I was a little kid when I found out about this accident a few years ago, and even as a kid, it took a lot to scare me. But seing those pics of the burnt-out L1011 on the ground were just downright horrifying.

Here's a good writeup on it for those who are unaware: https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/the ... ec85107809

Anyways, at the part where F/E Curtis informs the others of the smoke in the aft cargo hold, Capt. Khowyter says to stop the ventilation, which could have been the cause of no one making it out alive and dying of smoke inhalation.

My question is, although throughout the flight, it is hinted that Khowyter was unaware of the gravity of the situation, how come he couldn't have depressurized the cabin? With his remark on turning off ventilation, he seems to be aware of the fire, but made a wrong execution. Isn't it common sense to depressurize the cabin to starve the fire of air? Even if Curtis miscommunicated with him, a F/A told him also, so that shouldn't have been an excuse. And also, as recent as touchdown, weren't flames visible from the last 4 seats? That and did Khowyter not smell the smoke once (or hear any commotion in the cabin)?

Again, sorry if I'm misconstruing anything, I'm just curious why alternate events didn't happen. I'm well aware that Khowyter was apparently a sub-par pilot according to training records, but if he thought to turn off ventilation, shouldn't depressurizing the cabin also have been a thought to him?

Thanks

If there's anything that keeps pilots up at night, it's the thought of a cargo fire.

I hate to judge the dead. Pilots go to work intending to do the best they can. But in this case, it seems fairly clear that none of the flight crew had adequate situational awareness, and their CRM was atrocious.

A fire/smoke warning, especially in cargo, should be treated with extreme seriousness. An alarm may be spurious, but it may not be. Treat them all as authentic until proven otherwise. They spent four minutes dicking around when they could have turned immediately and maintained high speed all the way in. As the saying goes, "it's much more fun watching the plane burn while standing outside it, on the ground".

Depressurising would certainly have been an option, yes. It might have helped at least delay the spread slightly. But it was just one of many factors.

I don't know the L-1011, but in modern aircraft the cabin will depressurise completely on touchdown. However, some reading about the accident shows that the pressurisation system was on standby and thus the aircraft did not depressurise automatically. This was probably the final thing that doomed the passengers.

There isn't just one cause of course, but several. If you remove any of them, the accident would either not have happened at all, or would have been survivable.
- Dangerous goods in cargo and/or pax bags.
- Poor training.
- Poor CRM.
- Nonchalance in the face of a potentially lethal situation.
- Lack of urgency returning to the airport.
- Lack of urgency stopping and evacuating once on the runway.
- Unclear comms with ATC and cabin crew.
- Inadequate insulation material in the cargo hold.
- Depressurisation system on standby.

Of course, that's easy for me to say, at zero airspeed and zero altitude forty-two years later. It's very different when you're on the spot, and the industry has learned a lot since those days.

Starlionblue wrote:

If there's anything that keeps pilots up at night, it's the thought of a cargo fire.

I hate to judge the dead. Pilots go to work intending to do the best they can. But in this case, it seems fairly clear that none of the flight crew had adequate situational awareness, and their CRM was atrocious.

A fire/smoke warning, especially in cargo, should be treated with extreme seriousness. An alarm may be spurious, but it may not be. Treat them all as authentic until proven otherwise. They spent four minutes dicking around when they could have turned immediately and maintained high speed all the way in. As the saying goes, "it's much more fun watching the plane burn while standing outside it, on the ground".

Depressurising would certainly have been an option, yes. It might have helped at least delay the spread slightly. But it was just one of many factors.

I don't know the L-1011, but in modern aircraft the cabin will depressurise completely on touchdown. However, some reading about the accident shows that the pressurisation system was on standby and thus the aircraft did not depressurise automatically. This was probably the final thing that doomed the passengers.

There isn't just one cause of course, but several. If you remove any of them, the accident would either not have happened at all, or would have been survivable.
- Dangerous goods in cargo and/or pax bags.
- Poor training.
- Poor CRM.
- Nonchalance in the face of a potentially lethal situation.
- Lack of urgency returning to the airport.
- Lack of urgency stopping and evacuating once on the runway.
- Unclear comms with ATC and cabin crew.
- Inadequate insulation material in the cargo hold.
- Depressurisation system on standby.

Of course, that's easy for me to say, at zero airspeed and zero altitude forty-two years later. It's very different when you're on the spot, and the industry has learned a lot since those days.

Thank you for the very informative reply!

There were many problems with crew communication and crew management that resulted in this accident becoming a teaching example. One of the many things that the F/E did incorrect was to mismanage the pressurization such that the airplane remained pressurized after landing. This made it impossible to open the doors. The Captain made many mistakes but one of the ones with fatal results was that he did not stop immediately on the runway. He passed all of the emergency vehicles that had to chase the plane to the point where it finally stopped. This allowed the fire to expand significantly.

113312 wrote:

There were many problems with crew communication and crew management that resulted in this accident becoming a teaching example. One of the many things that the F/E did incorrect was to mismanage the pressurization such that the airplane remained pressurized after landing. This made it impossible to open the doors. The Captain made many mistakes but one of the ones with fatal results was that he did not stop immediately on the runway. He passed all of the emergency vehicles that had to chase the plane to the point where it finally stopped. This allowed the fire to expand significantly.

The urge to vacate the runway and not block it is strong.

Nowadays we are taught to stop on the runway in cases like this, even if we are able to vacate. For example, in the case of nosewheel steering failure we'd be able to vacate with differential braking without too much difficulty. Try that in the sim and you'll get an earful.

Starlionblue wrote:

The urge to vacate the runway and not block it is strong.

I think this may have been because there was rumor that the Saudi king's 747 was taking off, which meant that all the other planes and ground vehicles had to not move any more. This meant that the crew of flight 163 would have been unable to stop and evacuate on the runway, otherwise they would have gone to prison.

However there is every other reason not to believe this. Only one witness saw the Saudi King's 747, and that same person said that there were no firetrucks on the runway chasing the plane. However, I think this can be refuted, as there were stairs brought out to the burning L1011, meaning that there was help on the way. In that case, ground equipment was moving, and the king's plane was likely NOT in action at that time. Plus, there was the vivid detail that the firemen saw fire visible from the last 4 windows, and the flight attendants saw the fire trucks as well.

Personally I don't believe the King story, but I could very well be wrong.

I've known about this incident and actually saw the burned out plane as my flight into Riyadh when I moved there was only few days later. I've seen articles and videos about it, but never heard the transcript of the CVR. That's crazy the way they handled it. It sounded like the cabin crew were better trained about what to do with a fire on board.

Depressurising the cabin doesn’t help fight a fire. There might not be enough O2 up there to sustain consciousness but plenty to sustain a fire. The best you can hope is the outflow valves might evacuate a bit of smoke. It doesn’t slow the progression of the fire at all

There was also some finding the FE had dyslexia and delayed beginning the correct checklists.

It should be noted, however, that about 3 minutes were spent by the crew in looking for the aft cargo smoke warn- ing procedure. Evidence indicated that this difficulty was the
result of a split of'the Emergency and Abnormal procedures into Emergency, Abnormal and Additional. The crew apparently believ- ed that the correct procedures were in the Abnormal section whi- le it was actually in the Emergency section. Another factor which possibly contributed to the time required to find the loca- tion of the proper procedures was that the flight Engineer was affected by "Dyslexia". The manifestation of such a condition
can cause confusion of switches, actions, etc.

cedarjet wrote:

Depressurising the cabin doesn’t help fight a fire. There might not be enough O2 up there to sustain consciousness but plenty to sustain a fire. The best you can hope is the outflow valves might evacuate a bit of smoke. It doesn’t slow the progression of the fire at all

Depressurization would have allowed the opening of the exit doors though.

A cargo fire warning light illuminated on a NW DC-10 in 2005 over Iran. Crew made an emergency landing in Tehran, the first US passenger jet to land in the country since the Sha was overthrown. An hour long narrative of the event by the CPT here:

https://youtu.be/Cmmj5ELNv0Y

bourbon wrote:

cedarjet wrote:

Depressurising the cabin doesn’t help fight a fire. There might not be enough O2 up there to sustain consciousness but plenty to sustain a fire. The best you can hope is the outflow valves might evacuate a bit of smoke. It doesn’t slow the progression of the fire at all

Depressurization would have allowed the opening of the exit doors though.

I am no expert, but would that have been a viable action in midair? Of course, the plane for whatever reason was not set to depressurize as soon as touchdown, therby impeding the F/As from making an immediate evacuation. But the fire was still a hazard midair, and due to the crew members not utilizing their time correctly, it spread quickly throughout the cabin. I would have thought that depressurization of the cabin earlier in the flight could have mitigated the spread of the fire but I guess I was wrong.

RetiredWeasel wrote:

A cargo fire warning light illuminated on a NW DC-10 in 2005 over Iran. Crew made an emergency landing in Tehran, the first US passenger jet to land in the country since the Sha was overthrown. An hour long narrative of the event by the CPT here:

https://youtu.be/Cmmj5ELNv0Y

I had drinks with those guys at the NH City North after the fact; they said nothing but good things, from what I recall. The FA's were BOS-Based. The Purser (Dave T.) spins a good yard about their diversion...one night at San Remo's on the way to/from India I heard all about it. I think that airplane is one of the DC10 tankers now...