude Set: 26,000 flt / 2000 ft. cabin alt.
Baro Set: 29.9 in Hg / 1012 mb
Mode Set: Standby
Manual Select: Manual

The L-1011 pressurization system has three operational modes: NORMAL, STANDBY, and MANUAL. MANUAL permits the flight engineer to use toggle switches, one for each valve, to manually position each outflow valve to open to close and any position in-between. The STANDBY system is similar to NORMAL except it bypasses the aircraft ground sense relays so both outflow valves would not automatically go full open on touchdown. Only when operated in the NORMAL mode will both valves automatically go full open on touchdown.

From Page 109 of the PCA Report – CVR Transcript
CAM-2 Six point eight the QNH
CAM-2 One Zero Zero Six Decimal Eight
CAM-1 Okay Zero Six Decimal Eight

At 18:26 First Officer Hassani reports QNH. HZ-AHK at 1300’ AGL RUH; ten minutes to touchdown. Flight Engineer Curtis does not respond to CAM-2 by adjusting the Baro Correction Knob to the new setting which indicates the pressurization system in STANDBY mode.

The fate of the passengers and crew aboard SV 163 is now SEALED!


More later .....



Little ironic to be off on your spelling, it’s ‘Dyslexic’ ...
The best contribution to safety is a competent Pilot.


GGg
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Fri Jan 29, 2021 5:55 pm

Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part V

Checklists and Procedures

From Page 105 of the PCA Report – CVR Transcript (Time: 22:50)
CAM-3 Did we declare emergency?
CAM-1 Negative

Negative! What greater emergency can exist on an aircraft than a cabin fire. By not declaring an emergency Captain Khowyter and crew fail to review the applicable Emergency Procedures. Parts of which have Checklists that would correct the problem of the pressurization system being in STANDBY and the tragedy about to unfold.

SMOKE REMOVAL---------------------------- 3.10.09
1 HIGH PRESSURE & ENG ISLN
VALVES. OPEN.........................................................OPEN
2 PACKS, ON.....................................................................ON
3 COOL AIR OVBD VALVE. OPEN.
LIGHT OUT.......................................................LIGHT OUT
4 CABIN ALTITUDE SELECTOR. 10,000’............... 10,000’
5 CABIN PRESSURE RATE SELECTOR,
MAXIMUM...........................................................MAXIMUM
6 ALL COCKPIT FRESH AIR VALVES. OPEN.........OPEN

SMOKE REMOVAL (Amplified)
This procedure is based on the assumption that the source of smoke has been identified, and isolated or corrected. If smoke source was the bleed air or air conditioning system, do not reopen crossbleed, isolation or pack valves which remained closed as a result of completing the Air Conditioning Smoke check list.
1 HIGH PRESSURE & ENG ISLN
VALVES, OPEN...........................................OPEN
2 PACKS, ON........................................................ON
These steps ensure maximum airflow to the cabin to help exhaust the smoke.
3 COOL AIR OVBD VALVE, OPEN,
LIGHT OUT..........................................LIGHT OUT
Ensure switch is latched and CLOSE light is out.
4 CABIN ALTITUDE SELECTOR,
10,000'........................................................ 10,000'
Verify that both outflow valves move toward open.
5 CABIN PRESSURE RATE SELECTOR,
MAXIMUM............................................MAXIMUM
These two steps initiate a cabin altitude increase at the maximum rate to provide the highest possible air outflow rate, under automatic control.
6 ALL COCKPIT FRESH AIR VALVES, OPEN..................................................... OPEN
Push in flight station air supply knob located under the engineer’s desk to increase air flow to the cockpit. Open fresh air outlets. This will achieve maximum cockpit ventilation rate.

More later .....
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Fri Jan 29, 2021 6:47 pm

Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis – Part VI

Procedures and Checklists (Continued)

Captain Khowyter and crew had another opportunely to correct the pressurization panel anomaly. The Emergency Landing Procedure.

EMERGENCY LANDING --------------------- 3.10.15
NOTIFY ATC, COMPANY, FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, & PASSENGERS.
BEFORE LANDING
1. SHOULDER & SEAT BELTS, FASTEN.................FASTEN
2. AS APPROPRIATE, FUEL JETTISON...............JETTISON
3. DEPRESSURIZE & PACK VALVES, CLOSE.......... CLOSE
4. OUTFLOW VALVES MANUALLY, OPEN................. OPEN
5. LANDING GEAR, DOWN.................................... DOWN
6. FLAPS 33°.......................................................... 33°
7. LDG FINAL CHECK LIST, COMPLETE...........COMPLETE
8. EMERGENCY LIGHTS, ON....................................ON


EMERGENCY LANDING (Amplified)
NOTIFY ATC, COMPANY, FLIGHT ATTENDANTS, PASSENGERS.
BEFORE LANDING
Before landing, time permitting, dump fuel which will allow a slower approach speed. Remove all loose items (flight kits, clipboards, etc.) from the cockpit and store in the lavatories.
Do not open exits prior to the aircraft coming to a full stop. An exit that is opened can let fire enter the cabin immediately and drastically reduce the time available for evacuation.
The PA system or megaphones may be used as necessary to direct passenger movement.
1 SHOULDER & SEAT BELTS, FASTEN ........................................ FASTEN
Adherence to shoulder and seat belt policy will provide restraint and protection from injury.
Check that the engineer’s chair is facing forward to ensure maximum crash-load structural strength.
2 AS APPROPRIATE, FUEL JETTISON.
Before landing, if time permitting, jettison fuel which will allow a slower approach speed.
3 DEPRESSURIZE & PACK VALVES, CLOSE ...................................CLOSE
Set cabin altitude to 2000 feet above field elevation.
When pressure differential zero, pack valves close.
4 OUTFLOW VALVES MANUALLY,
OPEN..........................................................OPEN
Outflow valves manual selector switches pushed to MNL position and outflow valve manual switches to OPEN.
5 LANDING GEAR, DOWN........................DOWN
This condition provides maximum fuselage and fuel tank protection.
6 FLAPS 33°............... 33°
Extend flaps fully to provide the slowest possible approach speed and allow part of the initial impart to be absorbed.
7 LDG FINAL CHECK LIST, COMPLETE.............................................. COMPLETE.
8 EMERGENCY LIGHTS, ON............................ON
The emergency lights should be turned on just before touchdown as battery life is limited to approximately 15 minutes.

More later .....
 
BoeingGuy
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Fri Jan 29, 2021 8:30 pm

I’m familiar with the accident. Maybe I’m missing something, but what kind of response are you looking for?

Are you just posting the accident report for the heck of it, or is there some kind of discussion you are interested in having?
 
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fr8mech
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Fri Jan 29, 2021 8:33 pm

You know why I watch Netflix or why I watch a series on other services after the season has ended, rather than watching on broadcast TV?

Because I like to watch The whole season drop at once, not piece-meal.

Please get to the point, or don’t. It doesn’t matter anymore. You’ve lost my interest...like a bad pilot in TV.
When seconds count, the police are minutes away, or may not come at all.
It’s hard to win an argument with a smart person, but it’s damn near impossible to win an argument with a stupid person. ~B. Murray
Ego Bibere Capulus, Ut Aliis Sit Vivere
 
FGITD
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Fri Jan 29, 2021 9:29 pm

fr8mech wrote:
You know why I watch Netflix or why I watch a series on other services after the season has ended, rather than watching on broadcast TV?

Because I like to watch The whole season drop at once, not piece-meal.

Please get to the point, or don’t. It doesn’t matter anymore. You’ve lost my interest...like a bad pilot in TV.


This is more like having the full season come out on netflix, then months later broadcasting it week by week.

I was interested, so I went and reread the official report. All done in one swoop.
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Fri Jan 29, 2021 10:23 pm

I’m sorry you are disappointed. Accident investigation isn’t about binge watching so you’ll know the answer before nightfall. Its hard work. Forty years ago we used a home stereo to transcribe the CVR while we waited a week for the hand carried one to return from the NTSB in Washington. And if I do say so myself when we got the enhanced tape we had done a damn good job of it using Captain Berinji’s stereo. Perhaps we should have waited for Microsoft to create Windows 3.1 but we didn’t and meticulously hand drew the thousands of QAR points on huge wall charts. And then of course the visits to the wreckage. Maybe we should have waited till nightfall when it was cooler but then visibility wasn't that great and the flood lights blinded you. Do you have any idea what the daytime temps are in the open desert where the blowing wind makes it hotter not cooler. Maybe, delay it till winter would be your solution. There was no one complaining back then and believe they was a lot to criticize.
 
FGITD
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sat Jan 30, 2021 6:39 pm

No one's complaining about the methodology and how accident investigation has progressed over the years.

People aren't interested because you're recounting a decades old investigation, very slowly piece by piece, while offering up absolutely nothing for the sake of discussion.

It sounds as if you'd have some extremely interesting personal stories regarding this accident. Share those, if you please. But typing out the CVR as if it's new information won't get much
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sat Jan 30, 2021 10:24 pm

I appreciate the A.net members and the wealth of knowledge contained here. I wasn’t trying to be critical or condescending. But stay tuned as the mystery of what happened on SV 163 after landing will take this whole board to figure out.

But if you want a story …. I’ll give you one.
I spoke to the Saudi Maintenance Manager who opened the R2 Door the morning of the accident. He stated that at opening he couldn’t see far into the cabin as it was filled with white smoke. As he and the fireman with him were readying to enter he heard what sounded like a machine gun firing from back of aircraft coming toward him so he and the fireman ran like hell from the aircraft. As they were running the cabin burst into flames. The aircraft at that time was under Royal Saudi Air Force control and sometime in the afternoon after body removal it was released so members of the accident team could enter the cabin. Nearing the rear of the aircraft I noticed burst CO2 cartridges shrewn about the cabin. It was obvious then what the maintenance manager heard coming toward him were these exploding cartridges from the life vests. And to think I didn't believe him - a lesson learned.

Please stay tuned. It hasn’t been a week. So have patience and it will be rewarded

I have some data that I would like to share so if someone has an external account that would be available to all A.net members I could post the charts, graphs, and photographs there.
 
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Starlionblue
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 12:28 am

If you need to post files you can use DropBox. If you need to post pictures you can use Imgur.
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 1:04 am

Continuation of Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

I know you guys don’t like it but please have patience. There is a reason for including the engine shutdown procedure and the other prior Emergency Procedures. It will be clear when I detail what happened when the aircraft touches down. It is all linked to the pressurization system closing the aft outflow valve. It will be my next post.

The APU was placarded prior to departure and was not available for ground or flight operation. When the #2 throttle stuck Khowyter decided to shutdown the engine on final.

(Note: There was a change to the Emergency Engine Failure Procedure in 1983. The change added the requirement to pull CB 1H6 “HI FLOW CONT”.)

ENGINE FAILURE/TURBINE
AIR OVERHEAT/AVM
------------------------ 3.10.01
1. THROTTLE, CLOSE..............................................CLOSE
2. FUEL & IGN SWITCH, OFF......................................OFF
3. FUEL PANEL, CK...................................................... CK
4. HYDRAULIC POWER, CK...........................................CK
5. ELECTRICAL POWER, CK...........................................CK

ENGINE FAILURE/TURBINE
AIR OVERHEAT/AVM

1 THROTTLE, CLOSE.........................CLOSE
Smoothly closing the throttle will reduce engine temperature (and may alleviate the overheat condition) and will facilitate maintaining directional control of the aircraft by preventing an abrupt power loss. This also helps to ensure that the correct engine is eventually shut down by making the first step an easily reversible one.

2 FUEL & IGN SWITCH, OFF.........................OFF
Place fuel and ignition switch to OFF and observe fuel flow and TGT for indications of shutdown.
If fuel flow does not decrease, pull fire pull handle.

3 FUEL PANEL, CK............................................CK
For engine 1 or 3, close the respective tank valve. For engine 2, close its tank valve if the APU is not to be used.
Turn off the fuel tank pumps in any tank from which fuel is not being used. Monitor fuel distribution.

4 HYDRAULIC POWER, CK.............................CK
Check that the related hydraulic quantity is normal and then restore the system.

5 For engine 1 or 3, turn on PTU. For engine 2, place both ATMs to ON and, during the approach, turn on both AC pumps.

6 ELECTRICAL POWER, CK...............................CK
Check that all busses are powered and the generator breaker for the inoperative generator is open.
Check that active generators are operating within a total load of:
81 KW 10,000' & below.
120 KW above 10,000'.
If engine 1, set ESS PWR selector to
B3 (G2) position. (If single generator operation, select a manual position.)
If engine 2, pull CB 1H6 “HI FLOW CONT’’. This will prevent a possible Hi flow lock out of the bleed air system, due to both ATMs operating.
Refer to:
GENERATOR INOPERATIVE Abnormal Procedures.
LOSS OF ONE BLEED SOURCE Additional Procedures, Chapter 5.
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 1:24 am

I am posting my first photograph.
https://imgur.com/zPRrOgY
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 3:18 am

I reconstructed this chart last summer from an original chart I had that was faded and starting to become illegible. It graphs the failure of LH4 spoiler.
You'll notice that #3 engine reverser operates far longer than usual. I will share my theory when we start reviewing the QAR data.
https://imgur.com/lsSQbdj
Last edited by 1011Fan on Sun Jan 31, 2021 3:23 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
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golfradio
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 3:20 am

1011Fan wrote:
I am posting my first photograph.
https://imgur.com/zPRrOgY


You can post images inline

Image
CSeries forever. Bring back the old site.
 
VSMUT
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 6:02 am

1011Fan wrote:
I am posting my first photograph.
https://imgur.com/zPRrOgY


Image

Right click on the image, select "view-image", then copy the URL to this page and put this in front of the URL: [img]

And this behind the URL:[/img]
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 5:55 pm

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LyleLanley
Posts: 375
Joined: Wed Dec 18, 2019 9:33 pm

Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 7:29 pm

So was it the butler? Or the one-armed man?
"I've sold monorails to Brockway, Ogdenville, and North Haverbrook, and, by gum, it put them on the map!"
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 9:59 pm

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1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 10:11 pm

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1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 10:50 pm

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1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 10:52 pm

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1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Sun Jan 31, 2021 11:02 pm

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1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Mon Feb 01, 2021 3:43 am

More reading!

PACK FLOW CONTROL SWITCH

PREVENTING FALSE PACK NO. 2 HIGH FLOW LOCKOUTS
Whenever the No. 2 engine is shut down, the subsequent demand for high air flow by the B and C ATMs can cause flow distortion that may trip the pack No. 2 excess flow sensor. This would automatically close the ATM isolation valve, both crossbleed valves, and the No. 2 pack flow control valve, shutting off air to the ATMs. To prevent this from happening, whenever there is an inflight shutdown of the No. 2 engine, the HI FLOW CONT circuit breaker (1H6) should be pulled after the inflight shutdown checklist is completed. With CB 1H6 pulled, AREA OVHT lights will provide the only indication of a duct rupture. (From SV Flight Operations Training Bulletin 82-03, 20 Feb 83)

Note: Two-Pack Operation
Normally, pack No. 1 is shut down when two-pack operation is desired because hot bleed air is not available for zone trim through the No. 1 pack flow control. During two-pack
operation, increased cooling requirements will cause the louvers and bypass valves to move toward COOLER.

Controls pack flow control valve to schedule a constant mass airflow. Valve is energized closed and pressure opened. Thus, loss of electrical power causes the valve to open if pneumatic pressure is available.

IN Illuminated flowbar indicates flow control valve is open. If OVHT is illuminated, valve locks closed, flowbar is extinguished, and associated hot air valve and hot air manifold isolation valve close. Valve is also closed by excessive flow. OVHT indicates an overheat condition in either air conditioning pack compressor discharge or ACM outlet. Also, pack flow control valve closes if engine bleed air manifold pressure is low. No. 2 pack flow control valve closes automatically if ATM C2 is operating and manifold pressure is less than required.

OUT Valve is energized closed, and flowbar is extinguished. Any time the pack flow control valve is unlatched, the hot air valve and hot air manifold isolation valve for that pack are closed and locked out. When the pack flow control valve switch is again latched in, the hot air switch and hot air manifold isolation Switch must be cycled off and on again to open valves.

Excessive Flow Sensor switches are located just upstream of each pack flow control valve. The switches sense excessive flow caused by duct leakage downstream from the valves. If the leak occurs in the No. 1 system, the sensor switch detects excessive flow and closes the No. 1 engine isolation valve, the left cross-bleed valve, and the No. 1 pack flow control valve. If excessive flow is detected in the No. 2 system, the sensor switch closes both crossbleed valves, the aft fuselage isolation valve, and the No. 2 pack flow control valve. If excessive flow is detected in the No. 3 system, the sensor switch closes the No. 3 engine isolation valve, the right crossbleed valve, and the No. 3 pack flow control valve. After a sensor switch is tripped, all of the affected valve switches must be turned off, to release holding relays and then turned back on to open the valves.

Automatic Overrides - If excessive flow is sensed upstream of the pack flow control valve in distribution manifold section D or E, the relevant crossbleed valve, engine isolation valve and pack flow control valve will automatically close. If H is the affected section, the fuselage isolation valve, both crossbleed valves, and pack 2 flow control valve automatically close. The switches of the affected valves are locked until all are latched out simultaneously.

Controls pack flow control valve to schedule a constant mass airflow. Valve is energized closed and pressure opened. Thus, loss of electrical power causes the valve to open if pneumatic pressure is available. IN Illuminated flowbar indicates flow control valve is open. If OVHT is illuminated, valve locks closed, flowbar is extinguished, and associated hot air valve and hot air manifold isolation valve close. Valve is also closed by excessive flow. OVHT indicates an overheat condition in either air conditioning pack compressor discharge or ACM outlet. Also, pack flow control valve closes if engine bleed air manifold pressure is low. No. 2 pack flow control valve closes automatically if ATM C2 is operating and manifold pressure is less than required.

EXCESSIVE FLOW SENSOR SWITCHES
Excessive Flow Sensor switches are located just upstream of each pack flow control valve. The switches sense excessive flow caused by duct leakage downstream from the valves. If the leak occurs in the No. 1 system, the sensor switch detects excessive flow and closes the No. 1 engine isolation valve, the left cross-bleed valve, and the No. 1 pack flow control valve. If excessive flow is detected in the No. 2 system, the sensor switch closes both crossbleed valves, the aft fuselage isolation valve, and the No. 2 pack flow control valve. If excessive flow is detected in the No. 3 system, the sensor switch closes the No. 3 engine isolation valve, the right crossbleed valve, and the No. 3 pack flow control valve. After a sensor switch is tripped, all of the affected valve switches must be turned off, to release holding relays and then turned back on to open the valves.

HIGH FLOW TRIP
The sections of pneumatic dueling (three short sections which are 6 to 18 inches in length) that run between the aft pressure bulkhead of the mid electrical service center and the pack flow control valves are monitored by excessive airflow sensors, in addition to the area overheat detection and warning system. The excessive airflow sensors detect airflow rates which can only be caused by a pneumatic duct rupture. An unrestricted bleed air leak in this area could compromise aircraft safety (e.g., overheating the battery and rendering the standby electrical power source inoperative) if the appropriate pneumatic valves are not closed within five minutes. When excessive airflow sensors are activated, the system-associated valves will close and lock automatically, as follows:

No. 1 System No. 2 System No. 3 System
No. 1 engine isolation valve
Left crossbleed valve No. 1 pack valve
No. 2 fuselage isolation valve
Left crossbleed valve
Right crossbleed valve No. 2 pack valve (the No. 2 hot air and hot air isolation valves will close also).
No. 3 engine isolation valve
Right crossbleed valve No. 3 pack valve (the No. 3 hot air and hot air isolation valves will close also).

The valve lockout circuits will prevent the valves from reopening until all affected valve switches are unlatched at the same time. A leak downstream of the pack flow control valve cannot cause a high enough airflow rate to operate this protection system because of the flow controlling effect of the valve's venturi.
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Mon Feb 01, 2021 5:40 pm

Continuation of Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Time interval 18:22 to 18:30 SUPPOSITION:

18:22 CABIN @ 5700’ (3700’ AGL-RUH)
F/E PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM IN “NORM”
F/E DIALS IN RUH FIELD ELEVATION FOR LANDING
F/E SELECTS 600 ON NORMAL RATE KNOB
AFT OFV GOES CLOSED, FWD OFV AT PIP

18:23 CABIN @ 5100’ (3100’ AGL-RUH)

18:24 CABIN @ 4500’ (2500’ AGL-RUH)

18:25 CABIN @ 3900’ (1900’ AGL-RUH)
F/E FWD OFV VALVE TO MAN (ECS LIGHT ON CAWP, CAPTAIN QUESTIONS PRESSURIZATION)
F/E FWD OFV CLOSED (FOR SMOKE CONTAINMENT), AFT OFV AT PIP

18:26 CABIN @ 3300’ (1300’ AGL-RUH)
F/E SELECTS STDBY, STDBY RATE KNOB TO DECREASE 600’ /MIN
F/O GIVES QNH. F/E DOES NOT RESOND BY ADJUSTING BARO CORRECTION KNOB TO NEW SETTING, INDICATING IN STDBY MODE

18:27 CABIN @ 2700’ (700’ AGL-RUH)
F/E ADJUSTS RATE KNOB TO SLOW CABIN RATE OF DESCENT TO 300’ /MIN

18:28 CABIN @ 2400’ (400’ AGL-RUH)

18:29 CABIN @ 2100’ (100’ AGL-RUH)
F/E ADJUSTS RATE KNOB FROM 300’ TO HOLD POSITION TO MAINTAIN RUH FIELD ELEVATION

18:30 CABIN @ 2080’ (0’ AGL-RUH)
F/E MOVES SEAT FORWARD IN PREPARATION FOR LANDING
ON LANDING ENGINES TO REVERSE, AFT OFV GOES TOWARD CLOSE TO MAINTAIN CABIN PRESSURE
OUT OF REVERSE, ENGINES @ GROUND IDLE, BOTH ATM’S ON (ENGINE #2 SHUTDOWN ON APPROACH)

WITH THESE CONDITIONS #2 PACK WILL CLOSE. ONLY #3 PACK OPERATION AFT OFV GOES NEARLY FULL CLOSED.
 
1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Mon Feb 01, 2021 8:17 pm

DFDR Analysis Circa 1980
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1011Fan
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Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Mon Feb 01, 2021 9:53 pm

I created this chart using QAR data of the ground movement of the aircraft. I think the chart is explanatory so I won't waste time unless there are questions. I used a value of 8 and 18 for when the T/R's are in reverse. All the other values are from the recorder. I have other parameters but didn't include them for now to keep the chart reasonable. The obvious abnormality is his use of #3 reverser. I do have the engine speeds and will provide later but they are similar between engines. Someone needs to figure out why he would do this. I believe he had a problem with airflow and needed the engines at higher power so he used this method to keep the rate of forward motion in his control.
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A320FlyGuy
Posts: 295
Joined: Wed May 16, 2012 8:31 pm

Re: Saudia Flight 163 HZ-AHK Accident Analysis

Tue Feb 02, 2021 3:37 am

Considering that this crew was found to be incredibly incompetent in handling this accident, combined with the in-depth accident investigation at the time, what’s your point in dragging all this up? I can’t believe that you know more than the NTSB and Lockheed and you are really annoying everyone in this forum.
My other car is an A320-200

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