However on the MAX they have renamed these switches, the Stab Trim MAIN ELEC and AUTO PILOT are now named PRI and B/U. Just adding more confusion to the situation.
And only a 1 hour Difference Course on the iPad on some airlines. Have we taken "commonality too far" ?
Looking at the heading information and what I have previously done with the ADS-B data I saw a left turn commenced, maybe the crew commenced a left turn to return to CGK and simply ran out of elevator to keep the aircraft level in the turn.
That change in thrust lever and the turn... may explain the different force inputs sensed by the left and right yokes?
Shouldn’t a Max type rated pilot know the new names and what they do?
And the hours they spent in the NG to MAX
difference course is how long? Let's see...https://www.seattletimes.com/business/b ... air-crash/
APA spokesman Dennis Tajer said Monday that the detail on the MCAS system “is new infor_mation for us.”
He said his training on moving from the old 737 NG model cockpit to the new 737 MAX consisted of little more than a one-hour session on an iPad. The airline doesn’t have simulators specific to the MAX model.
I think we are are dealing with an intermittent partial ADIRU fault.
This has been my suspicion since day one.
I would be very surprised if Boeing was not aware of this issue as well prior to the flight, the aircraft dumps a lot of data, and I think the airline would have run this issue by the OEM technical representative attached to the airline for suggestions. Everyone is learning with new aircraft.
And it happened on a weekend. The tech rep would be having his/her days off...
If an AOA is deemed faulty ideally in my view MCAS/STS/Mach trim should all be taken offline and pilots made aware they have reduced protections and need to manually trim with the trim switches.
Zeke, you gotta find a different way to word that sentence, it sounds so Airbus... the hardcore Boeing fanboys are going to have a hard time accepting that. J/K
Jokes aside, yes, something along those lines would be a nice start on fixing this problem.
And that there lies the fundamental problem. We now all know the aircraft was not actually in serviceable condition. So it raises the question whether maintenance tests/procedures are actually sufficient for this type of fault. Maintenance has to trust Boeing's repair procedure.
With hindsight, we all know NOW that the aircraft shouldn't have flown. The question now is, what prevented them from being able to diagnose the problem correctly?
This crash started with red flags days ahead of the actual occurrence.
Make that "over the weekend"... I am told the that the aircraft was more or less perfect until that weekend... but then I have no way to verify that claim.
Oh the Onboard Mechanic issue that keeps getting questioned from time to time:
Outstation Mechanic with years of experience on the NG but probably very little on the Max onboard to monitor problematic aircraft.
If Lion was so confident, would they need to have a mechanic fly along?
Maybe so that the mechanic know what's wrong with the aircraft?
In Indonesia, an onboard mechanic/engineer is nothing related to an aircraft having problems from the previous flight
. They're there to release the aircraft should the aircraft develop a problem that can be deferred, should that problem occur at an outstation. Placing engineers at outstations can be more expensive than the loss of revenue from 1 seat plus flight pay, because aviation in Indonesia is very Jakarta-centric. Place someone at an outstation and the company has to fork out money for his accomodation and outstation pay, plus transportation to go back and forth to Jakarta or nearest maintenance base, and get a back up person. And you can't just get any engineer certified/rated on the type at an outstation to do stuff for you, the guy has to be approved on the type AND approved by the DGCA to do work for your airline. Now, Outstation based 3rd party contractors can be very expensive because of that. The same happens with dispatchers, and loadsheeters, it's not uncommon in Indonesia to see an engineer and a dispatcher onboard to outstations. Moves by the industry to make the use of certified 3rd party contractors and to make such a thing cheaper was effectively blocked by the previous transport minister in the aftermath of the Air Asia crash in end of 2014, because he seems to believe that safety should be expensive. Heck, he banned the use of centralized dispatch and tried to ban the use of approved weather information in computerized flight plans and dispatch briefs "because they're not from the national weather bureau", despite the national weather bureau were giving out the same exact information and source as those within the airline dispatch briefs!
Do consider these things first:
Oh the conspiracy theorists won't let that get in their way...
At some point, this thread splits into two camps. Those who wish to dig in the interaction of human and technology to discuss the source of the issue, which is a very complex subject that takes many months (or years) to resolve, and those who wish to oversimplify the cause so as resolve the questions within their minds as quickly as possible. Sometimes that can turn into a slippery slope of conspiracy theories as we saw with MH370.
Attepts to make it go down that slippery slope of conspiracy theories (including ones alleging that some member(s) of a.net is part of a coverup conspiracy) has been attempted... unfortunately... but at least the majority doesn't want to play along with that game.
The camps formed at the moment:
1. The It's only Lion's fault
2. The It's only Boeing's fault
3. The Let's just get to the bottom of the problem
The #3 camp goes something along the lines of the following:
This is not about loyalty to A, B, AA, ALPA, XYZ, ETC - this is about preventing future accidents.
Something that I agree with.