1) In reference to a post for the original question, Yes the accident could have been avoided even after the engine came off. Had the crew simply maintained an extra 5-10 kts of airspeed the left wing wouldn't have stalled, or once it did stall recovery was still possible had they simply lowered the nose instead of holding full back pressure as they did.
That is one reason the KC
-10 (and I assume the DC-10-30, as the AF KC
-10 -1 is essentially United's POH) maintains V2
+10 as a minimum for loss of an engine after V1. A while back we loaded the situation into the sim as best as we could, and about 50/50 was the best we could do to retain control. But it should be stated that in the sim we KNEW some of the unnaparent system malfuctions and attempted to maintain acft control using that. Even knowing that, the situation progresses so fast that the acft really gets ahead of you quickly.
2) I don't know the specifics on the initial DC10 A/P disconnect parameters when the control wheel is nudged.
The DC-10 has pressure sensors in the yoke, but not the control column. Pressure applied to the yoke will cause the system to drop off, and 4 red AP
annunciators to flash until the AP
DISC buttons are depressed twice. I don't know if the acft was designed with the annunciators or if they were ADed later. The catch to this is the yoke column. As mentioned, if pressure is applied to the column but NOT the yoke wheel itself, as with a seat cushion or knee, the AP
will retrim itself proportionately to the offset, until max trim for conditions is met, at which time 2 amber AP
TRIM annunciators illuminate, but the AP
will not disengage. After the Soix city accident, several modifications to the hyd sys were made. As a result of one of them, if certain conditions are met, a valve will isolate fluid in such a way that the AP
2 will not have elevator authority but it will not automatically disengage. This has not caused any accidents, but is a warning in the DC-10 POH.
4) FDXmech is dead on with the gear, in fact, the abnormal procedures don't even address gear malfuctions unless BOTH sets indicate unsafe. If any set indicates safe, the system design is such that the gear is safe. Although the DC-10 also has the visual indication method, it is a pain in the rump to use, and difficult to correctly identify under less than optimal conditions.
3) In general (and I am biased, I am a huge fan of the three holers) I have no issues with the safety record of the -10 at all. Look at the KC
-10, in 20 years of operating routinely at max weight (590K), and temp (60c), not to mention some of the harshest environments on earth (Desert, Thule), the AF
hasn't lost any to flight accidents. The only KC
-10 to be lost was due to a ground fire in the CAC.