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Starlionblue
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 5:42 am

FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:

Oh...I wonder why did KLM not get their demonic pilot Vanzanten trained with Low Visibility Ops...The only words I will forever remember him by now are that of Cap Grubbs which were recorded moments before the collision.

But honestly,I believe even had the KLM gotten that man equipped with required training it wouldn't have prevented what happened,for it was more of his vile egoistic self that murdered so many innocent people.


Before judging any aircraft incident or accident, it is important to remember that no pilot goes to work intending to make a serious mistake. We go to work intending to have a normal day, as did Captain Van Zanten on that day. He was neither vile nor egotistic. He made an error, yes, but only a very unusual combination of circumstances made this error have horrific consequences.

He is held up as a poster child for bad CRM, but we have to judge his actions in the context of both the era and the situation. And as with almost all accidents, there is not one single causal factor. The holes in the Swiss cheese all have to line up. The absence of any one of a number of factors would have prevented the Teneriffe disaster.

This was back in the day when captains were still Sky Gods and there was a much sharper authority gradient in the cockpit. At the time, there was little CRM training in the way we think of it today. At the time, comms were not standardised like today. Low visibility training was not the same either.

The crew was under pressure as their duty time was about to expire. It took the combination of lack of CRM, time pressure, an unusually congested airport due to the destination being closed, low viz, and non-standardised communications, to create the situation. While Captain van Zanten was in error, he didn't make the error because of his lack of skills. Many documentaries tend to focus on his particular action and words as the focal point and the one "big thing" that caused the accident. In reality, his error would have been inconsequential if not for that combination of factors.

We have learned from many accidents, notably Teneriffe, NW255, and BEA548, that even highly skilled people make mistakes under stress that they would probably not make otherwise. The major change since then has been changing procedures, comms and operations to mitigate, catch and correct errors. Instead of assuming that humans can be trained to perform actions without error, there are various mechanisms in place to ensure errors don't have serious consequences. For example, checklists have been reformatted, CRM training has emphasized that FOs should speak up, accurate ATC readbacks are required, and so on.


I completely understand that pilots are humans and at the end of the day they have working hour limitations and various other pressures with relation to their jobs, however,the most critical part of their job is that it involves people's Iives and I'm sure no pilot would ever wanna be in a scenario where they become the cause for the loss of it.I know that there may be difficulty in understanding the ATC or their way of speaking to them,the detriorating visibility etc, however, for some obvious reasons I can't ignore that man's decision to takeoff when obviously there was uncertainty around it given the erratic significant visibility drop..So I believe it was HIS decision,fuled by arrogance,was the final nail in the coffin so many innocent people.

But its because of such disasters that flying is so much safer now.



My point is that situations tend to be more complex than "his fault", and this one definitely was rather complex.

My thinking was there was quite a bit of "go fever", as they were running out of duty time. It is very important to keep in mind that before they got to the crucial decision, there were many other decisions and factors at play. There was stress and ambiguity involved. They'd diverted, were running out of duty time, at an unfamiliar airport, with very poor visibility and controllers who perhaps were unaccustomed to handling the level of traffic.

In the narrative that has developed, everyone focuses on Van Zanten's actions. While his actions were indeed causal and wrong, was an unclear ATC without blame? What about the KLM FO and FE? Should they not have more forcefully questioned the captain? For that matter, Pan Am taxied past the (probably very hard to see) assigned exit and the pilots were unsure of position. Should they not have more forcefully stated they were unsure of position and still on the runway? These questions sound simple, but there are complex truths about human nature in there, most especially the tendency for confirmation bias.

We like to see the crucial moments transcribed below as the one series of events that led to the accident, but that isn't the way it works at all. If any of the factors I listed in the above paragraphs had changed even a little, the accident would likely never have happened. And Van Zanten would have lived to a ripe old age, with no one thinking of him as more than an accomplished training captain.

Transcript:
1706:32.43 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af dan? {Is he not clear then?}
1706:34.1 KLM-1 Wat zeg je? {What do you say?}
1706:34.15 KLM-? Yup.
1706:34.7 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? {Is he not clear that Pan American?}
1706:35.7 KLM-1 Jawel. {Oh yes. - emphatic}


(Full transcript here: https://www.tailstrike.com/270377.htm)

The FE (KLM-3) asks if Pan Am is clear, but his wording is not nearly forceful enough to convey any real doubt.
The CN (KLM-1) didn't hear him clearly. This may be an indication of stress.
Most likely the FO (KLM-?) just says "yup", which is a rather ambiguous statement in this context, and may indicate tacit agreement that Pan Am is clear. But (speculation) perhaps not really convinced. He wants to "go" too, most likely.
The FE then repeats his question in a more pointed manner.
The CN then says "Oh yes!", which to me indicates confirmation bias.

No one in the cockpit has any really evidence that Pan Am is clear.

Speculation: The Captain has constructed a mental picture that is inaccurate. Unfortunately, due to the lack of more information, this picture becomes the real one in his mind. He is stressed, and this leads to tunnel vision. Once he is questioned, he goes into "I must act like a commander" mode, sealing the confirmation bias.

Speculation: Nowadays, if the other two crewmembers had had serious doubts, they would have been less likely to use such guarded language. And the captain would not see queries as casting doubts on his decisions.

I'm not saying Captain Van Zanten was not at fault. He definitely was. I'm saying that we cannot entirely lay the blame on him, as there was a series of unusual circumstances at play, combined with training that did not emphasize CRM like today.

I wager if I said something like "Is he not clear, then?" even in decent visibility, most captains I fly with would stop what they're doing and tell me to ask ATC. Even down to the SO (cruise pilot) level, we are encouraged to speak up if we see something. Better to question if unsure. Always. But Teneriffe happened almost fifty years ago. It was a very different aviation world.

Again, people do weird stuff under stress. Ask any airline pilot who has done a proficiency check. ;)
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
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Posts: 516
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 6:45 am

Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:

Before judging any aircraft incident or accident, it is important to remember that no pilot goes to work intending to make a serious mistake. We go to work intending to have a normal day, as did Captain Van Zanten on that day. He was neither vile nor egotistic. He made an error, yes, but only a very unusual combination of circumstances made this error have horrific consequences.

He is held up as a poster child for bad CRM, but we have to judge his actions in the context of both the era and the situation. And as with almost all accidents, there is not one single causal factor. The holes in the Swiss cheese all have to line up. The absence of any one of a number of factors would have prevented the Teneriffe disaster.

This was back in the day when captains were still Sky Gods and there was a much sharper authority gradient in the cockpit. At the time, there was little CRM training in the way we think of it today. At the time, comms were not standardised like today. Low visibility training was not the same either.

The crew was under pressure as their duty time was about to expire. It took the combination of lack of CRM, time pressure, an unusually congested airport due to the destination being closed, low viz, and non-standardised communications, to create the situation. While Captain van Zanten was in error, he didn't make the error because of his lack of skills. Many documentaries tend to focus on his particular action and words as the focal point and the one "big thing" that caused the accident. In reality, his error would have been inconsequential if not for that combination of factors.

We have learned from many accidents, notably Teneriffe, NW255, and BEA548, that even highly skilled people make mistakes under stress that they would probably not make otherwise. The major change since then has been changing procedures, comms and operations to mitigate, catch and correct errors. Instead of assuming that humans can be trained to perform actions without error, there are various mechanisms in place to ensure errors don't have serious consequences. For example, checklists have been reformatted, CRM training has emphasized that FOs should speak up, accurate ATC readbacks are required, and so on.


I completely understand that pilots are humans and at the end of the day they have working hour limitations and various other pressures with relation to their jobs, however,the most critical part of their job is that it involves people's Iives and I'm sure no pilot would ever wanna be in a scenario where they become the cause for the loss of it.I know that there may be difficulty in understanding the ATC or their way of speaking to them,the detriorating visibility etc, however, for some obvious reasons I can't ignore that man's decision to takeoff when obviously there was uncertainty around it given the erratic significant visibility drop..So I believe it was HIS decision,fuled by arrogance,was the final nail in the coffin so many innocent people.

But its because of such disasters that flying is so much safer now.



My point is that situations tend to be more complex than "his fault", and this one definitely was rather complex.

My thinking was there was quite a bit of "go fever", as they were running out of duty time. It is very important to keep in mind that before they got to the crucial decision, there were many other decisions and factors at play. There was stress and ambiguity involved. They'd diverted, were running out of duty time, at an unfamiliar airport, with very poor visibility and controllers who perhaps were unaccustomed to handling the level of traffic.

In the narrative that has developed, everyone focuses on Van Zanten's actions. While his actions were indeed causal and wrong, was an unclear ATC without blame? What about the KLM FO and FE? Should they not have more forcefully questioned the captain? For that matter, Pan Am taxied past the (probably very hard to see) assigned exit and the pilots were unsure of position. Should they not have more forcefully stated they were unsure of position and still on the runway? These questions sound simple, but there are complex truths about human nature in there, most especially the tendency for confirmation bias.

We like to see the crucial moments transcribed below as the one series of events that led to the accident, but that isn't the way it works at all. If any of the factors I listed in the above paragraphs had changed even a little, the accident would likely never have happened. And Van Zanten would have lived to a ripe old age, with no one thinking of him as more than an accomplished training captain.

Transcript:
1706:32.43 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af dan? {Is he not clear then?}
1706:34.1 KLM-1 Wat zeg je? {What do you say?}
1706:34.15 KLM-? Yup.
1706:34.7 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? {Is he not clear that Pan American?}
1706:35.7 KLM-1 Jawel. {Oh yes. - emphatic}


(Full transcript here: https://www.tailstrike.com/270377.htm)

The FE (KLM-3) asks if Pan Am is clear, but his wording is not nearly forceful enough to convey any real doubt.
The CN (KLM-1) didn't hear him clearly. This may be an indication of stress.
Most likely the FO (KLM-?) just says "yup", which is a rather ambiguous statement in this context, and may indicate tacit agreement that Pan Am is clear. But (speculation) perhaps not really convinced. He wants to "go" too, most likely.
The FE then repeats his question in a more pointed manner.
The CN then says "Oh yes!", which to me indicates confirmation bias.

No one in the cockpit has any really evidence that Pan Am is clear.

Speculation: The Captain has constructed a mental picture that is inaccurate. Unfortunately, due to the lack of more information, this picture becomes the real one in his mind. He is stressed, and this leads to tunnel vision. Once he is questioned, he goes into "I must act like a commander" mode, sealing the confirmation bias.

Speculation: Nowadays, if the other two crewmembers had had serious doubts, they would have been less likely to use such guarded language. And the captain would not see queries as casting doubts on his decisions.

I'm not saying Captain Van Zanten was not at fault. He definitely was. I'm saying that we cannot entirely lay the blame on him, as there was a series of unusual circumstances at play, combined with training that did not emphasize CRM like today.

I wager if I said something like "Is he not clear, then?" even in decent visibility, most captains I fly with would stop what they're doing and tell me to ask ATC. Even down to the SO (cruise pilot) level, we are encouraged to speak up if we see something. Better to question if unsure. Always. But Teneriffe happened almost fifty years ago. It was a very different aviation world.

Again, people do weird stuff under stress. Ask any airline pilot who has done a proficiency check. ;)


Yes,you are right Mr.Starlion and I have huge respect for you and other aviators even the ones whom I have had harsh interactive encounters with,for you all do something I have passion and love for...In no way do I mean to blame the entire aviator community, that would be utterly disgraceful.

I know Its easier for me to judge and pass my remarks on the basis of what I see in the documentaries, read online and obviously I've never been in an aircraft cockpit for more than 20 seconds,as far as I can remember, so I'm certainly not aware of the tense atmosphere you guys have to work under and so much more that goes into performing a successful flight. That's one the reasons I have never minded any harsh remarks from the pilots or crew on my flights because I know they are busy people and the last thing I would wanna do is to annoy them or delay their flight...So I totally get it

Thanks again Mr Starlion for elaborating this whole chapter and I apologize If I may have appeared a little rude through my remarks..it was just based on my limited knowledge of whatever I have been able to understand through the media.
 
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Starlionblue
Posts: 20692
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 7:14 am

FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:

I completely understand that pilots are humans and at the end of the day they have working hour limitations and various other pressures with relation to their jobs, however,the most critical part of their job is that it involves people's Iives and I'm sure no pilot would ever wanna be in a scenario where they become the cause for the loss of it.I know that there may be difficulty in understanding the ATC or their way of speaking to them,the detriorating visibility etc, however, for some obvious reasons I can't ignore that man's decision to takeoff when obviously there was uncertainty around it given the erratic significant visibility drop..So I believe it was HIS decision,fuled by arrogance,was the final nail in the coffin so many innocent people.

But its because of such disasters that flying is so much safer now.



My point is that situations tend to be more complex than "his fault", and this one definitely was rather complex.

My thinking was there was quite a bit of "go fever", as they were running out of duty time. It is very important to keep in mind that before they got to the crucial decision, there were many other decisions and factors at play. There was stress and ambiguity involved. They'd diverted, were running out of duty time, at an unfamiliar airport, with very poor visibility and controllers who perhaps were unaccustomed to handling the level of traffic.

In the narrative that has developed, everyone focuses on Van Zanten's actions. While his actions were indeed causal and wrong, was an unclear ATC without blame? What about the KLM FO and FE? Should they not have more forcefully questioned the captain? For that matter, Pan Am taxied past the (probably very hard to see) assigned exit and the pilots were unsure of position. Should they not have more forcefully stated they were unsure of position and still on the runway? These questions sound simple, but there are complex truths about human nature in there, most especially the tendency for confirmation bias.

We like to see the crucial moments transcribed below as the one series of events that led to the accident, but that isn't the way it works at all. If any of the factors I listed in the above paragraphs had changed even a little, the accident would likely never have happened. And Van Zanten would have lived to a ripe old age, with no one thinking of him as more than an accomplished training captain.

Transcript:
1706:32.43 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af dan? {Is he not clear then?}
1706:34.1 KLM-1 Wat zeg je? {What do you say?}
1706:34.15 KLM-? Yup.
1706:34.7 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? {Is he not clear that Pan American?}
1706:35.7 KLM-1 Jawel. {Oh yes. - emphatic}


(Full transcript here: https://www.tailstrike.com/270377.htm)

The FE (KLM-3) asks if Pan Am is clear, but his wording is not nearly forceful enough to convey any real doubt.
The CN (KLM-1) didn't hear him clearly. This may be an indication of stress.
Most likely the FO (KLM-?) just says "yup", which is a rather ambiguous statement in this context, and may indicate tacit agreement that Pan Am is clear. But (speculation) perhaps not really convinced. He wants to "go" too, most likely.
The FE then repeats his question in a more pointed manner.
The CN then says "Oh yes!", which to me indicates confirmation bias.

No one in the cockpit has any really evidence that Pan Am is clear.

Speculation: The Captain has constructed a mental picture that is inaccurate. Unfortunately, due to the lack of more information, this picture becomes the real one in his mind. He is stressed, and this leads to tunnel vision. Once he is questioned, he goes into "I must act like a commander" mode, sealing the confirmation bias.

Speculation: Nowadays, if the other two crewmembers had had serious doubts, they would have been less likely to use such guarded language. And the captain would not see queries as casting doubts on his decisions.

I'm not saying Captain Van Zanten was not at fault. He definitely was. I'm saying that we cannot entirely lay the blame on him, as there was a series of unusual circumstances at play, combined with training that did not emphasize CRM like today.

I wager if I said something like "Is he not clear, then?" even in decent visibility, most captains I fly with would stop what they're doing and tell me to ask ATC. Even down to the SO (cruise pilot) level, we are encouraged to speak up if we see something. Better to question if unsure. Always. But Teneriffe happened almost fifty years ago. It was a very different aviation world.

Again, people do weird stuff under stress. Ask any airline pilot who has done a proficiency check. ;)


Yes,you are right Mr.Starlion and I have huge respect for you and other aviators even the ones whom I have had harsh interactive encounters with,for you all do something I have passion and love for...In no way do I mean to blame the entire aviator community, that would be utterly disgraceful.

I know Its easier for me to judge and pass my remarks on the basis of what I see in the documentaries, read online and obviously I've never been in an aircraft cockpit for more than 20 seconds,as far as I can remember, so I'm certainly not aware of the tense atmosphere you guys have to work under and so much more that goes into performing a successful flight. That's one the reasons I have never minded any harsh remarks from the pilots or crew on my flights because I know they are busy people and the last thing I would wanna do is to annoy them or delay their flight...So I totally get it

Thanks again Mr Starlion for elaborating this whole chapter and I apologize If I may have appeared a little rude through my remarks..it was just based on my limited knowledge of whatever I have been able to understand.


Your comment about a "tense atmosphere" is interesting. And it speaks to the Teneriffe disaster.

I have seldom felt that the atmosphere in the cockpit is anything but pretty relaxed. Sure, there is at times a great deal of focus and concentration. But seldom tension.

If you feel that the atmosphere in the cockpit is tense, you should really ask yourself why that is. If you can't readily identify the reason for said tension (e.g. an actual emergency, or someone acting a bit at odds with good CRM), then stop, verify, check. What are we worrying about? What is it we feel uncertain about? Most likely your subconscious is trying to tell you something is "off". You need to resolve this before you continue.

The fact that the atmosphere on the cockpit of the KLM 747 at Teneriffe appears tense based on CVR transcripts is an indicator that there was probably doubt and uncertainty.

All three crew members were somewhat culpable of not resolving the ambiguity of the situation. And that's when Van Zanten made the crucial mistake of overriding them instead of listening. As a Captain, you have to be very careful not to let your personality and experience smother the opinions of the other crew member(s). Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509 is another example of this phenomenon of the captain's personality and experience having an adverse effect on the cockpit authority gradient.

Speculation: In Van Zanten mind, his mental picture was the correct one, and that was it. The fact that he was so emphatic could indicate that he subconsciously didn't want his assumptions challenged, because he himself was feeling uncomfortable, and because he needed to keep the schedule. Of course, we can never know. But I personally find it at least plausible.


Book recommendation again: The Air Disaster series by Macarthur Job is an excellent resource for this kind of thing. Clearly written with many illustrations, whilst never falling into the trap of sensationalism. Just the facts, and factual analysis based on the facts.

Image
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
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Topic Author
Posts: 516
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 7:34 am

Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:


My point is that situations tend to be more complex than "his fault", and this one definitely was rather complex.

My thinking was there was quite a bit of "go fever", as they were running out of duty time. It is very important to keep in mind that before they got to the crucial decision, there were many other decisions and factors at play. There was stress and ambiguity involved. They'd diverted, were running out of duty time, at an unfamiliar airport, with very poor visibility and controllers who perhaps were unaccustomed to handling the level of traffic.

In the narrative that has developed, everyone focuses on Van Zanten's actions. While his actions were indeed causal and wrong, was an unclear ATC without blame? What about the KLM FO and FE? Should they not have more forcefully questioned the captain? For that matter, Pan Am taxied past the (probably very hard to see) assigned exit and the pilots were unsure of position. Should they not have more forcefully stated they were unsure of position and still on the runway? These questions sound simple, but there are complex truths about human nature in there, most especially the tendency for confirmation bias.

We like to see the crucial moments transcribed below as the one series of events that led to the accident, but that isn't the way it works at all. If any of the factors I listed in the above paragraphs had changed even a little, the accident would likely never have happened. And Van Zanten would have lived to a ripe old age, with no one thinking of him as more than an accomplished training captain.

Transcript:
1706:32.43 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af dan? {Is he not clear then?}
1706:34.1 KLM-1 Wat zeg je? {What do you say?}
1706:34.15 KLM-? Yup.
1706:34.7 KLM-3 Is hij er niet af, die Pan American? {Is he not clear that Pan American?}
1706:35.7 KLM-1 Jawel. {Oh yes. - emphatic}


(Full transcript here: https://www.tailstrike.com/270377.htm)

The FE (KLM-3) asks if Pan Am is clear, but his wording is not nearly forceful enough to convey any real doubt.
The CN (KLM-1) didn't hear him clearly. This may be an indication of stress.
Most likely the FO (KLM-?) just says "yup", which is a rather ambiguous statement in this context, and may indicate tacit agreement that Pan Am is clear. But (speculation) perhaps not really convinced. He wants to "go" too, most likely.
The FE then repeats his question in a more pointed manner.
The CN then says "Oh yes!", which to me indicates confirmation bias.

No one in the cockpit has any really evidence that Pan Am is clear.

Speculation: The Captain has constructed a mental picture that is inaccurate. Unfortunately, due to the lack of more information, this picture becomes the real one in his mind. He is stressed, and this leads to tunnel vision. Once he is questioned, he goes into "I must act like a commander" mode, sealing the confirmation bias.

Speculation: Nowadays, if the other two crewmembers had had serious doubts, they would have been less likely to use such guarded language. And the captain would not see queries as casting doubts on his decisions.

I'm not saying Captain Van Zanten was not at fault. He definitely was. I'm saying that we cannot entirely lay the blame on him, as there was a series of unusual circumstances at play, combined with training that did not emphasize CRM like today.



I wager if I said something like "Is he not clear, then?" even in decent visibility, most captains I fly with would stop what they're doing and tell me to ask ATC. Even down to the SO (cruise pilot) level, we are encouraged to speak up if we see something. Better to question if unsure. Always. But Teneriffe happened almost fifty years ago. It was a very different aviation world.

Again, people do weird stuff under stress. Ask any airline pilot who has done a proficiency check. ;)


Yes,you are right Mr.Starlion and I have huge respect for you and other aviators even the ones whom I have had harsh interactive encounters with,for you all do something I have passion and love for...In no way do I mean to blame the entire aviator community, that would be utterly disgraceful.

I know Its easier for me to judge and pass my remarks on the basis of what I see in the documentaries, read online and obviously I've never been in an aircraft cockpit for more than 20 seconds,as far as I can remember, so I'm certainly not aware of the tense atmosphere you guys have to work under and so much more that goes into performing a successful flight. That's one the reasons I have never minded any harsh remarks from the pilots or crew on my flights because I know they are busy people and the last thing I would wanna do is to annoy them or delay their flight...So I totally get it

Thanks again Mr Starlion for elaborating this whole chapter and I apologize If I may have appeared a little rude through my remarks..it was just based on my limited knowledge of whatever I have been able to understand.


Your comment about a "tense atmosphere" is interesting. And it speaks to the Teneriffe disaster.

I have seldom felt that the atmosphere in the cockpit is anything but pretty relaxed. Sure, there is at times a great deal of focus and concentration. But seldom tension.

If you feel that the atmosphere in the cockpit is tense, you should really ask yourself why that is. If you can't readily identify the reason for said tension (e.g. an actual emergency, or someone acting a bit at odds with good CRM), then stop, verify, check. What are we worrying about? What is it we feel uncertain about? Most likely your subconscious is trying to tell you something is "off". You need to resolve this before you continue.

The fact that the atmosphere on the cockpit of the KLM 747 at Teneriffe appears tense based on CVR transcripts is an indicator that there was probably doubt and uncertainty.

All three crew members were somewhat culpable of not resolving the ambiguity of the situation. And that's when Van Zanten made the crucial mistake of overriding them instead of listening. As a Captain, you have to be very careful not to let your personality and experience smother the opinions of the other crew member(s). Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509 is another example of this phenomenon of the captain's personality and experience having an adverse effect on the cockpit authority gradient.

Speculation: In Van Zanten mind, his mental picture was the correct one, and that was it. The fact that he was so emphatic could indicate that he subconsciously didn't want his assumptions challenged, because he himself was feeling uncomfortable, and because he needed to keep the schedule. Of course, we can never know. But I personally find it at least plausible.


Book recommendation again: The Air Disaster series by Macarthur Job is an excellent resource for this kind of thing. Clearly written with many illustrations, whilst never falling into the trap of sensationalism. Just the facts, and factual analysis based on the facts.

Image


Yes,I have read and watched the episode of the Korean 747 Cargo and it turned out that it was a cultural thing in Korea that the younger first officers were,in the minds of Captains,considered assistants and that was not surprising to me given even in my culture (Indian) we are told to respect our elders and let alone relatives but even our neighbours like my friends dad and mom are automatically my uncle and aunt :lol:

But I didn't understand why that cultural thing had to creep into the cockpit during flight operations but I guess it did because normally in all Asian cultures its rude when a young person questions or doubts the decisions of the elders...but I believe now its changed and regardless of the age now FO is as imp as the cap and I feel it should have been always that way.

Oh and BTW Mr Starlion the last book that you posted the 777 one its not available Online and I will check this up too ..just hope its available.

Thanks for the links Mr Starlion.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 7:38 am

I just checked and This one is available on Amazon but they say its not deliverable to my location.. :(
 
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AirKevin
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 7:43 am

FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:

1972...Daymn...thats like 20 something years before I was born it means CAT IIIB has been there for quite some time now.


The first autoland with passengers on board was in 1965.


Oh...I wonder why did KLM not get their demonic pilot Vanzanten trained with Low Visibility Ops...The only words I will forever remember him by, are that of Cap Grubbs' which were recorded moments before the collision.

But honestly,I believe even had the KLM gotten that man equipped with required training it wouldn't have prevented what happened,for it was more of his vile egoistic self that murdered so many innocent people.

Autoland does nothing to help with take-offs.
Captain Kevin
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 7:45 am

AirKevin wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:

The first autoland with passengers on board was in 1965.


Oh...I wonder why did KLM not get their demonic pilot Vanzanten trained with Low Visibility Ops...The only words I will forever remember him by, are that of Cap Grubbs' which were recorded moments before the collision.

But honestly,I believe even had the KLM gotten that man equipped with required training it wouldn't have prevented what happened,for it was more of his vile egoistic self that murdered so many innocent people.

Autoland does nothing to help with take-offs.


But Doesn't LOW VISIBILITY OPERATIONS also include required minimum visibility for TAKE OFF ? I didn't even mention "AUTOLAND" anywhere in that post MrKevin !
 
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Starlionblue
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 7:53 am

FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:

Yes,you are right Mr.Starlion and I have huge respect for you and other aviators even the ones whom I have had harsh interactive encounters with,for you all do something I have passion and love for...In no way do I mean to blame the entire aviator community, that would be utterly disgraceful.

I know Its easier for me to judge and pass my remarks on the basis of what I see in the documentaries, read online and obviously I've never been in an aircraft cockpit for more than 20 seconds,as far as I can remember, so I'm certainly not aware of the tense atmosphere you guys have to work under and so much more that goes into performing a successful flight. That's one the reasons I have never minded any harsh remarks from the pilots or crew on my flights because I know they are busy people and the last thing I would wanna do is to annoy them or delay their flight...So I totally get it

Thanks again Mr Starlion for elaborating this whole chapter and I apologize If I may have appeared a little rude through my remarks..it was just based on my limited knowledge of whatever I have been able to understand.


Your comment about a "tense atmosphere" is interesting. And it speaks to the Teneriffe disaster.

I have seldom felt that the atmosphere in the cockpit is anything but pretty relaxed. Sure, there is at times a great deal of focus and concentration. But seldom tension.

If you feel that the atmosphere in the cockpit is tense, you should really ask yourself why that is. If you can't readily identify the reason for said tension (e.g. an actual emergency, or someone acting a bit at odds with good CRM), then stop, verify, check. What are we worrying about? What is it we feel uncertain about? Most likely your subconscious is trying to tell you something is "off". You need to resolve this before you continue.

The fact that the atmosphere on the cockpit of the KLM 747 at Teneriffe appears tense based on CVR transcripts is an indicator that there was probably doubt and uncertainty.

All three crew members were somewhat culpable of not resolving the ambiguity of the situation. And that's when Van Zanten made the crucial mistake of overriding them instead of listening. As a Captain, you have to be very careful not to let your personality and experience smother the opinions of the other crew member(s). Korean Air Cargo Flight 8509 is another example of this phenomenon of the captain's personality and experience having an adverse effect on the cockpit authority gradient.

Speculation: In Van Zanten mind, his mental picture was the correct one, and that was it. The fact that he was so emphatic could indicate that he subconsciously didn't want his assumptions challenged, because he himself was feeling uncomfortable, and because he needed to keep the schedule. Of course, we can never know. But I personally find it at least plausible.


Book recommendation again: The Air Disaster series by Macarthur Job is an excellent resource for this kind of thing. Clearly written with many illustrations, whilst never falling into the trap of sensationalism. Just the facts, and factual analysis based on the facts.

Image


Yes,I have read and watched the episode of the Korean 747 Cargo and it turned out that it was a cultural thing in Korea that the younger first officers were,in the minds of Captains,considered assistants and that was not surprising to me given even in my culture (Indian) we are told to respect our elders and let alone relatives but even our neighbours like my friends dad and mom are automatically my uncle and aunt :lol:

But I didn't understand why that cultural thing had to creep into the cockpit during flight operations but I guess it did because normally in all Asian cultures its rude when a young person questions or doubts the decisions of the elders...but I believe now its changed and regardless of the age now FO is as imp as the cap and I feel it should have been always that way.

Oh and BTW Mr Starlion the last book that you posted the 777 one its not available Online and I will check this up too ..just hope its available.

Thanks for the links Mr Starlion.


Why does culture creep into the cockpit? Because culture affects personality, corporate culture, social dynamics... You can't disconnect them. One of the advantages of the many nationalities amongst cockpit crew where I work is that it encourages (even forces) standardisation and clarity, for no other reason than that we can't count on cultural shorthand.

Pilots don't become other people in the cockpit, but good training and good operational culture allow the aspects that are positive for the cockpit environment to be strengthened and those that are negative to be discouraged.


AirKevin wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:

The first autoland with passengers on board was in 1965.


Oh...I wonder why did KLM not get their demonic pilot Vanzanten trained with Low Visibility Ops...The only words I will forever remember him by, are that of Cap Grubbs' which were recorded moments before the collision.

But honestly,I believe even had the KLM gotten that man equipped with required training it wouldn't have prevented what happened,for it was more of his vile egoistic self that murdered so many innocent people.

Autoland does nothing to help with take-offs.


Yeah we are getting a bit off topic. ;)
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
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AirKevin
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 7:56 am

FligtReporter wrote:
AirKevin wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Oh...I wonder why did KLM not get their demonic pilot Vanzanten trained with Low Visibility Ops...The only words I will forever remember him by, are that of Cap Grubbs' which were recorded moments before the collision.

But honestly,I believe even had the KLM gotten that man equipped with required training it wouldn't have prevented what happened,for it was more of his vile egoistic self that murdered so many innocent people.

Autoland does nothing to help with take-offs.


But Doesn't LOW VISIBILITY OPERATIONS also include required minimum visibility for TAKE OFF ? I didn't even mention "AUTOLAND" anywhere in that post MrKevin !

No, but you did respond to a few posts about autoland with this accident, hence my confusion.
Captain Kevin
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 8:11 am

AirKevin wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
AirKevin wrote:
Autoland does nothing to help with take-offs.


But Doesn't LOW VISIBILITY OPERATIONS also include required minimum visibility for TAKE OFF ? I didn't even mention "AUTOLAND" anywhere in that post MrKevin !

No, but you did respond to a few posts about autoland with this accident, hence my confusion.


I only used the term AUTOLAND where I thought I should have however, this chapter was entirely on the particular incident and my query clearly stated ( LOW VISIBILITY OPERATIONS ) because as far as I have learnt, that includes TAKEOFFS as well right ?

So I know my reference to the REQUIRED TRAINING for this particular person I was talking about was in relation to the TAKEOFF aspect of it all.I know autoland has nothing far and wide to do with that particular incident I mentioned.

But its ok....Mr Kevin I just thought of further clarifying myself.

Thanks
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 8:20 am

Respected Gentlemen,

Even though the amount of gratitude I have for you all is inexplicable but I can't emphasize enough how grateful I am to each and everyone of you for not only helping me understand the CAT IIIB technology better but most importantly teaching me myriads of new things related to it.

I started this thread with an intention to share my very first experience with fellow avgeeks and getting to know about theirs' ,however,serendipitously I came across people who in return bestowed me with so much wisdom regarding this subject that I had never expected to receive on this forum.There is so much more I wanna share and learn but I believe those subjects are different than what this thread is about and at times I get into different topics all together and I don't wanna end up mixing it with this one.So I think I'm gonna create a new thread for my different other experiences,questions and queries.

At the end I wanna mention few names who had been very paitent with me all this while Mr IAH, Mr Starlion, Mr Galaxy Flyer, Mr NoFlyzone, Mr E38, Mr Woodreau, Mr USA Thank you very much all of you and I hope to see you all in my other threads as well so I get to learn more form your expertise and experiences.

(Oh and if any of you ever happen to fly over my homebase do lemme know I'll make sure to spot your plane if the weather is good !)

Regards,
TheFlightReporter
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 4:24 pm

You want to place blame on the person, but that requires some level of intent. Safety process is about WHAT happened, not WHO as it’s a system error. Read Perrow on normal accidents in complex, tightly coupled systems.
 
CosmicCruiser
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Fri Feb 19, 2021 6:37 pm

Boy, did this thread change directions.
 
cpd
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:22 am

Starlionblue wrote:
Indeed. Then again, YSSY doesn't need it because visibility that low rarely occurs in Sydney. Same at most other Australian ports.


I must say that Sydney (my city) does indeed get very heavy fog on occasions. It's not super frequently, but it's also not so rare either. This morning out in Western Sydney close to where the new second airport will be there was incredibly dense/heavy fog, about the worst I've ever seen. I don't know what YSSY was like this morning.

I also remember 2012-04-22 at 9:30am in the morning there was still barely any visibility. Somehow United Airlines after giving up on the first approach (34L) went around and tried 16R for the next approach and made it work. As they went in front of me, you could hear their 747 but could not see it. Delta had one go at landing then gave up and went to Brisbane IIRC. That day was mayhem, everything diverted everywhere else pretty much.

9:30am:
Image

9:52am:
Image

10:17am - there are some planes back there
Image

10:34am - fog clearing, good for photos.
Image

Earlier than 9:30am, pointless, you could see nothing - even at very close range.

Maybe other airports might suffer from low visibility much more often, but I'm surprised that a major international airport wouldn't be equipped so it doesn't get affected by these conditions. I suppose costs must come into it, but what are the impacts of diversions?

Disclaimer: Feel free to report my post for deletion if it isn't appropriate.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:37 am

cpd wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
Indeed. Then again, YSSY doesn't need it because visibility that low rarely occurs in Sydney. Same at most other Australian ports.


I must say that Sydney (my city) does indeed get very heavy fog on occasions. It's not super frequently, but it's also not so rare either. This morning out in Western Sydney close to where the new second airport will be there was incredibly dense/heavy fog, about the worst I've ever seen. I don't know what YSSY was like this morning.

I also remember 2012-04-22 at 9:30am in the morning there was still barely any visibility. Somehow United Airlines after giving up on the first approach (34L) went around and tried 16R for the next approach and made it work. As they went in front of me, you could hear the plane but could not see it. Delta had one go at landing then gave up and went to Brisbane. That day was mayhem, everything diverted everywhere else pretty much.

9:30am:
Image

9:52am:
Image

10:17am - there are some planes back there
Image

10:34am - fog clearing, good for photos.
Image

Earlier than 9:30am, pointless, you could see nothing - even at very close range.

Maybe other airports might suffer from low visibility much more often, but I'm surprised that a major international airport wouldn't be equipped so it doesn't get affected too badly by these conditions.


Mr CPD ...I think you're joking ! May be you just wanted to share these amazing pictures with us...If you wanna see what REAL DENSE FOG looks like take a flight to North India from DEC to early FEB and almost every morning for over 2 and half months you will experience DENSE FOG !

None of these pictures can be classified as "DENSE FOG" Conditions...dense fog is when you can't even see the wing of your aircraft or can hardly see it and believe me on 2nd of this month I made an autolanding at my home airport (LKO) and before that I had a totally different view of a DENSE FOG until I really saw it with my own eyes what does that look like especially at an airport..the fog was so thick that even the runway borderline was blurred with it. BTW on my approach and landing the RVR was 100 meters and Horizontal and Vertical visibility was 0.

And Its no surprise to me if SYD doesn't have CAT IIIB because there's no need for it to have it at first place...In all these pictures I see no fog at all its just haze may be thats it...it would be a waste of money if they got it installed.

Whats the lowest RVR that you get there at SYD in foggy seasons and for how many days ?
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:50 am

Here is the Answer to why SYD doesn't get CAT IIIB equipped !

https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/nationa ... thick-fog/

As expected,SYD has less than 5 days a year of thick fog...So It doesn't make sense wasting money at SYD.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 4:06 am

FligtReporter wrote:
cpd wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
Indeed. Then again, YSSY doesn't need it because visibility that low rarely occurs in Sydney. Same at most other Australian ports.


I must say that Sydney (my city) does indeed get very heavy fog on occasions. It's not super frequently, but it's also not so rare either. This morning out in Western Sydney close to where the new second airport will be there was incredibly dense/heavy fog, about the worst I've ever seen. I don't know what YSSY was like this morning.

I also remember 2012-04-22 at 9:30am in the morning there was still barely any visibility. Somehow United Airlines after giving up on the first approach (34L) went around and tried 16R for the next approach and made it work. As they went in front of me, you could hear the plane but could not see it. Delta had one go at landing then gave up and went to Brisbane. That day was mayhem, everything diverted everywhere else pretty much.

9:30am:
Image

9:52am:
Image

10:17am - there are some planes back there
Image

10:34am - fog clearing, good for photos.
Image

Earlier than 9:30am, pointless, you could see nothing - even at very close range.

Maybe other airports might suffer from low visibility much more often, but I'm surprised that a major international airport wouldn't be equipped so it doesn't get affected too badly by these conditions.


Mr CPD ...I think you're joking ! May be you just wanted to share these amazing pictures with us...If you wanna see what REAL DENSE FOG looks like take a flight to North India from DEC to early FEB and almost every morning for over 2 and half months you will experience DENSE FOG !

None of these pictures can be classified as "DENSE FOG" Conditions...dense fog is when you can't even see the wing of your aircraft or can hardly see it and believe me on 2nd of this month I made an autolanding at my home airport (LKO) and before that I had a totally different view of a DENSE FOG until I really saw it with my own eyes what does that look like especially at an airport..the fog was so thick that even the runway borderline was blurred with it. BTW on my approach and landing the RVR was 100 meters and Horizontal and Vertical visibility was 0.

And Its no surprise to me if SYD doesn't have CAT IIIB because there's no need for it to have it at first place...In all these pictures I see no fog at all its just haze may be thats it...it would be a waste of money if they got it installed.

Whats the lowest RVR that you get there at SYD in foggy seasons and for how many days ?


That was what it was earlier on that day. You could see nothing. Even anything barely in front of you couldn’t be seen. I obviously didn’t take photos earlier because you wouldn’t see anything.

We can waste money on other projects with very little benefits at all other than political pork-barrelling (particularly to diverting funds to private companies), yet infrastructure upgrades at a major airport are a waste? I don’t think so.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 4:41 am

cpd wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
cpd wrote:

I must say that Sydney (my city) does indeed get very heavy fog on occasions. It's not super frequently, but it's also not so rare either. This morning out in Western Sydney close to where the new second airport will be there was incredibly dense/heavy fog, about the worst I've ever seen. I don't know what YSSY was like this morning.

I also remember 2012-04-22 at 9:30am in the morning there was still barely any visibility. Somehow United Airlines after giving up on the first approach (34L) went around and tried 16R for the next approach and made it work. As they went in front of me, you could hear the plane but could not see it. Delta had one go at landing then gave up and went to Brisbane. That day was mayhem, everything diverted everywhere else pretty much.

9:30am:
Image

9:52am:
Image

10:17am - there are some planes back there
Image

10:34am - fog clearing, good for photos.
Image

Earlier than 9:30am, pointless, you could see nothing - even at very close range.

Maybe other airports might suffer from low visibility much more often, but I'm surprised that a major international airport wouldn't be equipped so it doesn't get affected too badly by these conditions.


Mr CPD ...I think you're joking ! May be you just wanted to share these amazing pictures with us...If you wanna see what REAL DENSE FOG looks like take a flight to North India from DEC to early FEB and almost every morning for over 2 and half months you will experience DENSE FOG !

None of these pictures can be classified as "DENSE FOG" Conditions...dense fog is when you can't even see the wing of your aircraft or can hardly see it and believe me on 2nd of this month I made an autolanding at my home airport (LKO) and before that I had a totally different view of a DENSE FOG until I really saw it with my own eyes what does that look like especially at an airport..the fog was so thick that even the runway borderline was blurred with it. BTW on my approach and landing the RVR was 100 meters and Horizontal and Vertical visibility was 0.

And Its no surprise to me if SYD doesn't have CAT IIIB because there's no need for it to have it at first place...In all these pictures I see no fog at all its just haze may be thats it...it would be a waste of money if they got it installed.

Whats the lowest RVR that you get there at SYD in foggy seasons and for how many days ?


That was what it was earlier on that day. You could see nothing. Even anything barely in front of you couldn’t be seen. I obviously didn’t take photos earlier because you wouldn’t see anything.

We can waste money on other projects with very little benefits at all other than political pork-barrelling (particularly to diverting funds to private companies), yet infrastructure upgrades at a major airport are a waste? I don’t think so.


That Major airport doesn't need the UPGRADE you want it to have just for the sake of having it.There are many MAJOR AIRPORTS which don't have CAT IIIB because its not only a costly affair but it requires hefty amount to maintain it and if the conditions at SYD are way better than what is required for this system to be in place for, then what's the use to have it anyways ?

As per what I see, SYD doesn't get as foggy for long as Brisbane or Perth and thats why they have it but SYD doesn't. Its similar to saying that BOM should get CAT IIIB because its a MAIOR AIRPORT but the reality is its not needed there thats why smaller airports like mine (LKO) and ATQ,JAI have it but BOM,MAA etc don't cause its not needed there..and Im sure the Australian Airport Authorities know better and if they ever feel the need to equip SYD with CAT IIIB,they will.
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:27 pm

FligtReporter wrote:
Here is the Answer to why SYD doesn't get CAT IIIB equipped !

https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/nationa ... thick-fog/

As expected,SYD has less than 5 days a year of thick fog...So It doesn't make sense wasting money at SYD.


And, SYD isn’t a major hub operation where thousands get stranded if arrivals stop. The US airports with CAT III runways are mostly at large hubs—KJFK, KORD, KDFW, KLAX, KSEA, KMEM, KSDF—where the penalty in operations outcomes is enormous and weather below CAT I is not only more frequent but lasts for long periods. KJFK can go down to CAT II or lower for several days. The value of FDX cargo is so large, multiple CAT III approaches and a ramp where the loading and unloading goes on thru thunderstorms with a huge array of lightning protection at each parking bay. It’s because....money.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 3:56 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Here is the Answer to why SYD doesn't get CAT IIIB equipped !

https://thenewdaily.com.au/news/nationa ... thick-fog/

As expected,SYD has less than 5 days a year of thick fog...So It doesn't make sense wasting money at SYD.


And, SYD isn’t a major hub operation where thousands get stranded if arrivals stop. The US airports with CAT III runways are mostly at large hubs—KJFK, KORD, KDFW, KLAX, KSEA, KMEM, KSDF—where the penalty in operations outcomes is enormous and weather below CAT I is not only more frequent but lasts for long periods. KJFK can go down to CAT II or lower for several days. The value of FDX cargo is so large, multiple CAT III approaches and a ramp where the loading and unloading goes on thru thunderstorms with a huge array of lightning protection at each parking bay. It’s because....money.


Absolutely !! here at my homebase we get 75,50 to 100 RVR every morning and nights for almost 2 and a half months..so for a city that gets less than 5 days a year of thick fog and to have CAT IIIB is a joke to me :lol:

No wonder Australian Authorities are smart enough to not waste their money on SYD.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 4:12 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
And, SYD isn’t a major hub operation where thousands get stranded if arrivals stop. The US airports with CAT III runways are mostly at large hubs—KJFK, KORD, KDFW, KLAX, KSEA, KMEM, KSDF—where the penalty in operations outcomes is enormous and weather below CAT I is not only more frequent but lasts for long periods. KJFK can go down to CAT II or lower for several days. The value of FDX cargo is so large, multiple CAT III approaches and a ramp where the loading and unloading goes on thru thunderstorms with a huge array of lightning protection at each parking bay. It’s because....money.


Bingo. The cost associated for the airlines to equip their fleets and pilot training for all weather ops (CAT II/III) is minimal when you compare to missed connects, diversions, costs associated with using an airport where they have no contracts for fuel etc. The airports cost of upkeep on the lighting etc., gets returned somewhat by the landing fees that would not exist if ops were impacted by low weather mins. If the airport decided not to equip the airport for CAT II/III ops the airlines may decide to HUB elsewhere though that may be somewhat of a far fetched thought.

The mention purely of airlines is not meant to snub the GA or corporate side of aviation, but there are very few corporate operators that I know of who are authorized CAT III ops though when I was working there were a couple of tenant flight departments who were CAT III some of which was mission related no simply their home airport.
Any views shared are strictly my own and do not a represent those of any former employer.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 4:29 pm

There are no purpose-built bizjet with CAT III capability, even HUD-based manually flown CAT III. HUD/EVS gets a qualified crew/plane to basically CAT II. The BBJ, ACJ planes come with it, but I doubt the operators are CAT III qualified. Outside of the few major terminals, no GA destination has CAT III. We have more flexibility, too. If things look questionable about getting in, call two hours out, send the car to big city airport and divert. Done that many times at Aspen, for example, Burbank or Van Nuys, too.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 4:49 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
There are no purpose-built bizjet with CAT III capability, even HUD-based manually flown CAT III. HUD/EVS gets a qualified crew/plane to basically CAT II. The BBJ, ACJ planes come with it, but I doubt the operators are CAT III qualified. Outside of the few major terminals, no GA destination has CAT III. We have more flexibility, too. If things look questionable about getting in, call two hours out, send the car to big city airport and divert. Done that many times at Aspen, for example, Burbank or Van Nuys, too.


I have seen Aspen landing videos and it looks beautiful but also a little airport and somewhat built in a valley like terrain right Mr Galaxy ? Given you fly for Business jets and go around exotic places you could be a great YouTuber..you can get them GoPro cameras on your windshield and record the sights..I'd be your first subscriber for sure.
 
VMCA787
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 5:01 pm

Seems to have been overlooked, but you can't put a CATIII approach in at just any runway. There are terrain considerations that must be taken into account. For example, MSP 30L/R, notice there is only a CATII approach to 30L and a CATI to 30R. The reason is about 1/4 mile before the beginning of the overrun on both runways is a ravine where the Minnesota River runs through. So, the RA (radar altimeter) isn't accurate. Therefore the terrain doesn't meet the criteria for CATIII operations.
Fly fast, live slow!
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 5:05 pm

Aspen is in box canyon, airport at 7,800’ and Independence Pass to the south by 15 miles or so is over 12,000’—one way in, one way out. Runway is 8,000’, airline service with CRJ 700. The valley rise up from the Colorado River at Glenwood. The river is about 2,000’ lower. Some interesting approaches with the departing plane coming at you. Much tighter than Sion or Chambery, for instance.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 5:35 pm

VMCA787 wrote:
Seems to have been overlooked, but you can't put a CATIII approach in at just any runway. There are terrain considerations that must be taken into account. For example, MSP 30L/R, notice there is only a CATII approach to 30L and a CATI to 30R. The reason is about 1/4 mile before the beginning of the overrun on both runways is a ravine where the Minnesota River runs through. So, the RA (radar altimeter) isn't accurate. Therefore the terrain doesn't meet the criteria for CATIII operations.


It reminds me of CCJ in South India where recently we had an Air India express 738NG overshoot the runway during a storm..its one of the two infamous Table top airports in India the other one being VOML..though its not prone to fog but more so storms and clouds but their location is such that its hard to install the CAT III..though I'm not sure if they even got CAT II to be honest.

I think CAT III needs about 900 meters of length for its lighting itself so space is a huge factor while considering its installation.
 
GalaxyFlyer
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 7:51 pm

CCJ has CAT I mins only—250’ DH and 1300m. Mangalore has ILS on 24 only, CAT I mins—750m. VOML is nice airport and pretty looking area from what I could see in a one ground time. Flew the VOR 06, so got a pretty good tour on a bright day. Handler rode back to Mumbai with us in the jump seat, Praveen was excited that day.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 11:42 pm

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
CCJ has CAT I mins only—250’ DH and 1300m. Mangalore has ILS on 24 only, CAT I mins—750m. VOML is nice airport and pretty looking area from what I could see in a one ground time. Flew the VOR 06, so got a pretty good tour on a bright day. Handler rode back to Mumbai with us in the jump seat, Praveen was excited that day.


Yeah it surely is lush green down there !
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sat Feb 20, 2021 11:43 pm

Here is the 4K (ULTRA HD) unedited version of my CAT IIIB landing at my homebase !!

https://youtu.be/FP-sk7iqKZc
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sun Feb 21, 2021 5:01 am

FligtReporter wrote:
Here is the 4K (ULTRA HD) unedited version of my CAT IIIB landing at my homebase !!

https://youtu.be/FP-sk7iqKZc

Here's a very fogged in landing at Seattle. CAT IIIB. Can't even see the ground until after touchdown.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcEi5sU ... FWAviation

Go to 22:52.
All opinions expressed herein are mine and do not represent the views of Cape Air
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Sun Feb 21, 2021 5:33 am

maps4ltd wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Here is the 4K (ULTRA HD) unedited version of my CAT IIIB landing at my homebase !!

https://youtu.be/FP-sk7iqKZc

Here's a very fogged in landing at Seattle. CAT IIIB. Can't even see the ground until after touchdown.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AcEi5sU ... FWAviation

Go to 22:52.


Yeah that was a good one too..Thanks for sharing.In my video during the approach I thought it would be a normal CAT I or II because I could see mild fog but as we got like close to about a nauticle mile to touch down it got thick and that was a sheer surprise to me,obviously a pleasant one.Even after touchdown I could hardly see the RWY borderline or much of taxiways until after we exited and reached the parking bay I could see mildly though the fog.As per the METAR during my landing the Horizontal and Vertical visibility was 0.

Here at LKO it gets foggy for almost 2 and a half months (DEC - early FEB) especially during mornings and evenings the RVR between 50 - 100 Meters is normal in the north Indian region.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 12:11 am

One more Question.

How far ahead or behind is that Glideslope Antenna from the touchdown zone to make sure the Airplane touches down near the TDZ ?
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 12:53 am

It’s somewhat dependent on siting, but the antenna will be about 1,200’ from the threshold, that’s also where the theoretical glide slope intercepts the runway. The flare program will begin reducing the ROD at 5-0’, so actual touchdown is about 1500’ down from the threshold.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 2:37 am

GalaxyFlyer wrote:
It’s somewhat dependent on siting, but the antenna will be about 1,200’ from the threshold, that’s also where the theoretical glide slope intercepts the runway. The flare program will begin reducing the ROD at 5-0’, so actual touchdown is about 1500’ down from the threshold.


Thanks a ton for the answer Mr Galaxy.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 4:18 am

Also I wanted to know if the METAR is issued every minute or every 5 minutes or 30 Minutes etc and or is it live weather every second at the ATC or Cockpit.

Like how does the weather reporting works ? I know there is TAF and SPECI as well..it would be great someone could please elaborate this as well for me please.

Thank you !
Last edited by FligtReporter on Tue Feb 23, 2021 4:39 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
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Starlionblue
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 4:39 am

FligtReporter wrote:
Also I wanted to know if the METAR is issued every minute or every 5 minutes or 30 Minutes etc and or is it live weather every second at the ATC or Cockpit.

Like how does the weather reporting works ?


METARs are typically issued hourly. In case there is rapid change, a SPECI will be issued, indicating it is an unscheduled report.

ATIS (aerodrome information used for approach and departure) is typically issued hourly or half-hourly. If there is a rapid change, a new ATIS is simply issued. ATIS is the METAR information plus runway in use and other pertinent information. See also note on magnetic vs true winds.

ATC has live surface wind data, which they will transmit with the landing clearance. E.g. "BigJet-one-two-three, wind one-three-zero at seven, cleared to land runway zero-seven-left". Pilots can also request "wind check" over the radio.

TAFs are issued every 6 hours with a 24-hour forecast period (30 hours in some places like Australia).

Of note is that METAR/SPECI/TAF use true wind direction, while ATIS uses magnetic*, since runways headings are magnetic.


*Some airports near the magnetic North Pole reference everything in true.
Last edited by Starlionblue on Tue Feb 23, 2021 4:44 am, edited 1 time in total.
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 4:47 am

Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Also I wanted to know if the METAR is issued every minute or every 5 minutes or 30 Minutes etc and or is it live weather every second at the ATC or Cockpit.

Like how does the weather reporting works ?


METARs are typically issued hourly. In case there is rapid change, a SPECI will be issued, indicating it is an unscheduled report.

ATIS is typically issued hourly or half-hourly. If there is a rapid change, a new ATIS is simply issued. ATIS is the METAR information plus runway in use and other pertinent information.

ATC has live surface wind data, which they will transmit with the landing clearance. Pilots can also request "wind check" over the radio.

TAFs are issued every 6 hours with a 24-hour forecast period (30 hours in some places like Australia).


Thank you Mr Starlion,

So the weather report of the destination that the pilots recieve before the the takeoff is the TAF right ?

Also when they prepare to land are they given a briefing about the weather at the airport by the ATC like 10 something minutes or so before the landing ?

I know pilots can see the weather at the display but during final approach I'm sure that's what they are looking at..are they ?
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 4:58 am

FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Also I wanted to know if the METAR is issued every minute or every 5 minutes or 30 Minutes etc and or is it live weather every second at the ATC or Cockpit.

Like how does the weather reporting works ?


METARs are typically issued hourly. In case there is rapid change, a SPECI will be issued, indicating it is an unscheduled report.

ATIS is typically issued hourly or half-hourly. If there is a rapid change, a new ATIS is simply issued. ATIS is the METAR information plus runway in use and other pertinent information.

ATC has live surface wind data, which they will transmit with the landing clearance. Pilots can also request "wind check" over the radio.

TAFs are issued every 6 hours with a 24-hour forecast period (30 hours in some places like Australia).


Thank you Mr Starlion,

So the weather report of the destination that the pilots recieve before the the takeoff is the TAF right ?

Also when they prepare to land are they given a briefing about the weather at the airport by the ATC like 10 something minutes or so before the landing ?

I know pilots can see the weather at the display but during final approach I'm sure that's what they are looking at..are they ?


A TAF is not a weather report. It is a weather forecast.

A METAR is a weather report. As in the weather at the time of observation.

We tend to use TAFs pre-flight, but we get the METARs too. In-flight we'd normally get the METAR. On long flights we'd also get updated TAFs.

ATC doesn't brief us on the weather. We simply get the ATIS. Many places have digital ATIS, so you can just get it printed in the cockpit. If it is a non-digital ATIS, you tune a frequency and listen to a recorded voice ATIS, which you write down. The information is the same.

10 minutes before the landing is too late for us to brief the approach. Typical approach briefing time is 30-60 minutes before landing. By then the ATIS will be quite accurate. You'd then perhaps get an updated ATIS while in the descent, but unless the weather is really dynamic it's not essential. If anything relevant changes (QNH, runway in use, etc), ATC will tell you anyway. If the flight is really short, say 30 minutes, you'd brief the arrival before departing.

The weather you see on the navigation display (ND) is the weather radar return. The more moisture in the air, the stronger return, which gives an indication of storm clouds and turbulence. We also get a wind direction and speed on the ND, which is useful but only tells us that data for our exact location.
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 5:20 am

Starlionblue wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:

METARs are typically issued hourly. In case there is rapid change, a SPECI will be issued, indicating it is an unscheduled report.

ATIS is typically issued hourly or half-hourly. If there is a rapid change, a new ATIS is simply issued. ATIS is the METAR information plus runway in use and other pertinent information.

ATC has live surface wind data, which they will transmit with the landing clearance. Pilots can also request "wind check" over the radio.

TAFs are issued every 6 hours with a 24-hour forecast period (30 hours in some places like Australia).


Thank you Mr Starlion,

So the weather report of the destination that the pilots recieve before the the takeoff is the TAF right ?

Also when they prepare to land are they given a briefing about the weather at the airport by the ATC like 10 something minutes or so before the landing ?

I know pilots can see the weather at the display but during final approach I'm sure that's what they are looking at..are they ?


A TAF is not a weather report. It is a weather forecast.

A METAR is a weather report. As in the weather at the time of observation.

We tend to use TAFs pre-flight, but we get the METARs too. In-flight we'd normally get the METAR. On long flights we'd also get updated TAFs.

ATC doesn't brief us on the weather. We simply get the ATIS. Many places have digital ATIS, so you can just get it printed in the cockpit. If it is a non-digital ATIS, you tune a frequency and listen to a recorded voice ATIS, which you write down. The information is the same.

10 minutes before the landing is too late for us to brief the approach. Typical approach briefing time is 30-60 minutes before landing. By then the ATIS will be quite accurate. You'd then perhaps get an updated ATIS while in the descent, but unless the weather is really dynamic it's not essential. If anything relevant changes (QNH, runway in use, etc), ATC will tell you anyway. If the flight is really short, say 30 minutes, you'd brief the arrival before departing.

The weather you see on the navigation display (ND) is the weather radar return. The more moisture in the air, the stronger return, which gives an indication of storm clouds and turbulence. We also get a wind direction and speed on the ND, which is useful but only tells us that data for our exact location.


So I believe the ATIS is like the METAR, I remember you taught me about METAR on the very first day of this thread and I still remember the format and everything about it so I'd expect ATIS with pretty much the same format like the METAR or does it have some differences than the METAR ..like some different coding etc or limitations ?
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 8:01 am

Also when it comes to weather then which of them between Winds,Rains,Fog,Storms is most prone to erratic fluctuations and something that always trouble pilots ?
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 8:04 am

An ATIS strictly encoded like a METAR, though METAR codes are sometimes used. Different places have different variations of how they write it.

Remember ATIS is a spoken collection of information. The digital version might have some abbreviations as you see below, but you can read it out loud easily.

HONG KONG ARRIVAL INFORMATION F AT TIME 0734
ARRIVAL RUNWAY 07R
RNP AR APCH IS AVBL ON REQ RWY 07L IS CLSD FOR MAINT
WIND 270 DEG 07 KT
VISIBILITY 10KM
CLOUD FEW 3500FT
TEMPERATURE 26 DEWPOINT 11
QNH 1012 HPA
ACKNOWLEDGE INFORMATION F ON FIRST CONTACT WITH APPROACH


Some airports, like HKG, have two ATIS, one for departure and one for arrival.


When we copy down a spoken ATIS we'll often write METAR codes for brevity. Like if I copied that down I'd write something like:

VHHH F 0734Z
R 07R
RNP AR AVLB. 07L CLSD
270/07
9999
F035
26/11
Q1012
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 8:19 am

Starlionblue wrote:
An ATIS strictly encoded like a METAR, though METAR codes are sometimes used. Different places have different variations of how they write it.

Remember ATIS is a spoken collection of information. The digital version might have some abbreviations as you see below, but you can read it out loud easily.

HONG KONG ARRIVAL INFORMATION F AT TIME 0734
ARRIVAL RUNWAY 07R
RNP AR APCH IS AVBL ON REQ RWY 07L IS CLSD FOR MAINT
WIND 270 DEG 07 KT
VISIBILITY 10KM
CLOUD FEW 3500FT
TEMPERATURE 26 DEWPOINT 11
QNH 1012 HPA
ACKNOWLEDGE INFORMATION F ON FIRST CONTACT WITH APPROACH


Some airports, like HKG, have two ATIS, one for departure and one for arrival.


When we copy down a spoken ATIS we'll often write METAR codes for brevity. Like if I copied that down I'd write something like:

VHHH F 0734Z
R 07R
RNP AR AVLB. 07L CLSD
270/07
9999
F035
26/11
Q1012


Once again thank you very much Mr Starlion for explaining this to me elaborately..I truly appreciate your time and paitence with me !
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 1:29 pm

Starlionblue wrote:
ATIS (aerodrome information used for approach and departure) is typically issued hourly or half-hourly. If there is a rapid change, a new ATIS is simply issued. ATIS is the METAR information plus runway in use and other pertinent information.


We'd update the ATIS every hour unless as you mentioned there was a significant change in the weather, a NOTAM was issued or cancelled, change in runways in use etc.
Any views shared are strictly my own and do not a represent those of any former employer.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 1:45 pm

IAHFLYR wrote:
Starlionblue wrote:
ATIS (aerodrome information used for approach and departure) is typically issued hourly or half-hourly. If there is a rapid change, a new ATIS is simply issued. ATIS is the METAR information plus runway in use and other pertinent information.


We'd update the ATIS every hour unless as you mentioned there was a significant change in the weather, a NOTAM was issued or cancelled, change in runways in use etc.


MrIAH could you tell me from your experience that which of the following attributes of the weather conditions have proven to be the most erratic with fluctuations I.e Winds,Rains,Fog,Storm,Snow,clouds etc ?
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 2:13 pm

FligtReporter wrote:
MrIAH could you tell me from your experience that which of the following attributes of the weather conditions have proven to be the most erratic with fluctuations I.e Winds,Rains,Fog,Storm,Snow,clouds etc ?


That's a handful there as weather is constantly changing be it small changes or large changes that might be completely dependent on fronts that move through the area that can change all of the above.

Wind tend to remain fairly steady in direction unless a front passes though the speeds vary unless you're in a valley that has them changing directions.

Rain is usually predicable though the intensity can fool the best forecasters. In large you are able to detect rain intensity approaching with our ATC RADAR as it has gotten much better in depicting precipitation.

Fog if often predicted and never shows up or vice versa. It can linger for days though around here in the Houston area is usually burns off mid morning. The visibility seldom goes from low RVR values to say five miles and then back down again.

Storm we again can see coming at us on our RADAR. They move along in most cases though they may develop along the same line and move over the same area for hours on end. I've seen a line of TRW form on a southwest to northeast line and while the individual storms move alone and more form from the southwest the line itself lingers not moving like a front would move.

Clouds probably the most erratic in both altitude and amount of cover.

Others will certainly be able to give different replies from the areas they reside.
Any views shared are strictly my own and do not a represent those of any former employer.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Tue Feb 23, 2021 2:18 pm

IAHFLYR wrote:
FligtReporter wrote:
MrIAH could you tell me from your experience that which of the following attributes of the weather conditions have proven to be the most erratic with fluctuations I.e Winds,Rains,Fog,Storm,Snow,clouds etc ?


That's a handful there as weather is constantly changing be it small changes or large changes that might be completely dependent on fronts that move through the area that can change all of the above.

Wind tend to remain fairly steady in direction unless a front passes though the speeds vary unless you're in a valley that has them changing directions.

Rain is usually predicable though the intensity can fool the best forecasters. In large you are able to detect rain intensity approaching with our ATC RADAR as it has gotten much better in depicting precipitation.

Fog if often predicted and never shows up or vice versa. It can linger for days though around here in the Houston area is usually burns off mid morning. The visibility seldom goes from low RVR values to say five miles and then back down again.

Storm we again can see coming at us on our RADAR. They move along in most cases though they may develop along the same line and move over the same area for hours on end. I've seen a line of TRW form on a southwest to northeast line and while the individual storms move alone and more form from the southwest the line itself lingers not moving like a front would move.

Clouds probably the most erratic in both altitude and amount of cover.

Others will certainly be able to give different replies from the areas they reside.


Thank you very much for your response Mr IAH...As always I profoundly appreciate your insights !
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Wed Feb 24, 2021 12:17 am

In general, unstable air gives more rapidly variable conditions than stable air. One indication of unstable air is low barometric pressure.

Moisture content in the air is perhaps the main driver of more "active" weather. In warmer areas like the tropics, the air can hold more moisture. Hence why you get typhoons in the South China Sea but not in the North Sea. Grossly oversimplified of course.
"There are no stupid questions, but there are a lot of inquisitive idiots." - John Ringo
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Wed Feb 24, 2021 1:04 am

Starlionblue wrote:
In general, unstable air gives more rapidly variable conditions than stable air. One indication of unstable air is low barometric pressure.

Moisture content in the air is perhaps the main driver of more "active" weather. In warmer areas like the tropics, the air can hold more moisture. Hence why you get typhoons in the South China Sea but not in the North Sea. Grossly oversimplified of course.


Thanks for sharing that with us Mr Starlion.
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Wed Feb 24, 2021 3:22 am

Hello everyone !

So I was going through this document by AAI on Low visibility procedures at my home airport and I could understand much of it and relate it to my own experience but the charts about the different approach types are a little bewildering to me especially the ILS CAT II/IIIA/IIIB..because I was trying to match my own flight route and it looked like my flight followed the same pattern as its mentioned in the chart but I just don't know how to put it coherently together...Can anyone please decode it for me.

Thank you

Here is the link

https://aim-india.aai.aero/eaip-v2//25- ... -en-GB.pdf
 
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Re: The Magic of "CAT IIIB"

Wed Feb 24, 2021 3:44 am

Lot of charts there, exactly where’s your question? Lucknow has radar, so it would be assumed vectors were given to intercept the final course somewhere around the 12.0 miles fix from LKN. Possibly your were given the DME arc at 12 miles and flew that to intercept the final. What was your departure point which would tell us direction approaching Lucknow.

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