smartplane
Posts: 1024
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun Jun 02, 2019 8:48 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
A late change, and fatal flaws, in a Boeing jet design

https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wor ... et-design/

So originally MCAS was designed to use two sensors, two different sensors. AoA and g-force.

Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues. I hope this mess at Boeing gets cleared up, because how can on trust system ever again with safety relevant decisions?

And according to the information in this article, one has to call MCAS a stall avoidance system.

Some credibility erosion, as haven't we been told here, repeatedly, it's NOT a stall avoidance system by the 'blame it on the pilots' group?
 
XRAYretired
Posts: 488
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun Jun 02, 2019 9:09 pm

14ccKemiskt wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
A late change, and fatal flaws, in a Boeing jet design

https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wor ... et-design/

So originally MCAS was designed to use two sensors, two different sensors. AoA and g-force.

Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues. I hope this mess at Boeing gets cleared up, because how can on trust system ever again with safety relevant decisions?

And according to the information in this article, one has to call MCAS a stall avoidance system.


Even though the original MCAS did rely on G-force sensors, along with an AoA sensor, why did they not incorporate both AoA sensors to MCAS even in the first iteration? I don't get it, there is no reasonable explanation to why you would not use two sensors when they were immediately available for use without extra cost. The fact that no-one considered the effects of the (single) sensor malfunctioning and tested what would happen if it did, is just a side effect of the single sensor implementation decision.

If I could influence the investigation of this affair, I would dig as deeply as possible into the underlying cause and decision process behind why the other AoA sensor was not connected to MCAS 1.0.

Yes, there are a number of questions here.

The MCAS system was borrowed from 767Tanker/KC46 (also called MCAS!) that is a competent 2 AOA sensor system with other sensor/sensors undefined. Why change it to a single AOA sensor system?
(NB it has been reported that Boeing looked at using MCAS on other applications as well but it found un-necessary).

It might be argued that it was because 737 system also used IRU sensors. Suggest this makes no sense perhaps, unless, you are trying to avoid AOA Sensor not available as a no despatch condition. (It became so anyway with AOA sensor removed from the MEL as reported in these threads).

It might be argued that the 737 is based on two FCCs that use single sensor inputs as standard and the a 2 sensor would be contrary to this philosophy. However, it would seem there is precedent in that there was a modification of Auto-Throttle from 1 sensor to use 2 radio altitude sensors following the THY AMS event ~2009 that became mandatory (we now go to a 2 sensor system for MCAS in similar circumstances!).

It might be argued that STS uses only one sensor and MCAS is part of STS. It would be of interest to know if KC46 MCAS is declared of part of an STS system and if that STS uses 2 sensors? I have had no luck looking for this information in open source.

However, and in any case, MCAS does not appear to share any functions with STS with perhaps, the exception of motor drives. Nor does it appear to use SPEED TRIM FAIL warning (although it is not clear what conditions set this) that is part of the STS.
MACH Trim would seem to be much more like Speed Trim but at MACH speed values, and as far as I can see, it does not appear to be declared part of STS and also has its own MACH TRIM FAIL Warning. I would have thought this would be more likely than MCAS to be declared part of STS.

I note that there does not appear to be any action For SPEED TRIM FAIL in QRH but MACH TRIM FAIL QRH places a restriction on Airspeed of 280kts.There is no similar MCAS TRIM FAIL or QRH.

Additionally, the STS descriptions I have seen do not cover the functions of MCAS, if this is so, and MCAS is part of STS why would it not be covered? The information in the NYT report this week, if correct, would indicate that description of the operation of MCAS was removed from the 'Pilots' manual (as we suspected due to MCAS appearing only in the glossary), so it is likely the STS description does not include MCAS functions.

I currently see no convincing justification for single sensor or calling MCAS part of STS. I remain to be convinced.

Ray
 
ltbewr
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun Jun 02, 2019 9:43 pm

It appears that the best estimates are that the 737MAX aircraft won't be in the air in commercial service until the end of 2019-early 2020. That of course is if everything works out at Boeing and minimal delays with European and Chinese aircraft safety authorities. There are no guarantees of that. That means Several $Billions in costs for Boeing, likely a major hit on profits and hurting the stock price as well as long-term lost business.
 
aryonoco
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun Jun 02, 2019 10:14 pm

FAA saying 179 MAX and 133 NG aircraft worldwide have an improperly manufactured leading-edge slat track that need to be replaced quickly.

Nothing fatal, and not related to MCAS obviously, but interesting that this stuff is coming out now.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKCN1T30RX
 
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7BOEING7
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun Jun 02, 2019 10:53 pm

aryonoco wrote:
FAA saying 179 MAX and 133 NG aircraft worldwide have an improperly manufactured leading-edge slat track that need to be replaced quickly.

Nothing fatal, and not related to MCAS obviously, but interesting that this stuff is coming out now.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKCN1T30RX


It happens all the time and if the MAX hadn't been grounded it wouldn't have made the news.
 
akb88
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Sun Jun 02, 2019 11:30 pm

aryonoco wrote:
FAA saying 179 MAX and 133 NG aircraft worldwide have an improperly manufactured leading-edge slat track that need to be replaced quickly.

Nothing fatal, and not related to MCAS obviously, but interesting that this stuff is coming out now.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKCN1T30RX


I saw this too and being a nervous ninny I got a bit of a twinge in my stomach since I'm flying on an NG in 4 weeks.
But then I read this from the FAA: https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=93206

"The FAA will issue an Airworthiness Directive to mandate Boeing's service actions to identify and remove the discrepant parts from service. Operators of affected aircraft are required to perform this action within 10 days. The FAA today also alerted international civil aviation authorities of this condition and required actions"

Surely this means that all carriers affected by this need to have it completely fixed with new proper parts in 10 days. Also, I'm assuming this is affecting newly built planes
 
speedking
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 12:00 am

morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
smokeybandit wrote:

Does extended time mean a more robust fix? Or just red tape and skepticism in getting it re-certified?

Ironically, Boeing is facing almost the same problem as pilots of crashed flights. There is something crazy going on, they lost control of events, and there is no understanding of where to go, as too many things are going on. A lot of deer in headlights looks both in c-suit and engineering offices I presume.
Hopefully an outcome will be a bit better, though.


i think the Industry's big problem is how complex these machine are getting or how little one person knows about the whole design.

There needs to be CZAR's who are in charge of the design - who have flight and engineering experience - Not an MBA - who have the ability to say - wait a second - this isn't right. The buck stops with them - not in some committee or email chain.

Where are the Kelly Johnson's of today? He wasn't a Pilot but was a flight test engineer so he had a pretty good idea of how things worked.


First time I absolutely agree with you. A bean counter in charge of an engineering company leads eventually to a disaster.
 
kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 12:41 am

speedking wrote:
morrisond wrote:
kalvado wrote:
Ironically, Boeing is facing almost the same problem as pilots of crashed flights. There is something crazy going on, they lost control of events, and there is no understanding of where to go, as too many things are going on. A lot of deer in headlights looks both in c-suit and engineering offices I presume.
Hopefully an outcome will be a bit better, though.


i think the Industry's big problem is how complex these machine are getting or how little one person knows about the whole design.

There needs to be CZAR's who are in charge of the design - who have flight and engineering experience - Not an MBA - who have the ability to say - wait a second - this isn't right. The buck stops with them - not in some committee or email chain.

Where are the Kelly Johnson's of today? He wasn't a Pilot but was a flight test engineer so he had a pretty good idea of how things worked.


First time I absolutely agree with you. A bean counter in charge of an engineering company leads eventually to a disaster.

if you look at yesterday's NYT report, they mention Max’s chief technical pilot as one of the figures in the center of a problem....
 
speedking
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 1:26 am

kalvado wrote:
speedking wrote:
morrisond wrote:

i think the Industry's big problem is how complex these machine are getting or how little one person knows about the whole design.

There needs to be CZAR's who are in charge of the design - who have flight and engineering experience - Not an MBA - who have the ability to say - wait a second - this isn't right. The buck stops with them - not in some committee or email chain.

Where are the Kelly Johnson's of today? He wasn't a Pilot but was a flight test engineer so he had a pretty good idea of how things worked.


First time I absolutely agree with you. A bean counter in charge of an engineering company leads eventually to a disaster.

if you look at yesterday's NYT report, they mention Max’s chief technical pilot as one of the figures in the center of a problem....


I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.
 
planecane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 1:53 am

ltbewr wrote:
It appears that the best estimates are that the 737MAX aircraft won't be in the air in commercial service until the end of 2019-early 2020. That of course is if everything works out at Boeing and minimal delays with European and Chinese aircraft safety authorities. There are no guarantees of that. That means Several $Billions in costs for Boeing, likely a major hit on profits and hurting the stock price as well as long-term lost business.


Where are these "best estimates" sourced from? Last I saw the 3 US operators were advised that they didn't need to extend the removal of the MAX from their schedules (which currently lasts through early August.

Perhaps it will take that long for all countries to agree.
 
cal764
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 2:50 am

aryonoco wrote:
FAA saying 179 MAX and 133 NG aircraft worldwide have an improperly manufactured leading-edge slat track that need to be replaced quickly.

Nothing fatal, and not related to MCAS obviously, but interesting that this stuff is coming out now.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKCN1T30RX

On an aside, it’s good to see that the FAA is going through things with a fine-toothed comb all the way around (i.e. not limited to MCAS).
1. Fly to Win 2. Fund Future 3. Reliability 4. Work Together CO: Work Hard, Fly Right...
 
Lapplander800
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 3:54 am

mjoelnir wrote:
346fetish wrote:
How many 7M9s/7M8s was FI supposed to have in summer 2019? Had there not be any MAX grounding, would they have retired any 75s & 76s?

Best,
346fetish


9 Max frames, 6 737-8 and 3737-9, should have been in use at Icelandair this summer.

There was no plan to retire 757 or 767 this summer. The one retired 757-200 was replaced by a slightly newer one.

Icelandair is cutting down on charter flights, asking customers to try to move to other airlines.


Incorrect. Icelandair's plan was to reduce their 757 fleet by 3 frames in 2019 and an another 2 in 2020.

Pages 10 and 40
https://www.icelandairgroup.is/servlet/ ... 0FINAL.pdf

Image

Also, Icelandair has also announced plans for dedicated economy only planes for sunny vacation places in 2020. It has not been announced if these new focus will be sold wholesale via travel agencies ("/scheduled charters") or directly from Icelandair.

See bottom paragraph
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-rele ... ml?print=1
 
Agrajag
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 5:27 am

Every day i read these pages and the disbelief of how Boeing behaves just increases.

I am not an MBA or Executive level employee. What I would like to know is, are the Boeing C-suite people sitting around and thinking 'yes, we are handling this correctly and in line with all our corporate training in crisis management, our message is clear, we are protecting our Brand and Stock value, good job everyone...and then slapping eachother on the back'. ? If so, what am i missing?? Other than the 8 figure salary of course??
The plural of anecdote is anecdotes, not data.
Slartibartfast had a point
 
xmp125a
Posts: 233
Joined: Mon Mar 11, 2019 6:38 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 5:35 am

mjoelnir wrote:
A late change, and fatal flaws, in a Boeing jet design

https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wor ... et-design/

So originally MCAS was designed to use two sensors, two different sensors. AoA and g-force.

Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues. I hope this mess at Boeing gets cleared up, because how can on trust system ever again with safety relevant decisions?

And according to the information in this article, one has to call MCAS a stall avoidance system.


"Then Boeing engineers reconceived the system, expanding its role to avoid stalls in all types of situations. They allowed the software to operate throughout much more of the flight."


So much for the argument "any pilot who flies into part of the envelope where the MCAS should be active has no business flying a commercial plane". This is a royal mess now.

The current and former employees, many of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the continuing investigations, said that after the first crash, they were stunned to discover MCAS relied on a single sensor.

“That’s nuts,” said an engineer who helped design MCAS.
“I’m shocked,” said a safety analyst who scrutinized it.
“To me, it seems like somebody didn’t understand what they were doing,” said an engineer who assessed the system’s sensors.


Well guys, imagine OUR shock, you know, the flying public! This was major breakdown at Boeing.
Shall we rehash the old joke? Who flies only Airbus planes - Airbus and Boeing engineers!
 
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Dutchy
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 5:51 am

aryonoco wrote:
FAA saying 179 MAX and 133 NG aircraft worldwide have an improperly manufactured leading-edge slat track that need to be replaced quickly.

Nothing fatal, and not related to MCAS obviously, but interesting that this stuff is coming out now.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKCN1T30RX


Publicity-wise it is very bad for Boeing, everything around the Boeing 737MAX and broader the NG's is news at the moment. In practice not a very big deal, planes will be inspected and repaired if necessary.
Many happy landings, greetings from The Netherlands!
 
sgrow787
Posts: 167
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:23 am

mjoelnir wrote:
A late change, and fatal flaws, in a Boeing jet design

https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wor ... et-design/

So originally MCAS was designed to use two sensors, two different sensors. AoA and g-force.

Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues. I hope this mess at Boeing gets cleared up, because how can on trust system ever again with safety relevant decisions?

And according to the information in this article, one has to call MCAS a stall avoidance system.


Can someone dig up the MTBF for the Rosemount AOA sensor? If MCAS 1.0 was a single-sensor design, then MTBF would be that of its single point of failure:

"Boeing engineers did consider such a possibility in their safety analysis of the original MCAS. They classified the event as “hazardous,” one rung below the most serious designation of catastrophic, according to two people. In regulatory-speak, it meant that MCAS could trigger erroneously less often than once in 10 million flight hours."

Also:

"
At a tense meeting with the pilots’ union at American Airlines in November, Boeing executives dismissed concerns. “It’s been reported that it’s a single point failure, but it is not considered by design or certification a single point,” said Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president, according to a recording of the meeting.

His reasoning? The pilots were the backup.

“Because the function and the trained pilot work side by side and are part of the system,” he said.
"
Does anyone know if the failure rate for an aircraft system can include the competency of humans operating that system? I would expect the failure rate to be BEFORE human error is factored in.
 
Interested
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:51 am

speedking wrote:
kalvado wrote:
speedking wrote:

First time I absolutely agree with you. A bean counter in charge of an engineering company leads eventually to a disaster.

if you look at yesterday's NYT report, they mention Max’s chief technical pilot as one of the figures in the center of a problem....


I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.


It's the public's fault now??
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:57 am

sgrow787 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
A late change, and fatal flaws, in a Boeing jet design

https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wor ... et-design/

So originally MCAS was designed to use two sensors, two different sensors. AoA and g-force.

Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues. I hope this mess at Boeing gets cleared up, because how can on trust system ever again with safety relevant decisions?

And according to the information in this article, one has to call MCAS a stall avoidance system.


Can someone dig up the MTBF for the Rosemount AOA sensor? If MCAS 1.0 was a single-sensor design, then MTBF would be that of its single point of failure:

"Boeing engineers did consider such a possibility in their safety analysis of the original MCAS. They classified the event as “hazardous,” one rung below the most serious designation of catastrophic, according to two people. In regulatory-speak, it meant that MCAS could trigger erroneously less often than once in 10 million flight hours."

Also:

"
At a tense meeting with the pilots’ union at American Airlines in November, Boeing executives dismissed concerns. “It’s been reported that it’s a single point failure, but it is not considered by design or certification a single point,” said Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president, according to a recording of the meeting.

His reasoning? The pilots were the backup.

“Because the function and the trained pilot work side by side and are part of the system,” he said.
"
Does anyone know if the failure rate for an aircraft system can include the competency of humans operating that system? I would expect the failure rate to be BEFORE human error is factored in.


I would be staggered if pilot backup can be considered part of the stat analysis of what's safe or unsafe technically?

This is taking safety backwards not forwards

You have to design planes and systems that account for the possibility of human error on the ground and in the air
Last edited by Interested on Mon Jun 03, 2019 7:06 am, edited 1 time in total.
 
Interested
Posts: 647
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 7:05 am

https://www.engadget.com/2019/06/02/boe ... l-changes/

Here's the article that explains different departments within Boeing, the FAA and the Chief Test Pilot all were making decisions UNAWARE of the full details and power of MCAS

The chief test pilot was mainly testing on simulators that didn't replicate MCAS correctly

Sounds like disorganised chaos tbh
 
chiad
Posts: 1193
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:23 am

speedking wrote:
kalvado wrote:
speedking wrote:

First time I absolutely agree with you. A bean counter in charge of an engineering company leads eventually to a disaster.

if you look at yesterday's NYT report, they mention Max’s chief technical pilot as one of the figures in the center of a problem....


I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.


What?!?
So this is my fault then?
 
Virtual737
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Joined: Tue Jul 19, 2016 6:16 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:34 am

speedking wrote:

I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.


The airlines set the prices of seats. If they weren't in a race to the bottom then the flying public would just have to pay more.
 
RickNRoll
Posts: 1728
Joined: Fri Jan 06, 2012 9:30 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:55 am

speedking wrote:
kalvado wrote:
speedking wrote:

First time I absolutely agree with you. A bean counter in charge of an engineering company leads eventually to a disaster.

if you look at yesterday's NYT report, they mention Max’s chief technical pilot as one of the figures in the center of a problem....


I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.


Boeing is pulling in mountains of cash. This isn't a shortage of money. They are, though, spending a lot of that cash on cutting their workforce, share dividends, bonuses for executives and share buy backs.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8374
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 10:05 am

Lapplander800 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
346fetish wrote:
How many 7M9s/7M8s was FI supposed to have in summer 2019? Had there not be any MAX grounding, would they have retired any 75s & 76s?

Best,
346fetish


9 Max frames, 6 737-8 and 3737-9, should have been in use at Icelandair this summer.

There was no plan to retire 757 or 767 this summer. The one retired 757-200 was replaced by a slightly newer one.

Icelandair is cutting down on charter flights, asking customers to try to move to other airlines.


Incorrect. Icelandair's plan was to reduce their 757 fleet by 3 frames in 2019 and an another 2 in 2020.

Pages 10 and 40
https://www.icelandairgroup.is/servlet/ ... 0FINAL.pdf

Image

Also, Icelandair has also announced plans for dedicated economy only planes for sunny vacation places in 2020. It has not been announced if these new focus will be sold wholesale via travel agencies ("/scheduled charters") or directly from Icelandair.

See bottom paragraph
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-rele ... ml?print=1


Yes, Icelandair did plan to use fewer 3 757-200 in their normal route system, that does not mean that they had planed to reduce the fleet. Even the one 757-200 that is scraped has been replaced. Icelandair group does a lot more than the Icelandair routes, they do charter through Loftleiðir, wet leasing, including running small airlines for their owners, and last year Cabo Verde airline was added as a subsidiary. As it is, Icelandair has been drawing frames of the special operations, as far as that is possible without breaking contracts, to use them on their own routes
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 10:52 am

RickNRoll wrote:
speedking wrote:
kalvado wrote:
if you look at yesterday's NYT report, they mention Max’s chief technical pilot as one of the figures in the center of a problem....


I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.


Boeing is pulling in mountains of cash. This isn't a shortage of money. They are, though, spending a lot of that cash on cutting their workforce, share dividends, bonuses for executives and share buy backs.


The Boeing CEO earnt 23.4M dollars in the last 12 months

No wonder he doesn't want to resign
 
planecane
Posts: 1041
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 11:25 am

sgrow787 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
A late change, and fatal flaws, in a Boeing jet design

https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wor ... et-design/

So originally MCAS was designed to use two sensors, two different sensors. AoA and g-force.

Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues. I hope this mess at Boeing gets cleared up, because how can on trust system ever again with safety relevant decisions?

And according to the information in this article, one has to call MCAS a stall avoidance system.


Can someone dig up the MTBF for the Rosemount AOA sensor? If MCAS 1.0 was a single-sensor design, then MTBF would be that of its single point of failure:

"Boeing engineers did consider such a possibility in their safety analysis of the original MCAS. They classified the event as “hazardous,” one rung below the most serious designation of catastrophic, according to two people. In regulatory-speak, it meant that MCAS could trigger erroneously less often than once in 10 million flight hours."

Also:

"
At a tense meeting with the pilots’ union at American Airlines in November, Boeing executives dismissed concerns. “It’s been reported that it’s a single point failure, but it is not considered by design or certification a single point,” said Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president, according to a recording of the meeting.

His reasoning? The pilots were the backup.

“Because the function and the trained pilot work side by side and are part of the system,” he said.
"
Does anyone know if the failure rate for an aircraft system can include the competency of humans operating that system? I would expect the failure rate to be BEFORE human error is factored in.


It appears from the article that the issue was they used the "natural" failure rate of the sensors and didn't include failures from damage caused on the ramp or FOD/bird strikes.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1821
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 11:33 am

planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
A late change, and fatal flaws, in a Boeing jet design

https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wor ... et-design/

So originally MCAS was designed to use two sensors, two different sensors. AoA and g-force.

Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues. I hope this mess at Boeing gets cleared up, because how can on trust system ever again with safety relevant decisions?

And according to the information in this article, one has to call MCAS a stall avoidance system.


Can someone dig up the MTBF for the Rosemount AOA sensor? If MCAS 1.0 was a single-sensor design, then MTBF would be that of its single point of failure:

"Boeing engineers did consider such a possibility in their safety analysis of the original MCAS. They classified the event as “hazardous,” one rung below the most serious designation of catastrophic, according to two people. In regulatory-speak, it meant that MCAS could trigger erroneously less often than once in 10 million flight hours."

Also:

"
At a tense meeting with the pilots’ union at American Airlines in November, Boeing executives dismissed concerns. “It’s been reported that it’s a single point failure, but it is not considered by design or certification a single point,” said Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president, according to a recording of the meeting.

His reasoning? The pilots were the backup.

“Because the function and the trained pilot work side by side and are part of the system,” he said.
"
Does anyone know if the failure rate for an aircraft system can include the competency of humans operating that system? I would expect the failure rate to be BEFORE human error is factored in.


It appears from the article that the issue was they used the "natural" failure rate of the sensors and didn't include failures from damage caused on the ramp or FOD/bird strikes.

And again, competing product datasheet shows 70k hours MTBF. 8 years is not an unreasonable lifetime for precision moving part exposed to elements and airstream...
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8374
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 11:40 am

kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:
sgrow787 wrote:

Can someone dig up the MTBF for the Rosemount AOA sensor? If MCAS 1.0 was a single-sensor design, then MTBF would be that of its single point of failure:

"Boeing engineers did consider such a possibility in their safety analysis of the original MCAS. They classified the event as “hazardous,” one rung below the most serious designation of catastrophic, according to two people. In regulatory-speak, it meant that MCAS could trigger erroneously less often than once in 10 million flight hours."

Also:

"
At a tense meeting with the pilots’ union at American Airlines in November, Boeing executives dismissed concerns. “It’s been reported that it’s a single point failure, but it is not considered by design or certification a single point,” said Mike Sinnett, a Boeing vice president, according to a recording of the meeting.

His reasoning? The pilots were the backup.

“Because the function and the trained pilot work side by side and are part of the system,” he said.
"
Does anyone know if the failure rate for an aircraft system can include the competency of humans operating that system? I would expect the failure rate to be BEFORE human error is factored in.


It appears from the article that the issue was they used the "natural" failure rate of the sensors and didn't include failures from damage caused on the ramp or FOD/bird strikes.

And again, competing product datasheet shows 70k hours MTBF. 8 years is not an unreasonable lifetime for precision moving part exposed to elements and airstream...


As the MAX used to switch the AoA sensor every flight, one has to look at the failure rate for one of two sensors. That doubles the failure rate, so 35k hours would nearer the real number and one would have to add accidental damage, upping the failure rate again.
 
planecane
Posts: 1041
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 11:45 am

mjoelnir wrote:
kalvado wrote:
planecane wrote:

It appears from the article that the issue was they used the "natural" failure rate of the sensors and didn't include failures from damage caused on the ramp or FOD/bird strikes.

And again, competing product datasheet shows 70k hours MTBF. 8 years is not an unreasonable lifetime for precision moving part exposed to elements and airstream...


As the MAX used to switch the AoA sensor every flight, one has to look at the failure rate for one of two sensors. That doubles the failure rate, so 35k hours would nearer the real number and one would have to add accidental damage, upping the failure rate again.


Regardless of anything that the pilots could have/should have done differently to save the aircrafts, the decision to go from a 2 sensor design to a single sensor is incompetent. It seems the original designers knew relying on 2 sensors was the correct implementation. When they decided to use MCAS at low speeds and couldn't use the g-force sensor as #2, the solution should have been to find a replacement for redundancy, not just eliminate redundancy.
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 12:51 pm

planecane wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
kalvado wrote:
And again, competing product datasheet shows 70k hours MTBF. 8 years is not an unreasonable lifetime for precision moving part exposed to elements and airstream...


As the MAX used to switch the AoA sensor every flight, one has to look at the failure rate for one of two sensors. That doubles the failure rate, so 35k hours would nearer the real number and one would have to add accidental damage, upping the failure rate again.


Regardless of anything that the pilots could have/should have done differently to save the aircrafts, the decision to go from a 2 sensor design to a single sensor is incompetent. It seems the original designers knew relying on 2 sensors was the correct implementation. When they decided to use MCAS at low speeds and couldn't use the g-force sensor as #2, the solution should have been to find a replacement for redundancy, not just eliminate redundancy.


Even for us observers this is such basic stuff??

How does this even happen??
 
shmerik
Posts: 8
Joined: Sun May 05, 2019 2:28 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 1:39 pm

For a while now I've been thinking that the way MCAS was handled could be one of two options... either that somewhere along the line decisions were made intentionally to keep it low profile enough that it wouldn't require extra training, or that Boeing's internal org structure and processes have devolved to a point where they can no longer effectively coordinate on large scale operations like designing an aircraft.

With the articles coming out about multiple departments making incremental changes unknown to each other without knowing the full consequences it looks like they are claiming the latter of the two options. I'm not convinced, but it does raise the question that if we are to believe that everyone was acting in good faith then this brings into question the quality of any other product that they have worked on during the same time as MAX development and ever since then to the present day.

Is this an unfair assessment of the situation? I fail to see how if the teams really are as atomized as the article posits, how can their process be trusted or be considered as effective in other endeavors?
 
Interested
Posts: 647
Joined: Thu May 19, 2016 12:19 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:12 pm

shmerik wrote:
For a while now I've been thinking that the way MCAS was handled could be one of two options... either that somewhere along the line decisions were made intentionally to keep it low profile enough that it wouldn't require extra training, or that Boeing's internal org structure and processes have devolved to a point where they can no longer effectively coordinate on large scale operations like designing an aircraft.

With the articles coming out about multiple departments making incremental changes unknown to each other without knowing the full consequences it looks like they are claiming the latter of the two options. I'm not convinced, but it does raise the question that if we are to believe that everyone was acting in good faith then this brings into question the quality of any other product that they have worked on during the same time as MAX development and ever since then to the present day.

Is this an unfair assessment of the situation? I fail to see how if the teams really are as atomized as the article posits, how can their process be trusted or be considered as effective in other endeavors?


I guess the only way we find out if anything else is messed up is when something else crashes?

And if the crashes aren't happening we have to assume it's all ok?

I'm happy enough to trust their existing planes (apart from Max of course). But would be worried about any new ones.

Dreamliners have been flying long enough now safely not to worry about - haven't they?
 
DenverTed
Posts: 243
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:16 pm

Interested wrote:
shmerik wrote:
For a while now I've been thinking that the way MCAS was handled could be one of two options... either that somewhere along the line decisions were made intentionally to keep it low profile enough that it wouldn't require extra training, or that Boeing's internal org structure and processes have devolved to a point where they can no longer effectively coordinate on large scale operations like designing an aircraft.

With the articles coming out about multiple departments making incremental changes unknown to each other without knowing the full consequences it looks like they are claiming the latter of the two options. I'm not convinced, but it does raise the question that if we are to believe that everyone was acting in good faith then this brings into question the quality of any other product that they have worked on during the same time as MAX development and ever since then to the present day.

Is this an unfair assessment of the situation? I fail to see how if the teams really are as atomized as the article posits, how can their process be trusted or be considered as effective in other endeavors?


I guess the only way we find out if anything else is messed up is when something else crashes?

And if the crashes aren't happening we have to assume it's all ok?

I'm happy enough to trust their existing planes (apart from Max of course). But would be worried about any new ones.

Dreamliners have been flying long enough now safely not to worry about - haven't they?

The only difference I can see between MCAS and the dreamliner batteries, is that on the batteries they got lucky.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1821
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:20 pm

Interested wrote:
shmerik wrote:
For a while now I've been thinking that the way MCAS was handled could be one of two options... either that somewhere along the line decisions were made intentionally to keep it low profile enough that it wouldn't require extra training, or that Boeing's internal org structure and processes have devolved to a point where they can no longer effectively coordinate on large scale operations like designing an aircraft.

With the articles coming out about multiple departments making incremental changes unknown to each other without knowing the full consequences it looks like they are claiming the latter of the two options. I'm not convinced, but it does raise the question that if we are to believe that everyone was acting in good faith then this brings into question the quality of any other product that they have worked on during the same time as MAX development and ever since then to the present day.

Is this an unfair assessment of the situation? I fail to see how if the teams really are as atomized as the article posits, how can their process be trusted or be considered as effective in other endeavors?


I guess the only way we find out if anything else is messed up is when something else crashes?

And if the crashes aren't happening we have to assume it's all ok?

I'm happy enough to trust their existing planes (apart from Max of course). But would be worried about any new ones.

Dreamliners have been flying long enough now safely not to worry about - haven't they?

Dreamliners had their share of bad problems, which fortunately came up mostly before delivery, with battery fires as icing on a cake - hence program cost $30+ billion.
Certification is the process which is supposed to make sure problems get caught before entry into service, though. So future of MAX may be more interesting than I want to believe. If you think about it, things are pretty grim at this point, especially given Boeing public attitude - and I am not sure if people within company take things with full seriousness...
 
DenverTed
Posts: 243
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:21 pm

What was the justification for one sensor? That MCAS would only be needed in one in a billion flights? But they don't look at the system malfunction rate, and what the consequences of that are? Ya, they might want to add that to the list, for any systems that control the rudder or any other important parts.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 243
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:24 pm

Why wasn't MCAS limited to the amount of repititions that was needed, and the range on the stab that was applicable? Too much work?
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 509
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:27 pm

Interested wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:
speedking wrote:

I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.


Boeing is pulling in mountains of cash. This isn't a shortage of money. They are, though, spending a lot of that cash on cutting their workforce, share dividends, bonuses for executives and share buy backs.


The Boeing CEO earnt 23.4M dollars in the last 12 months

No wonder he doesn't want to resign

Yep, 2M/month is ridicule. There exists far enough peoples able to do the same job for 10x less. A lot of employees earn in there whole life between 1 and 2 months of the Boeing CEO money.
Just 20M/year over the six years of the 737 MAX development give 120M. Fare enough to pay more than 100 experienced engineers all the duration of the project. Or enough to train more a lot of pilots.

The public in actually not in position to change anything in that extreme capitalist principle: if the price goes high the money will goes to the top executive. If the price goes down, the worker's money will be cut.
 
DenverTed
Posts: 243
Joined: Wed Mar 27, 2019 11:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:45 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
Interested wrote:
RickNRoll wrote:

Boeing is pulling in mountains of cash. This isn't a shortage of money. They are, though, spending a lot of that cash on cutting their workforce, share dividends, bonuses for executives and share buy backs.


The Boeing CEO earnt 23.4M dollars in the last 12 months

No wonder he doesn't want to resign

Yep, 2M/month is ridicule. There exists far enough peoples able to do the same job for 10x less. A lot of employees earn in there whole life between 1 and 2 months of the Boeing CEO money.
Just 20M/year over the six years of the 737 MAX development give 120M. Fare enough to pay more than 100 experienced engineers all the duration of the project. Or enough to train more a lot of pilots.

The public in actually not in position to change anything in that extreme capitalist principle: if the price goes high the money will goes to the top executive. If the price goes down, the worker's money will be cut.

There ought to be some modern monetary code of Hammurabi. Every human life is worth what the CEO makes in a year, 20M x 350 lives is 7B.
 
User avatar
par13del
Posts: 8693
Joined: Sun Dec 18, 2005 9:14 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 4:55 pm

So anyone seen any details on why Boeing has not submitted their fix to the FAA for them to schedule their own test flight and acceptance or rejection,
is Boeing waiting for any additional requirements from the FAA to be included in the fix?

We know Boeing completed their flight test about a month ago, hopefully it is just a case of waiting for the FAA to say they are ready to review.
So far all we have seen is that Boeing has completed the fix bit not yet submitted to the FAA, which has been stated on multiple sites with no additional details.
 
many321
Posts: 292
Joined: Sat Mar 11, 2017 6:15 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 5:06 pm

Interested wrote:
shmerik wrote:
For a while now I've been thinking that the way MCAS was handled could be one of two options... either that somewhere along the line decisions were made intentionally to keep it low profile enough that it wouldn't require extra training, or that Boeing's internal org structure and processes have devolved to a point where they can no longer effectively coordinate on large scale operations like designing an aircraft.

With the articles coming out about multiple departments making incremental changes unknown to each other without knowing the full consequences it looks like they are claiming the latter of the two options. I'm not convinced, but it does raise the question that if we are to believe that everyone was acting in good faith then this brings into question the quality of any other product that they have worked on during the same time as MAX development and ever since then to the present day.

Is this an unfair assessment of the situation? I fail to see how if the teams really are as atomized as the article posits, how can their process be trusted or be considered as effective in other endeavors?


I guess the only way we find out if anything else is messed up is when something else crashes?

And if the crashes aren't happening we have to assume it's all ok?

I'm happy enough to trust their existing planes (apart from Max of course). But would be worried about any new ones.

Dreamliners have been flying long enough now safely not to worry about - haven't they?


I'd be looking at the 777x closely. I hope we don't have any surprises when it enters into service.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1179
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 5:43 pm

Mullenburg is on CNBC again right now - saying certification flight could be soon - then it needs to be approved by the regulators - has said sorry about 10x.

He didn't give a definite time line - I got the impression still a few months.
 
hivue
Posts: 1903
Joined: Tue Feb 26, 2013 2:26 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:09 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues.


On the contrary, this information seems to answer one of the great mysteries surrounding these events: why presumably talented and professional engineers would design an aircraft safety system with a built-in single point failure mode. The answer is -- they didn't. But when the problem the system was intended to solve expanded from the strictly high G environment to a larger part of the envelope, the high G detection part had to go leaving only AoA. Then the great bugaboo of any large scale project struck: lack of communication.

So many poster here seem to want either to tag the flight crews with total inability to fly an airplane or to tag Boeing with purposeful intent to cold bloodedly murder more than 300 people. What everyone should be doing instead is trying to figure out exactly what happened. It's not likely we yet have all the information to do that.
"You're sitting. In a chair. In the SKY!!" ~ Louis C.K.
 
planecane
Posts: 1041
Joined: Thu Feb 09, 2017 4:58 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:12 pm

many321 wrote:
Interested wrote:
shmerik wrote:
For a while now I've been thinking that the way MCAS was handled could be one of two options... either that somewhere along the line decisions were made intentionally to keep it low profile enough that it wouldn't require extra training, or that Boeing's internal org structure and processes have devolved to a point where they can no longer effectively coordinate on large scale operations like designing an aircraft.

With the articles coming out about multiple departments making incremental changes unknown to each other without knowing the full consequences it looks like they are claiming the latter of the two options. I'm not convinced, but it does raise the question that if we are to believe that everyone was acting in good faith then this brings into question the quality of any other product that they have worked on during the same time as MAX development and ever since then to the present day.

Is this an unfair assessment of the situation? I fail to see how if the teams really are as atomized as the article posits, how can their process be trusted or be considered as effective in other endeavors?


I guess the only way we find out if anything else is messed up is when something else crashes?

And if the crashes aren't happening we have to assume it's all ok?

I'm happy enough to trust their existing planes (apart from Max of course). But would be worried about any new ones.

Dreamliners have been flying long enough now safely not to worry about - haven't they?


I'd be looking at the 777x closely. I hope we don't have any surprises when it enters into service.

777X is a completely different animal. It is full FBW. Kludges aren't needed to make it fly like the current models.
 
snowkarl
Posts: 19
Joined: Fri May 24, 2019 7:48 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:15 pm

morrisond wrote:
Mullenburg is on CNBC again right now - saying certification flight could be soon - then it needs to be approved by the regulators - has said sorry about 10x.

He didn't give a definite time line - I got the impression still a few months.


Did he say anything about world wide training standards or did he - rightfully - take the blame?

After reading the numerous articles that have come out over the past 36 hours have you, perpha,s, changed your perspective and given Boeing a larger share of the blame than the pilots?

Boeing completely failed with this plane, not only in covering up their band aid in MCAS, but also now with the leading edge flaps being incorrectly manufactured. If it wasn't for the fact that they are quite literally too big to fail, their stock would be sky diving at this moment in time.
 
kalvado
Posts: 1821
Joined: Wed Mar 01, 2006 4:29 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:24 pm

planecane wrote:
many321 wrote:
Interested wrote:

I guess the only way we find out if anything else is messed up is when something else crashes?

And if the crashes aren't happening we have to assume it's all ok?

I'm happy enough to trust their existing planes (apart from Max of course). But would be worried about any new ones.

Dreamliners have been flying long enough now safely not to worry about - haven't they?


I'd be looking at the 777x closely. I hope we don't have any surprises when it enters into service.

777X is a completely different animal. It is full FBW. Kludges aren't needed to make it fly like the current models.

If miscommunication is the root cause, as it seems, FBW or not is irrelevant. Issue is not limited to control system, chaos just spreads through the system
Someone replaced reinforcement bar with a pressure line, or removed couple of bolts standing in a way, used lower grade aluminum for thrust link or what not. Those are not impossible scenarios given what we already heard, and it is virtually impossible to catch those in normal certification - things are designed that way. We may learn about such issues only when an engine falls of on TOGA thrust.
that is why X certification can take much longer than expected, and MAX re-EIS may be a fun ride.
 
mjoelnir
Posts: 8374
Joined: Sun Feb 03, 2013 11:06 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:35 pm

hivue wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues.


On the contrary, this information seems to answer one of the great mysteries surrounding these events: why presumably talented and professional engineers would design an aircraft safety system with a built-in single point failure mode. The answer is -- they didn't. But when the problem the system was intended to solve expanded from the strictly high G environment to a larger part of the envelope, the high G detection part had to go leaving only AoA. Then the great bugaboo of any large scale project struck: lack of communication.

So many poster here seem to want either to tag the flight crews with total inability to fly an airplane or to tag Boeing with purposeful intent to cold bloodedly murder more than 300 people. What everyone should be doing instead is trying to figure out exactly what happened. It's not likely we yet have all the information to do that.


Somebody or a group of persons decided, that one sensor was enough, there is undeniable proof for it, there was only one sensor used. It is very simple to point to miscommunication. But the main point is, such a system, like the design department at Boeing, should be build exactly around procedures to minimize miscommunication.
So there are either rank amateurs designing the systems, or there are rank amateurs called managers at Boeing, all the way to the highest level. Take your pick.
 
User avatar
PixelFlight
Posts: 509
Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 6:36 pm

hivue wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues.


On the contrary, this information seems to answer one of the great mysteries surrounding these events: why presumably talented and professional engineers would design an aircraft safety system with a built-in single point failure mode. The answer is -- they didn't. But when the problem the system was intended to solve expanded from the strictly high G environment to a larger part of the envelope, the high G detection part had to go leaving only AoA. Then the great bugaboo of any large scale project struck: lack of communication.

So many poster here seem to want either to tag the flight crews with total inability to fly an airplane or to tag Boeing with purposeful intent to cold bloodedly murder more than 300 people. What everyone should be doing instead is trying to figure out exactly what happened. It's not likely we yet have all the information to do that.

As you wrote the "lack of communication" is certainly big part of what happened. But the communication is a very important aspect of the safety assessment and a safety certification work, because the first structural work is to define how the hierarchy of requirements will be documented, known, followed, verified and tested. This require competent peoples constantly monitoring the evolution of the project and to keep all the documents in a coherent state.
 
User avatar
Dutchy
Posts: 9573
Joined: Sat Nov 03, 2007 1:25 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:07 pm

Icelandair to lay off 24 pilots on MAX grounding; cancels hiring plans


Source

So 24 + 21 pilots can search for a new carrier. This is kind of worrying, this means that Icelandair doesn't think the MAX will return to the air within a reasonable time, otherwise you don't lay off pilots which are hard to come by and you have invested in their training on the MAX.

This decision was made as it is expected that the suspension of the 737 MAX aircraft will last longer than anticipated and we have made changes to our flight schedule until Sept. 15 to reflect that,”
Many happy landings, greetings from The Netherlands!
 
User avatar
Jouhou
Posts: 1965
Joined: Tue May 24, 2016 4:16 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:13 pm

Dutchy wrote:
Icelandair to lay off 24 pilots on MAX grounding; cancels hiring plans


Source

So 24 + 21 pilots can search for a new carrier. This is kind of worrying, this means that Icelandair doesn't think the MAX will return to the air within a reasonable time, otherwise you don't lay off pilots which are hard to come by and you have invested in their training on the MAX.

This decision was made as it is expected that the suspension of the 737 MAX aircraft will last longer than anticipated and we have made changes to our flight schedule until Sept. 15 to reflect that,”


Either they aren't planning to take the aircraft at all or they have to be pretty arrogant to think those pilots will just come crawling back after they've proven their selves to be an unreliable employer.
 
Absynth
Posts: 82
Joined: Wed Apr 17, 2019 5:37 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:21 pm

RickNRoll wrote:
speedking wrote:
kalvado wrote:
if you look at yesterday's NYT report, they mention Max’s chief technical pilot as one of the figures in the center of a problem....


I'm 100% sure the Boeing engineers could build a best plane in the world. Those guys went to the moon already 40 years ago. The problem is that the flying public expects to fly on a dime. No wonder planes crash. That's what you get with this money.


Boeing is pulling in mountains of cash. This isn't a shortage of money. They are, though, spending a lot of that cash on cutting their workforce, share dividends, bonuses for executives and share buy backs.


Not only are they making tons of money, Airbus apoears able to design planes that havent been affected by cost cutting measures.

Penny-pinching flyers is probably the worst excuse for the MAX disasters I've read here.
 
shmerik
Posts: 8
Joined: Sun May 05, 2019 2:28 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q2 2019

Mon Jun 03, 2019 8:22 pm

mjoelnir wrote:
hivue wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
Reading this article, assuming that it is a true representation of what happened around MCAS, one could believe that rank amateurs are working at Boeing on safety critical issues.


On the contrary, this information seems to answer one of the great mysteries surrounding these events: why presumably talented and professional engineers would design an aircraft safety system with a built-in single point failure mode. The answer is -- they didn't. But when the problem the system was intended to solve expanded from the strictly high G environment to a larger part of the envelope, the high G detection part had to go leaving only AoA. Then the great bugaboo of any large scale project struck: lack of communication.

So many poster here seem to want either to tag the flight crews with total inability to fly an airplane or to tag Boeing with purposeful intent to cold bloodedly murder more than 300 people. What everyone should be doing instead is trying to figure out exactly what happened. It's not likely we yet have all the information to do that.


Somebody or a group of persons decided, that one sensor was enough, there is undeniable proof for it, there was only one sensor used. It is very simple to point to miscommunication. But the main point is, such a system, like the design department at Boeing, should be build exactly around procedures to minimize miscommunication.
So there are either rank amateurs designing the systems, or there are rank amateurs called managers at Boeing, all the way to the highest level. Take your pick.


Yep, this is why I'm not buying the story that it was multiple groups within Boeing that "accidentally" made changes that together added up to the disastrous MCAS that is on the MAX in it's final state.

Every design decision is explicitly written out in requirements documents, and the requirements in all of the systems are generally kept in matrices that show how each requirement relates to each other so that teams can see when changes happen and review the downstream effects. If Boeing was acting in good faith and genuinely thought that this was good design, they would be able to point directly to the logic that lead to that conclusion in all of the design documents and emails that would have been circulating during the project.

This isn't an open-source software project where some guy across the globe can merge a breaking change that no one sees, there's a documentation trail for every choice made in a safety critical design process.

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