I have written several trip reports about my flying at America West Airlines over the past few years, and even wrote one about Hawaiian Airlines since I returned from furlough last year. But I have been prodded to do one on this specific event by several people here (yes, including you, Scarlet Harlot), and now that some time has passed, and since I will not be returning to America West (OK, USAirways), I thought I should get this down before the details start fading from memory. What I hope to do here is to allow you to understand some of the feelings and thoughts that go through a pilot's mind in the moments leading up to, during, and after a serious event, and how through a lot of intense professional training we handle unexpected (and possibly life-threatening) situations.

There is a very old adage in aviation that a flying career is hours and hours of boredom punctuated by moments of stark terror. I feel fortunate that I haven't really felt the terror part yet, but there have been a few moments where my attention was, shall we say, a little more focused than usual, and the closest I have come to that terror moment was on Thursday, September 22nd, 2005. I had been flying for AWA for over a year, and had been based in Las Vegas since February of that year. I enjoyed the flying, even though it included a lot of red-eye trips across the U.S., and had settled down into a comfortable routine of flying four 4-day trips a month, with a fairly easy commute to and from my home in Seattle. On that hot early-fall day I rode down on my usual commute from SEA, arriving in LAS around 7pm. I knew the Captain I would be flying with quite well, as we had gone through our yearly recurrent training together two months earlier, and had flown two trips together since then too. He was a great guy to fly with, and had an easygoing attitude with a down-home Texas sense of humor. He arrived in LAS on his commute from Dallas about the same time I did and we sat around the crew room telling lies until it was time to check in and get ready for the flight.

Our first day of the trip was a one-leg redeye to Cleveland Ohio. It was flight 539 with a scheduled departure time of 10:53pm. We were flying an Airbus A320, N632AW. It was one of the older aircraft in the fleet, and had the less powerful --A1 version engines on it. We walked to the gate and got onboard to begin our preflight preparations. There was a nice routine feeling to the day, because I had flown with this Captain, and on this route, several times before. The weather was cooperative too, with no storms forecast along our route of flight. It was however quite warm in LAS, and combined with a full load of passengers meant that we would be using pretty much all of the performance available from the aircraft. If for some reason we ended up with even more weight onboard than expected we did have a few options. The whole point of these preflight calculations is to ensure that the aircraft can meet the required climb performance if one engine quits right a liftoff. If it gets to the point that you can't, your options are to either increase the thrust produced by the engines, or take some weight off of the plane. The second option isn't too popular with the airline because that means less revenue for them. The first option can work sometimes, but it also means more wear and tear on the engines, with reduced time between expensive overhauls. The airline knows in advance roughly how many passengers and how much cargo it will carry so there usually isn't too much work we have to do in the cockpit, but when the margins get slimmed down to the bare minimum, we always double check to ensure that we meet the required performance levels. Compounding the problem that September night was the fact that we were taking off from Las Vegas when the weather was still summer-hot. And combined with the 2000+ foot elevation at LAS meant that the air wasn't as dense, and the aircraft wouldn't have as much performance available as it would on a cool day at sea level. Under most normal conditions, departing airliners often takeoff with the engines producing less than maximum thrust. The performance required to keep the flight legal is computed, and the autothrottles and/or aircraft computer is programmed to set the appropriate amount of thrust for takeoff. The amount of reduction can go from 0 to 25%, depending on how light the aircraft is. If even full thrust won't be enough, we have a few other tricks up our sleeves too. The older Airbuses (Airbii?) in the fleet with the A-1 engines were known to be somewhat lackluster in performance, especially when taking off heavy on a hot day from Vegas. The newer A320's, as well as all the A319's had newer --A5 engines which had more power and caused fewer headaches in flight planning.

When we computed the final numbers for our flight we found that we could just barely do the takeoff with full thrust, without having to do a 'bleeds-off' takeoff. What that means is that under normal conditions the engines have some of the air vented out (bled off) of the compressor section, even during takeoff, which is used to power the onboard air conditioning and pressurization equipment. Taking that air from the engines saps some of the power it could put out as thrust, but as long as there is enough power to takeoff legally, it isn't a problem. If we had been too heavy for a normal departure however, we could have turned off the bleeds just before takeoff which would let the engine have full available power, and increase the weight we could lift. In our case, we were just a couple hundred pounds under that limit, so officially we could do a normal 'bleeds-on' takeoff. The Captain and I discussed this for a moment, and decided that since LAS has such a long runway for departure we would go ahead and do the 'bleeds on' takeoff. There is always the option to be a little more conservative if we wish, but we felt comfortable with the numbers we had, and continued with the preflight preparations.

The flight attendants came onboard and we all introduced ourselves. Unlike Hawaiian Airlines, AWA was a big enough company that I rarely flew with the same F/A's more than once. These three were all new to me and the Captain, as they were fairly junior. It was usually the more junior F/A's that got the redeye trips. I went outside to do the walkaround inspection, and was surprised again at how hot it stays in Vegas, even at night. The sun had set a couple hours earlier, but with the Vegas strip just a mile away, there was no way to see the stars above against the glitter and glitz reflecting up from the heart of sin city. The only constant feature in the Vegas sky is the pillar of light coming from the peak of the Luxor Hotel pyramid, spearing up into the stratosphere.

Everything on the exterior of the aircraft looked to be in good shape, if a little dirty and worn. I suppose most passengers would be surprised to see the amount of dirt, grime, grease, and hydraulic fluid on the underside of a typical airliner. It's not dangerous, but it is inevitable when the planes fly so much, and can come in for a wash only when it's time for a maintenance check at the hanger. Most planes have vents on the bottom from the hydraulic system, as well as drains from the sinks in the lavatories. Whenever a flight attendant pours out a pot of coffee into the sink before landing, that coffee goes out the vent, to eventually make a brown stain somewhere aft of the drain mast on the underside of the plane. The acid from that coffee is actually one of the leading causes of the stains, corrosion, and paint peeling on the aircraft fleets of the world.

Half an hour before departure the passengers began to board, and the Captain and I waited while they all got settled. The preflight procedures are setup so that most of our work is done early, and we can relax and be ready to go once the passengers and baggage has been loaded. When they were settled and the gate agent gave us the OK, we closed the door and called ramp control for clearance to push back.

As a pilot, we sometimes get the feeling that we are more closely related to Pavlov's dog than any other species of animal. The training we accomplish for the job has us go over and over certain areas so often that our procedures and reactions are (and must be) automatic. Those areas are usually in the most critical phases of flight, takeoff, approach, and landing. In other areas we try and stay standard in what we do, but aren't limited to a strict litany of callouts and procedures. Getting ready to leave the gate is one of those areas where we have some latitude in what we do, because the situation is often changing. In LAS the county controls the ramp area, and they have a separate frequency set up for control there, apart from the normal FAA ground controllers up in the tower. The problem in LAS was that AWA had scheduled upwards of 25 flights to leave in a 15 minute window each evening. Since each flight has to call for push, then again for taxi, and each one requires a couple of back-and-forth comments from us and the controller, things can get very busy on the radio. And if two people try and call at once, all you get is screech over the radio and the whole thing has to be done again. On one occasion I had to wait nearly 12 minutes before I could get a word in edgewise to get clearance to push. This night however I got through on the first call, and received our clearance to push and start. A check of a few of the overhead switches was accomplished, (another of the long practiced and memorized procedures) and we were ready to go. As long as the APU (auxiliary power unit) in the tail is running and providing compressed air for the start, starting the engines on an Airbus is extremely simple. Merely ensure that adequate air is available, and flip one switch. The computers take care of the rest. A minute later we had both engines running, and with another clearance in hand, began the taxi to runway 25R.

We were about half way into the block of departures, so there were over a dozen aircraft ahead of us on the taxiway heading down toward the end of the runway. Most were AWA planes, heading east for redeyes, plus a few United, Delta, and Northwest planes too. AWA had another block of flights leaving between 11:45pm and midnight which included a few redeyes, plus all the late flights to west coast destinations. Southwest was normally absent from the nighttime rush, as their schedule is very civilized with most of their flying finished by that time of night. The lineup shortened as more aircraft launched into the sweltering night, and we soon found ourselves next in line. Ground control had been talking to us up to that point with a couple of questions about our route of flight, and a possible deviation for weather over the midwest. As we reached the front of the line ground control asked us to switch to tower, and almost immediately we were cleared into position on the runway. The Captain steered us into position and stopped us on the centerline with the toe brakes on the rudder pedals. We had decided earlier that I would fly the first leg, then we'd alternate over the next few days. The Captain turned the controls over to me, and took over the radio duties. I put my right hand on the comfortable sidestick, my left on the throttles, held the brakes with my feet and waited for our turn to go. When it's busy at LAS, the controllers can give one aircraft clearance to go as soon as the one ahead has lifted off. That was what happened in our case.

"Cactus 539, runway 25 right, cleared for takeoff, keep preceding company in sight."

"Cleared for takeoff, company in sight," the Captain replied.

"Here we go," I said, and advanced the throttles to the 'TOGA' (Takeoff/Go-Around) position. I kept my eyes on the centerline of the runway and steered with the rudder pedals. As we started to move we heard the controller say,

"Cactus 278 position and hold Runway 25 Right." That was the plane directly behind us, one of our 757's going to Baltimore. The 757 needs a few moments without moving before rolling onto the runway in order to align its navigation platform, and with the rapid flow of traffic, they hadn't had enough time yet.

"Cactus 278, we need a few more seconds here," they replied.

"Cactus 278, cancel takeoff clearance," the tower said.

I was of course listening to this exchange on the radio as we accelerated, and for a moment I thought that was a little strange, since they hadn't been cleared for takeoff yet, but merely into position and hold. But I was primarily concentrating on our own takeoff roll, and just after the last call from the tower the Captain said,

"Eighty knots, power set."

The next call I expected from the Captain was 'V1 - rotate', meaning we had reached a speed where we would have to continue the takeoff even if we lost an engine. In this case, the V1 speed and our rotation speed were the same, 151 knots. Because of our heavy weight, the hot day, high altitude, and less powerful engines I knew it would be a long takeoff roll, and it was. We were rumbling along the runway and gathering speed when I heard,

"I don't think he's going to stop!"

I looked ahead and to the left, and saw another aircraft that had apparently landed on the parallel runway, 25L, about to cross our runway. Sure enough, his nose poked past the runway lights and he kept moving into our path. Since it was dark, what I mostly remember seeing was the light from the line of windows along the side of the plane, not the plane itself.

My first thought was, of course, "Oh shit". But at the same time I was trying to figure out how to miss him. We were still below V1, somewhere around 130 to 135 knots, which meant we would normally have enough room to stop, but with this other plane in the way all those calculations go out the window. My next thought was to stomp hard left on the rudder and go behind him, but the areas between the taxiways and runways are mostly desert sand, and have substantial dips in them. I knew that if I veered off the runway we'd bounce a few times, then rip off the landing gear and go barreling across the airport shedding parts of the plane as we went. Without thinking more about it I pulled full aft on the sidestick and watched as we made a slow rotation. We were still probably 10 or 15 knots below our normal rotation speed, and the plane felt sluggish. As I yanked back the Captain was yelling to me,

"Pull! Pull! Pull!", meaning he wanted me to pull on the sidestick, and for us to get airborne, now! I had already beaten him to that conclusion.

The Captain had pulled himself forward to the glareshield and was watching all this unfold from his front row seat. It's to his credit that he trusted me enough that he didn't grab hold of his own sidestick too. Instead he watched, helpless, as the plane tried to struggle into the air. Keep in mind that from the time he pointed out the intruding aircraft until I pulled back was probably less than three or four seconds. I didn't feel panic, but instead a very close ability to see details as the clock seemed to slow down. I also remember many different options running through my head in those few seconds. However now we were committed to fly, and despite the low airspeed we were airborne. I heard the clunk of the landing gear struts extending as we became airborne, and even as the two aircraft kept closing the gap between them with alarming speed, I could see that we were climbing. From that point on, I kept my eyes on the instruments ahead of me. In the Airbus the controls are fly-by-wire, which means everything is computer controlled. There are limits on how much we can point the nose up, or roll the wings before the computer says 'Uh, no thanks boys', and stops us there. With my sidestick full aft, all I could hope for was that the computer (which didn't know about the danger ahead) would allow us to climb enough before we got too slow and it lowered our nose to ensure we didn't stall. I watched the airspeed tape roll backwards with frightening speed, and the altimeter tape climbing much too slowly. Suddenly I saw a red flash out of the corner of my eye -- the red beacon on the top of the other plane as it passed underneath us, just on my side. I counted one, two, three, didn't hear anything banging or smashing, and gently lowered the nose enough to stop the airspeed decline. We were within a few knots of what Airbus calls 'Alpha-floor', which is part of the fly-by-wire program that prevents stalls by lowering the nose and increasing power. If that had happened, since we were already at full power, all that would have happened would be a lowering of the nose - something I had desperately wanted to avoid up to that point. Slowly, slowly we began to speed up as I lowered the nose a little more, and I saw our vertical speed indicator begin to inch upward too. When I saw we were in a good climb I called for gear up, and took a good, long, deep breath. At a thousand feet we were almost back on profile and I called for power to be reduced to the climb setting. The Captain did that, then we heard,

"Cactus 539, contact departure."

The Captain keyed the mike and said, "Tower, Cactus 539, we nearly hit someone down there on the runway!"

"Roger 539, we are aware and are investigating. Contact departure now on 125.9."

"Going to departure, 539."

From what I remember, the Captain sounded somewhat out of breath, but in control. I haven't heard the tower tapes of that night, but I suspect now that he may have sounded more like Mickey Mouse after a deep slug of helium. But at the time I thought he was fairly well restrained.

I clicked on the autopilot and called for the flaps to be retracted on schedule. Departure control turned us to the south along the planned departure path, then eastward with a direct clearance to Dove Creek VOR in the southwest corner of Colorado. As we climbed out of 10,000 feet we both unclipped our shoulder harnesses, looked at each other, and took a big breath along with showing a couple of very weak smiles.

"Holy shit," the Captain said quietly, "that was way, way too close. Are you all right? What happened?"

I replied that I had no idea what had happened, and hadn't even heard anything on the radio from that plane or the tower before we took off. We both took a moment to ensure we weren't too panic stricken to continue, and that neither of us thought we had hit the other plane. The Captain said that from his viewpoint, we passed directly over the other aircraft's tail, somewhere between 50 and 100 feet above it. That matched what I saw as we passed over the plane, so after another moment to calm down, we quietly discussed what we thought had happened for a few minutes. We both agreed that we had never heard the other airplane being given clearance to cross our runway, and that the tower had never said anything to us about them. With that, the Captain got to work sending an ACARS message to our dispatch office. ACARS is like an airborne e-mail system that allows us to get updated weather information, as well as send and receive text messages to and from our dispatchers and the stations we're about to land at. He put in a brief account of what happened and sent it off. Less than a minute later we got back a message saying that they already knew about it -- the tower had called our operations people right after it happened. They told us that they didn't know any more than we did, but were in contact with the tower and would let us know more later.

After we leveled off, we pulled out some blank event report forms and began to fill them out. Most airlines have similar forms that we are supposed to fill out whenever something unusual happens -- bird strikes, unruly passengers, and of course, accidents and near misses. By the time we had them both filled out (and had compared them to make sure we were both telling roughly the same story) we were half way across the country. When the lead flight attendant came up to let us take a restroom break, we told her what had happened. She hadn't noticed anything different, but after talking to the F/A who had been sitting in the back we discovered that she (in the aft galley) had seen an unusual red light flash by out the window just as we took off, and wondered what it was. That was the same beacon light I had seen out my side window as we passed over the other aircraft. Needless to say, all three of them were fairly shaken up after hearing how close we had come to a major accident.

The rest of the flight proceeded quietly, as dispatch had no more information for us. The descent, approach and landing were quite uneventful. We pulled up to the gate, shut down the engines, and let the passengers go, unaware of how close they had come that evening. We let the F/A's know that they should go on ahead of us to the hotel, because we had a lot of phone calls to make before we left the airport. It was about 5:30 in the morning, and still dark outside, with the cool, humid midwest air wafting in through the quiet and now-empty cabin.

Finally, for the first time since the incident, I had a chance to sit back and really think about what had happened, and make a check on how I was feeling. To my surprise, I didn't feel all that upset of shaky. When I thought about it, I realized that once I started pulling back on the sidestick, I could feel how the aircraft was performing and knew that we would probably clear the plane ahead -- by how much I didn't know, but I guess I had felt sure enough that we'd make it that I didn't have time to look at disaster square in the face. The Captain on the other had had merely been an observer during the incident, and that feeling of helplessness is probably what contributed to his mild case of 'the shakes'.

Once everyone was gone and our postflight chores done, we called our national union office to let them know what had happened, and left another message with our local union office. Both offices were closed due to the early hour, but it was something we had to do. Then we called the dispatch office again, but they didn't have much more to tell us. They only said that the other plane was an Air Canada Airbus A320, just like ours, but that no more information was available. We made sure that our event reports were sealed in the company-mail envelope heading back to Phoenix that morning, and finally left for the hotel as the early light of dawn filtered through the hazy air.

At the hotel near the airport, I was able to fall right asleep, and got a good night's (day's?) rest. The poor Captain however had just dozed off when his phone started ringing. He got calls from the union, the company, the dispatchers, and the FAA. He didn't get more than a few hours sleep total that night, most of it interrupted. After I woke up I went for a walk around the neighborhood and had a whatever-you-call-it-meal-when-you've-been-up-all-night at about 3pm. I met the Captain and F/A's in the lobby at about 6pm to start the next leg. That was where I found out about the Captain's lack of sleep, and that the F/A's were so shaken that they were calling off the trip as soon as we got back to Vegas.

The rest of the trip was uneventful, with an evening flight to LAS, then on to Oakland CA. On the third evening we flew back to LAS, then did another redeye to Philadelphia. Finally, in the late afternoon on Sunday, the fourth day of the trip, the Captain got a call just as we were loading our stuff into the van for the ride to the PHL airport. It turned out that there had been a meeting in Phoenix that afternoon between the company, the union, and the FAA concerning the incident, and the FAA had said that is was entirely the controllers fault.

It had been a combination of errors that nearly resulted in a tragic accident. The ground controller had kept us on his frequency so long that we never heard the tower clear the Air Canada plane to land, or to cross our runway. All that had been done before we switched to the tower. The tower controller had realized his error shortly after giving us our takeoff clearance, but instead of using our callsign he used that of our company 757 just behind us, who he had been talking to in regard to their need for a few more seconds before departure. After he thought he had told us to stop, he turned away for a moment to try and coordinate where we would go in the lineup once we returned to the taxiway. Of course, since we thought he had been talking to the plane behind us, we kept going. By the time the controller turned back to the view outside, we were already in our panic-stricken attempt to fly over the other plane.

When the Captain hung up, he relayed this information to me, and with the exception of one note from our operations department the next week repeating what we had just learned, that was the very last time I heard anything from the company on the incident. No 'thank you', or even 'good job' from the chief pilot. Just silence. The Captain and I know we did a good job, and I suppose that is enough. The passengers made it through that flight safe, secure, and unaware. We did our job, the one we were trained to do. There is of course no part of our training syllabus that tells us what to do in exactly the situation we saw that evening, but what we do learn is what our aircraft is capable of doing, and what it isn't. And most of all the long hours in the simulator teach us how to think clearly, even when the crap is spreading rapidly though every fan blade in existence. By sheer repetition we learn how to think clearly, quickly, and to use all the resources available to us. We are presented with unusual situations so often in training that our first response is 'what do we have to do to keep us safe', instead of 'Oh my God, we're going to die!' Habit, practice, and repetition are the keys to ensuring that we can do our best, even when there's a wall of aluminum directly in front of us.

A few days later a small article appeared in the local Vegas newspaper about the incident. As usual, they got some parts right, and some wrong. The FAA was apparently telling the press that it wasn't too much of an incident, since the Air Canada plane had already cleared the runway before we crossed over it. Since we were the ones who flew directly over the tail of the other plane, I'd like to differ. However the press never came to talk to us, so our side was never presented. There was also a brief mention in the Drudge report, the New York Times, and a paper in Toronto. Beyond that, nobody else heard much about the incident, and in a short time it all faded into the quiet mass of 'could-have-been' stories. The only thing new we learned from those stories was that the 17-year veteran tower controller had been relieved of duty, and would be going through 'retraining'.

The only unanswered question I have left is regarding the crew of that Air Canada plane. Whenever I have landed on 25L in LAS and been given clearance to cross 25R, I always looked back up the other runway before crossing it, even though -- because of the angle that the taxiway crosses that runway -- the nose of our plane is pointed at an angle away from the departure end of 25R. My question is, did that AC crew ever look back and up the runway to where we were barreling toward them from? By seeing that long row of illuminated windows on the right side of the plane in front of us, I'm sure that some of the passengers saw that set of too-close landing lights glaring at them. And I KNOW that everyone on that plane heard us as we flew less than 100 feet right over their heads, our engines screaming at maximum power as we tried to claw our way into the air. Was the crew ever aware of what actually happened? How many sets of underwear had to be changed that evening? Who knows? Ours remained unsoiled, but just barely. I know it probably won't happen, but the one thing I would wish still to happen is to meet the crew of that plane and find out what they heard, saw, and thought.

In the end, everyone was safe, no metal was bent, and I am still enjoying my career. I wouldn't wish an incident like that on anyone, but I will admit that when I got home a few days later, I hugged my wife and son a little bit longer than usual. I've never taken my happiness for granted, but it sure was nice to be able to say hello to them one more time.

HAL

Wow HAL, Thanks for sharing this with us, I cant even begin to imagine the thoughts that ran through your head during and after the event!!.. Guess it just makes us in the back all the more grateful for the proffesionalism and skill of you guys in the pointy end...

Rgrds
Ryan

HAL,

I remember your first report on this very well, and you did say then that at some point, once the NTSB report was concluded, that you could comment further. You additional details now are very much appreciated

BWI757

HAL,

A superbly written report! Thanks so much for sharing! I have missed the pilot reports that you and the other commercial pilots have posted here. They are most entertaining to those of us who love the industry but will never get to sit up front in the left or right seat!

bcoz

HAL,
Many thanks for sharing, as ever, amazing detail and more thrilling than usual! I remember you promising to write this one day after the paperwork and formalitites were finished. Saying you stayed calm and acted swiftly under pressure is somewhat of an understatement. It is a shame you didn't get a 'thank you' or 'great job.' Manners and appreciation don't cost anything but they are worth a hell of alot.
It was awesome to hear the account from a front row seat.
Did they propose or implement any changes at LAS after the incident?

Hope your enjoying your time back at HA! How do your hours compare with your time at US?

Looking forward to further reports!
Best wishes

Adam

Thanks for a very well written account of what happened that night. It was very easy to visualise what you were looking at and how the aircraft performed, but I can't begin to imagine what was going through your head as you flew on to CLE in the hours following the incident.

Seeing as you got no official thanks or praise from your employer or the FAA... allow me to say thanks for doing such a great job... as mentioned above these events make those of us down the back appreciate the professionalism of the flight crews that get us safely from A to B on a daily basis.

This just made metafilter so prepare for the barrage.

Wow..thank you for sharing and more importantly since your company won't say it, amazing job at saving hundreds of lives.

Also, the way you write is clear and it is nice how you explain all the technical terms. One of my fav. trip reports on here, look forward to more.

Who are you flying for now?

Thanks again.

-Brian

hi from dar es salaam.
Thanks for sharing this.... it has been a good read.

i hope to fly the jets one day just like yours......

HAL, did you ever finish your book? You were writing one, right?

Thanks for the amazing report. And a great job avoiding disaster.

Wow, thats really scary. I just did a few animations for runway incursions and I placed myself in the cockpit of the departing/landing aircraft as a viewpoint. I can only begin to imagine what you thought.
Great flying and great split-second decision making!

9V-SPJ

Well written. I was on the edge of my chair the whole time. Great flying, and glad everyone is ok!

C-GAGN

A rivetting read HAL!! Good on yer for keeping your head and pulling it off! Keep safe and write again soon.

A brilliantly and effectively told story, Hal. It highlights what apparently continues to be the most persistent and most difficult problem still facing aviation today -- runway incursions. A mixture of good training and good fortune has kept countless passengers and crew alive, thanks to professional aviators like you. But telling this story with your level of breadth and detail will doubtless contribute to the continuing need to address this problem in all its complex facets. Congratulations and, most of all, thank you!

Jim Brown
Orlando, FL

Quoting PlateMan (Reply 7): Who are you flying for now?

HAL is flying with Hawaiian again and I had the privilege of flying to PHX with him last year. Very nice guy and professional to a T.

pualani

very nice report.
its amazing that all that description only happened in a few seconds.
it can be very difficult when it comes to split second decision making. and it helps to fly with a pilot that you know and feel comfortable with.

Nice report Hal. Do you remember which taxiway they were crossing 25R at?

Airport diagram of LAS available here

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Las_Vegas_Airport

The AC pilots obviously saw you guys coming toward them down the runway. Was there no way for them to just gun it and get off the runway (or is that what they tried to do?)

Thank you everyone for the nice comments. It's always a pleasure to share a bit of my job with people who like and appreciate our industry.

Quoting AdamTStarFlyer (Reply 4): Did they propose or implement any changes at LAS after the incident?

No, nothing different from what they were doing before. The subject of runway incursions is an ongoing battle with the FAA, airlines, and airport operators across the country. Incursions don't happen all that often, but with such serious possible consequences, there's a lot of effort being put into training for everyone involved, plus putting in improved signage and markings around all the airports in the US.

Quoting AdamTStarFlyer (Reply 4): Hope your enjoying your time back at HA! How do your hours compare with your time at US?

I'm enjoying Hawaiian very much again. It's nice to be back, and although I have nothing but good to say about my time at America West/USAirways, Hawaiian is where I want to be. The hours are about the same, although since my commute from Seattle is now to Honolulu instead of Las Vegas, I try to group as many of my trips together so I don't have to do that commute more than once or twice a month. That usually means I'm gone for 7 to 14 days at a time, but when I'm home, it's for longer stretches too. I try to bid for several Sydney trips each month too because I can get more hours per trip, and there's always a lot to do down here (yes, I'm on a SYD layover as I write this).

Quoting SirOmega (Reply 9): HAL, did you ever finish your book? You were writing one, right?

Good memory Omega! Yes, I finished it about two months ago (it took longer than I thought, but still nice to be done), and sent it off to my first choice of publisher. The way the publishing industry works means that they will take 6 to 9 months to consider it, then if they reject it (which happens to more than 95% of the submissions they get) I'll send it off to the next one. In the mean time I'm outlining my second novel, a present day thriller that does involve a lot of aviation. For anyone who asks, my first novel was a science fiction/ political/ disaster/ thriller. No airplanes in that one, but I'm proud of it anyway. If it eventually does get published, I'll let you all know.

Quoting Pualani (Reply 14): HAL is flying with Hawaiian again and I had the privilege of flying to PHX with him last year. Very nice guy and professional to a T.

Thank you very much Pualani. I'll say it again, HA has the best and most professional cabin staff I have ever flown with. You guys make our job easy.

Quoting Bakersdozen (Reply 16): Do you remember which taxiway they were crossing 25R at?

They were crossing at A6. Because of the angle that A6 crosses 25R, the FO has to crane his neck around to look somewhat backwards to see down the runway. A quick glance to the side won't be enough. Every time I fly into LAS now with HA, I am very careful to check backwards before crossing 25R.

Quoting Bakersdozen (Reply 16): The AC pilots obviously saw you guys coming toward them down the runway. Was there no way for them to just gun it and get off the runway (or is that what they tried to do?)

It's quite possible that they didn't see us at all, but if the did it was only at the very last second. I don't know if they gunned their engines or not, but even if the did they were still directly below us as we overflew them. I don't think they had enough time to get completely out of the way.

HAL

[Edited 2007-08-01 00:55:07]

I can sympathise with the controller involved. I myself used to be an ATC controller and put 2 planes very close together before and got relieved from the seat. It is a scary thought and blood just gushed from my face... I went pale... There was a lot of shouting going on in the tower and an omninous silence when one of the pilots went on the air and said "That was close..."

Needless to say... After the whole ordeal was over, I went to the squadron to apologise to the pilots personally.

Quoting HAL (Thread starter): The 757 needs a few moments without moving before rolling onto the runway in order to align its navigation platform, and with the rapid flow of traffic, they hadn't had enough time yet

Since the moderaters chose to delete my first post with respect to this subject, I shall re-post. The above statement is factually wrong! The IRS on the 757 is just like it is on any other aircraft. Once it's in NAV that's it. There is no alignment that's done prior to taking the active runway or anything else.

Very interesting and well-detailed report of a incident. Thank god it didn't turn into an accident!

Reminded me of "Fear and loathing in Las Vegas"...

HAL,

All I can say is WOW! Great Job....

Keep up the good the work... and i hope one day I'll have honor of flying on one of your flights!

Zaki

Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 19): The IRS on the 757 is just like it is on any other aircraft. Once it's in NAV that's it. There is no alignment that's done prior to taking the active runway or anything else.

Phil, I didn't fly the 757 for AWA, but all I know is that they required a few moments at the end of the runway for a 'quick align'. I asked one of the guys on that plane about it once, but all I remember is that he said it was standard procedure. What I do remember from that night is that when cleared into position, the 757's words were "We need a few more seconds here for the alignment". Don't shoot the messenger here on this one - I'm just reporting what I know from my time at AWA. I fly the 767 now, and no, we don't have to do the 'quick align'. Maybe it is a leftover procedure from years past, maybe it's something different. Since I didn't fly that plane, I don't know the details.

HAL

all I can say is 'GOOD JOB' !!!

Great Report HAL!

Keep up the safe flying with HA!!

-Aloha!

Hal, I very much appreciate the professionalism displayed in your report (expected nothing less) as well as all of your writings I have had the pleasure of reading......quite a hair raising experience for sure and one that I certainly do not ever wish to even come close to living.

WOW

Quoting HAL (Reply 22): I'm just reporting what I know from my time at AWA. I fly the 767 now, and no, we don't have to do the 'quick align'

It's just like the 767 and every other Boeing IRS/FMS aircraft.

Great report HAL! Thanks for sharing.


I have a couple of questions:

What would have happened if an engine had failed during that takeoff?
Is there some sort of emergency power available?

And:

Quoting HAL (Thread starter): The newer A320's, as well as all the A319's had newer --A5 engines which had more power and caused fewer headaches in flight planning.

Are you sure about that? IIRC, if the A320 has CFM56-5A series engines, it can only be the -A1, -A1/F or -A3.

http://www.content.airbusworld.com/S...cds/A319-A320-A321/SA_JAA_TCDS.pdf

Quoting A342 (Reply 27): What would have happened if an engine had failed during that takeoff? Is there some sort of emergency power available?

Technically we still would have been able to fly, because that whole part I wrote about ensuring we were legal for takeoff meant that if one engine quit, we had enough power to meet minimum FAA climb requirements. However, those numbers don't take into account having someone pull in front of you, requiring you to rotate early and climb fast. If one had quit just as we rotated that night, we probably would have hit him. If we were doing a normal reduced-power takeoff, we could always push the thrust levers into the TOGA position for more power, but since we were already there (TOGA) the engines were producing max power. Fiddling around trying to find the bleed switch and turn it off would be useless and dangerous because it would have distracted us from the all-important job of flying the plane at the moment of engine failure. Other than that, there isn't any 'emergency power' available.

Quoting A342 (Reply 27): Are you sure about that? IIRC, if the A320 has CFM56-5A series engines, it can only be the -A1, -A1/F or -A3

All the AWA Airbus aircraft have IAE V2500 series engines; -A1 on the older 320's, and -A5 on the newer ones and all the 319's. Until the merger with USAirways, none of the fleet had CFM engines.

Quoting PhilSquares (Reply 26): It's just like the 767 and every other Boeing IRS/FMS aircraft.

Yes, the equipment is the same, but apparently not the procedures. During my time at AWA, all three fleets (737, 757, & Airbus) used the same Jeppesen charts package, and included in the LAS and PHX charts were AWA-tailored 757 QA (quick align) pages that showed specific hold-short points and their Lat/Long coordinates to be used for these quick align procedures. If anyone reading this is a current (or ex) AWA 757 pilot, I'd like to hear a clarification myself on the details of the procedure.

HAL

Quoting HAL (Reply 28): Technically we still would have been able to fly, because that whole part I wrote about ensuring we were legal for takeoff meant that if one engine quit, we had enough power to meet minimum FAA climb requirements. However, those numbers don't take into account having someone pull in front of you, requiring you to rotate early and climb fast. If one had quit just as we rotated that night, we probably would have hit him. If we were doing a normal reduced-power takeoff, we could always push the thrust levers into the TOGA position for more power, but since we were already there (TOGA) the engines were producing max power. Fiddling around trying to find the bleed switch and turn it off would be useless and dangerous because it would have distracted us from the all-important job of flying the plane at the moment of engine failure. Other than that, there isn't any 'emergency power' available.

Thanks for the answer.

Quoting HAL (Reply 28): All the AWA Airbus aircraft have IAE V2500 series engines; -A1 on the older 320's, and -A5 on the newer ones and all the 319's. Until the merger with USAirways, none of the fleet had CFM engines.

Oops, I'm sorry, for some reason I thought that the aircraft had CFMs. Thanks for the correction.

Quoting HAL (Thread starter): The FAA was apparently telling the press that it wasn't too much of an incident, since the Air Canada plane had already cleared the runway before we crossed over it

What a shame , the Authority that is supposed to protect the public is lying to them .

Quoting HAL (Thread starter): A few days later a small article appeared in the local Vegas newspaper about the incident.

aww, so you're not based from LAS anymore?      

ya know, a similar incident happened about a year and 6 months before this. i only know because i was going up on a tour of the tower at LAS and was seeing a controller getting ready to get yelled at for his mistake... poor guy..

Wow, what a read. You kept my full attention. I'm sorry that you never got any official thank you. And as many before me have said; "Thank You" It's becuase of people like you, that we feel safe sitting in a metal tube for hours on end. You ARE a great writer.

Quoting HAL (Reply 17): For anyone who asks, my first novel was a science fiction/ political/ disaster/ thriller. No airplanes in that one, but I'm proud of it anyway. If it eventually does get published, I'll let you all know.

If your writing in the book, is anything like how you wrote this report. I can't wait to read it. I'm a picky reader, anyway us a.netters could get a sneek preview?


Thanks again, on a job well done!

[email protected]

Dammit, AC, dammit...  

Glad to hear it wasn't entirely AC's fault for once.

Quoting Acey (Reply 33): urs 29 minutes 41 secs ago) and read 141 times: Dammit, AC, dammit... banghead Glad to hear it wasn't entirely AC's fault for once.

With all due respect, if the original post had been written by the AC captain, it might have read quite a bit differently, which is why no accident or incident should be based on the interpretation of only one of the various participants.

Quoting Gift4tbone (Reply 32): If your writing in the book, is anything like how you wrote this report. I can't wait to read it. I'm a picky reader, anyway us a.netters could get a sneek preview?

The way the publishing world works, I'm afraid I can't let any of it out until it has been bought and published. Contracts for novels like this usually require that none of the material has been 'previously published, or made available through publicly available means, print or electronic'. That means if I post part of it here, most publishers won't touch it. Sorry. I do have another magazine article coming out in the next few months in Airways Magazine, on flying ETOPS across the Pacific. Keep an eye out for that this fall or winter.

Quoting Sebring (Reply 34): With all due respect, if the original post had been written by the AC captain, it might have read quite a bit differently, which is why no accident or incident should be based on the interpretation of only one of the various participants.

You are correct, although nothing in my original post was 'speculation'. It was merely the facts of what happened to me that night. But like I said, I would love to hear the AC pilot's perspective on what happened.

HAL

I wonder what it would have looked like as a PAX of the AC jet? To see another airplane racing at you at 130+ mph, and you are in the direct path!

Great Job

HAL very well told. I like the detail and am proud you flew with someone who could trust you on your flying.

Hunter

Great story-telling HAL. Of course the subject matter should keep any of us interested or else we wouldn't be on this site at all, your delivery just makes it that much more realistic and keeps the interest peaked. Good luck on getting the book published!

As far as this incident, it's stories like this that make my wife cringe and not want to get on a plane but at the same time, the fact that if you (and the media) hadn't told it, most people (including your passengers) would have no idea that anything happened. Good job on keeping things normal and essentially non-eventful. We'll be on HA next May/June from SMF-HNL-SMF and you know I'll be wondering who's up front  

Thanks for that HAL, it's always fantastic to get the pilots perspective on flight operations. I guess there is nothing like a good scare experience to get your attention!

Regards, JetMech

Wow, amazing story and very well written. Good job and it is a great example of why pilots make the salaries they do.

Quoting Christao17 (Reply 40): Good job and it is a great example of why pilots make the salaries they do.

What? This story is exemplary of why pilots should make more than they currently do. Their ability to make quick decisions is like no other.

Quoting A342 (Reply 27): Are you sure about that? IIRC, if the A320 has CFM56-5A series engines, it can only be the -A1, -A1/F or -A3.

are you aware that HP's A319/A320s have IAE2500s? im just wondering, not trying to be a jacka**...

Yes another lunch reading from HAL, and this time it is juicy. Thanks HAL!!!