kalvado
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Tue Dec 03, 2019 5:50 pm

Baldr wrote:
If Boeing, on the other hand, had decided to just better the A320neo family -- i.e. more modern A320-type fuselage with a LD3-45 compatible lower hold, aluminium wings/fuselage structure and 787-derived systems (etc.) -- they could have had that aircraft in service by now.

Hindsight is always 20/20. Boeing ALMOST did what was planned. If MCAS was held to a little bit higher standard from beginning, things would be way better for Boeing. It is two crashes which resulted in very critical attitude towards MAX, and a very critical review of MAX. Rightly or not, if not for the crashes, MAX would continue to ride success wave of NG.
I am not willing to say that MCAS is a result of an oh-so-bad MAX aerodynamics. There are problems; but show me a complex $100M machine without any... It is the way Boeing deals with problems what bothers me...
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Tue Dec 03, 2019 6:04 pm

kalvado wrote:
Baldr wrote:
If Boeing, on the other hand, had decided to just better the A320neo family -- i.e. more modern A320-type fuselage with a LD3-45 compatible lower hold, aluminium wings/fuselage structure and 787-derived systems (etc.) -- they could have had that aircraft in service by now.

Hindsight is always 20/20. Boeing ALMOST did what was planned. If MCAS was held to a little bit higher standard from beginning, things would be way better for Boeing. It is two crashes which resulted in very critical attitude towards MAX, and a very critical review of MAX. Rightly or not, if not for the crashes, MAX would continue to ride success wave of NG.
I am not willing to say that MCAS is a result of an oh-so-bad MAX aerodynamics. There are problems; but show me a complex $100M machine without any... It is the way Boeing deals with problems what bothers me...


Yes I would agree - they are not as transparent as one would hope.

If they were it would give us a lot more to talk about than the obvious.
 
smartplane
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Tue Dec 03, 2019 6:43 pm

LondonAero wrote:
smartplane wrote:
Based on a Reuter's report in the last 18 hours, the software documentation revisions are still not complete. Many posters here surmised this was just dotting i's and crossing t's formality. Or is the audit itself incomplete / suspended for more fundamental reasons?

Also the test flight still hasn't occurred. That suggests the audit isn't complete, because the MCAS re-work isn't complete, hence there still isn't a signed off MCAS 2.0 to fly / test / certify.


Sorry - where is this Reuter's report? I have not seen it. Thanks.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boei ... SKBN1Y622P

Also states the biggest 3 US MAX operators now not expecting a return to service until at least March.
 
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seahawk
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Tue Dec 03, 2019 6:53 pm

kalvado wrote:
Baldr wrote:
If Boeing, on the other hand, had decided to just better the A320neo family -- i.e. more modern A320-type fuselage with a LD3-45 compatible lower hold, aluminium wings/fuselage structure and 787-derived systems (etc.) -- they could have had that aircraft in service by now.

Hindsight is always 20/20. Boeing ALMOST did what was planned. If MCAS was held to a little bit higher standard from beginning, things would be way better for Boeing. It is two crashes which resulted in very critical attitude towards MAX, and a very critical review of MAX. Rightly or not, if not for the crashes, MAX would continue to ride success wave of NG.
I am not willing to say that MCAS is a result of an oh-so-bad MAX aerodynamics. There are problems; but show me a complex $100M machine without any... It is the way Boeing deals with problems what bothers me...


Agree, the only thing one can take away from the story at the moment is a serious cooperate culture problem at Boeing.
 
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PW100
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Tue Dec 03, 2019 7:01 pm

Revelation wrote:
Baldr wrote:
Even before the MAX disasters, Boeing had gone from a 50/50 split in the single aisle market to nearly a 60/40 split in favour of Airbus.

Is it a European thing to fixate on market share? If so I guess you're willing to concede that Airbus sucks at wide bodies, freighters, military aircraft, spacecraft, etc.


Not that I support his point(s), but I do wonder whether Airbus had ever reached a 50/50 split in any of those fields . . . ?
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shmerik
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Tue Dec 03, 2019 9:56 pm

Re. Pilot Training, looks like at least one airline is considering stepping up requirements for the MAX:

https://finance.yahoo.com/news/india-we ... 09095.html

India's Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) may consider mandating a minimum number of flying hours for pilots of the 737 MAX, the source said, adding a decision would be made once it is clear when the planes are fit to return to the air.

"Pilot training is a serious matter for the DGCA and the airlines will also need to work on building pilot confidence," said the source, who sought anonymity, as the discussions were private.

The regulator will also make it mandatory for Boeing to set up simulators in India and for airlines to carry out comprehensive pilot training before it allows the planes to start flying, the source added.
 
Saintor
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 12:19 am

These are issues specific to the MAX and why it was grounded.


There was a 737 rudder issue in the '90s that lead to two crashes and almost 3rd one.

They were NOT grounded.

A protocol was quickly issued how to handle that potential pitfall and it was diligently & nicely done in a professional manner. 737s were updated between 1996 and 2002. No more drama. IT WORKED.

Apparently no longer possible 20 years later, in 2019. If JT610 and ET302 happened in western world, instead of in third-world countries, the 737 MAX would be flying by now. Now what we see is some kind of retaliation, .... because at least two crews didn't follow basic checklists.

The cases of '90s were much worse as it took MUCH longer to identify the direct cause (not the root causes) and no check list would have saved the planes, unlike 2019's cases.

Unbelievable...
Last edited by Saintor on Wed Dec 04, 2019 12:39 am, edited 15 times in total.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 12:22 am

Saintor wrote:
Now what we see is some kind of retaliation


By the FAA? :confused:
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aerolimani
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 12:51 am

kalvado wrote:
Baldr wrote:
If Boeing, on the other hand, had decided to just better the A320neo family -- i.e. more modern A320-type fuselage with a LD3-45 compatible lower hold, aluminium wings/fuselage structure and 787-derived systems (etc.) -- they could have had that aircraft in service by now.

Hindsight is always 20/20. Boeing ALMOST did what was planned. If MCAS was held to a little bit higher standard from beginning, things would be way better for Boeing. It is two crashes which resulted in very critical attitude towards MAX, and a very critical review of MAX. Rightly or not, if not for the crashes, MAX would continue to ride success wave of NG.
I am not willing to say that MCAS is a result of an oh-so-bad MAX aerodynamics. There are problems; but show me a complex $100M machine without any... It is the way Boeing deals with problems what bothers me...

It's questionable whether Boeing could have met their self-imposed launch schedule for the MAX, had they done MCAS properly. By "done properly," I mean that the hazard assessment would have been catastrophic, and required input redundancy. As I understand, achieving that is turning out to be a lot more difficult than initially assumed.

Boeing began work on the software shortly after the Lion Air crash, in November of 2018. It's December 2019 now. That's more than a year since they began work, and the plane is still not ready. I know that the bit-flip thing is also part of the situation, and that likely wouldn't have come up were it not for the crashes. The bit-flip issue appeared at the end of June, so still at least 8 months of delay. So, imagine Boeing telling its MAX customers that their aircraft are going to be delayed by 8, 12, 14 months… or even longer??? Who knows, exactly?

IMO, that would have been the best of all paths for Boeing, but that can only be realized with the benefit of hindsight. As a plane-lover, I would have loved to see an NSA, but I recognize that Boeing also needs to run a successful company in today's market environment. Truly though, I do wish that Boeing would become more of an innovator and less of a slave to Wall Street.
 
prebennorholm
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 2:31 am

Saintor wrote:
These are issues specific to the MAX and why it was grounded.


There was a 737 rudder issue in the '90s that lead to two crashes and almost 3rd one.

They were NOT grounded.

A protocol was quickly issued how to handle that potential pitfall and it was diligently & nicely done in a professional manner. 737s were updated between 1996 and 2002. No more drama. IT WORKED.

Apparently no longer possible 20 years later, in 2019. If JT610 and ET302 happened in western world, instead of in third-world countries, the 737 MAX would be flying by now. Now what we see is some kind of retaliation, .... because at least two crews didn't follow basic checklists.

The cases of '90s were much worse as it took MUCH longer to identify the direct cause (not the root causes) and no check list would have saved the planes, unlike 2019's cases.

Unbelievable...

No, not unbelievable. After accident in 1991, another accident in 1994, and the near miss in 1996, it took the NTSB until 1999 to fully understand what was wrong. The major reason was the extremely crude FDRs on these old planes which hardly gave any useful information for the investigators.

It wasn't until after the Eastwind 1996 incident they got the first useful information about what was going on, because the crew happened to live to tell their story.

Had these old planes had anything similar to modern day FDRs onboard, then the 737 would have been grounded in 1991 until rebuilt with modified PCUs. And 132 lives would have been saved by no 1994 accident.

For years on years the 737 rudder hardovers were hidden under the rug as wake turbulence and stupid pilots. Thank God our FDR manufacturers have progressed since then.
Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs
 
Saintor
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 2:53 am

prebennorholm wrote:
Saintor wrote:
These are issues specific to the MAX and why it was grounded.


There was a 737 rudder issue in the '90s that lead to two crashes and almost 3rd one.

They were NOT grounded.

A protocol was quickly issued how to handle that potential pitfall and it was diligently & nicely done in a professional manner. 737s were updated between 1996 and 2002. No more drama. IT WORKED.

Apparently no longer possible 20 years later, in 2019. If JT610 and ET302 happened in western world, instead of in third-world countries, the 737 MAX would be flying by now. Now what we see is some kind of retaliation, .... because at least two crews didn't follow basic checklists.

The cases of '90s were much worse as it took MUCH longer to identify the direct cause (not the root causes) and no check list would have saved the planes, unlike 2019's cases.

Unbelievable...

No, not unbelievable. After accident in 1991, another accident in 1994, and the near miss in 1996, it took the NTSB until 1999 to fully understand what was wrong. The major reason was the extremely crude FDRs on these old planes which hardly gave any useful information for the investigators.

It wasn't until after the Eastwind 1996 incident they got the first useful information about what was going on, because the crew happened to live to tell their story.

Had these old planes had anything similar to modern day FDRs onboard, then the 737 would have been grounded in 1991 until rebuilt with modified PCUs. And 132 lives would have been saved by no 1994 accident.

For years on years the 737 rudder hardovers were hidden under the rug as wake turbulence and stupid pilots. Thank God our FDR manufacturers have progressed since then.


Sorry, absolutely nothing you wrote refuted what I wrote.

*Nothing*.

Again, it WORKED.
 
airzona11
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 3:59 am

Baldr wrote:
Revelation wrote:
hivue wrote:
Excellent point. Boeing could have been farsighted way back before the A320NEO was even being considered, and come up with a new FBW single aisle design to replace the 40+ year-old 737 design (now 50 year-old) as an A320 competitor.

That's exactly what they investigated doing. Their conclusion is that they needed an all new CFRP narrow body aircraft to provide any advantage relative to the incumbent A320 and the technology of the day could not produce one at the desired rate and at a price point that could make a profit.

It's not clear to me that even today one could build an all new CFRP aircraft comparable to A320 and make it at the required price point and rate. In fact a main goal of NMA is to mature the manufacturing tech to get to that point at some point in the future. Therefore it should be clear Boeing doesn't think they are at that point right now.

hivue wrote:
But the 737 has been Boeing's cash (to give to share holders, execs and managers, for buybacks) cow. Since it worked so well in that capacity, the temptation to keep milking it was impossible to resist for the executive suite and the bean counters. Unfortunately, karma struck big time, and the cash cow now has to be fed on cash.

I think this is a false narrative. I think you need to show how Boeing could have produced a new small airplane in 2011 that could have competed with A320 and projected a profit never mind a ROI, and I'm confident that you cannot. Without such an airplane they would be abandoning their customers and their part of the market which is madness.

The reality is that MAX was the right business strategy in 2011, and no matter how you look at it Boeing's engineering team let the company down by producing a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane. I'm sure they were facing heavy pressure from managers, but it is part of an engineer's job to resist such pressure and not produce a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.


No, the MAX wasn't the right business strategy in 2011. 737 MAX R&D costs + grounding costs are approaching the cost of that of an all new single aisle aircraft.

That's exactly what they investigated doing. Their conclusion is that they needed an all new CFRP narrow body aircraft to provide any advantage relative to the incumbent A320 and the technology of the day could not produce one at the desired rate and at a price point that could make a profit.


The notion that you have to bury the competition seems to be a uniquely American trait. With the 787, Boeing apparently believed that they would "bury" the A330. At the 2012 Phoenix ISTAT conference, Boeing's Mike Bair spoke of eliminating Airbus from the large twin market.

With that kind of mindset, it's easy to understand why the management at Boeing thought that if they couldn't "kill" the A320 outright, they'd just copy what Airbus was doing with the A320neo, with their 737NG -- damn the consequences.

If Boeing, on the other hand, had decided to just better the A320neo family -- i.e. more modern A320-type fuselage with a LD3-45 compatible lower hold, aluminium wings/fuselage structure and 787-derived systems (etc.) -- they could have had that aircraft in service by now.

There is no doubt that in terms of passenger appeal the A320 trumps the 737. When the A320 was designed in the 1980s, Airbus purposely chose a cabin seven inches wider than the 737’s -- and yet, the Airbus designers knew that the wider cabin came at a cost; the wider the tube, the heavier the structure and the more the aerodynamic drag, and weight and drag translate into higher fuel consumption and higher operating costs. The difference is actually small but it still enabled Boeing to crow about having “the most profitable single-aisle ever.”

So after having been talking down the A320neo -- even before the A320neo programme was launched in December 2010 and until the Paris Air Show in 2011 -- it would perhaps have been awkward for Boeing to backtrack. Hence, Boeing's top management were seemingly trapped in their own falsity and mind-set.

and no matter how you look at it Boeing's engineering team let the company down by producing a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.


No, Boeing's management let the company down. Boeing's engineering team had a damn near impossible task making the MAX fully competitive with the A320neo family. Even before the MAX disasters, Boeing had gone from a 50/50 split in the single aisle market to nearly a 60/40 split in favour of Airbus.

I'm sure they were facing heavy pressure from managers, but it is part of an engineer's job to resist such pressure and not produce a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane


Boeing engineers are also human -- many of whom being afraid of losing their jobs in a system where benefits are so closely tied to the employer-employee relationship.

Engineers working for Airbus in Europe, however, won’t have to worry about missing an insurance premium, getting sick, becoming homeless, and "having to live in their car," if they were to resist heavy pressure from Airbus managers in order not to be responsible for the production of a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.


You don’t believe all of this that you opined, do you? This is an alternate, hindsight interpretation of reality.
 
prebennorholm
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 4:06 am

Saintor wrote:
Sorry, absolutely nothing you wrote refuted what I wrote.

*Nothing*.

Again, it WORKED.

Yeah, it WORKED. It WORKED the way that it killed 132 on US 427 and almost killed 53 on Eastwind 517. That wouldn't have happened if UA 585 had been equipped with a modern FDR.

You have lived under a rock if you imagine that we WORK the same way today. Do you really believe that pilots in 2019 will fly planes with known defects such as rudder hardover or MCAS 1.0? Or that airlines can survive offering such flights to the public? 20,000 posts back on this thread you will see the ALPA opinion - their members fly 16% of all MAXs. Go and read newspapers in 100 more countries - where 84% of the MAXs fly or belong, and you will know. Hint: Google.com.

Your definition of *WORKED*: The MAX has made roughly 250,000 revenue flights. 249,998 of them WORKED.

But at the end of the day you don't need to convince me that I am wrong. You only have to convince a dozen CAAs around the world. Singapore, Russia, Turkey, EU, Canada, USA to name a few. When you have done so, then it is irrelevant what I tell you.
Always keep your number of landings equal to your number of take-offs
 
maint123
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 5:44 am

scbriml wrote:
Saintor wrote:
Now what we see is some kind of retaliation


By the FAA? :confused:

No. By trump, the leader of the free world. He ordered the suspension of max flights in usa after the CEO of Boeing had called it the safest plane around, just after the 2nd crash.
My prediction of return to service for the max -
April 2020- FAA gives clearance to Boeing to implement the changes.
Takes a couple of months to update the software, it's not OTA.
Then a few trial flights for each plane.
FAA has decided to sign off on each plane, so FAA officials have to go to each carrier around the world.
So around July 2020 max might be flying.
But -
With trump picking up fights with the chinese and the Europeans, timetable might get effected a bit.
Wonder what will the insurance premiums be, will the companies increase them?
 
B777LRF
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 5:48 am

Saintor wrote:

Sorry, absolutely nothing you wrote refuted what I wrote.

*Nothing*.

Again, it WORKED.


That is the most twisted logic we've seen here so far. Had it "worked" there would have been one crash, after which the cause would have been identified and rectified. But that didn't happen; Boeing blamed wake turbulence and/or poor piloting and the NTSB were none the wiser owing to lack of data. Then a second crash happened, Boeing stuck to their rhetoric and the NTSB was still left in the dark. It was only after a 3rd flight had a lucky escape the puzzle fell into place.

That's not "worked". That was, for lack of a better term, pure blinding luck. Had the NTSB and FAA had the data at hand after the first crash, the 737 Classic would indeed have been grounded until Boeing had replaced the rudder PCU. And that would have resulted in one less crash and around 130 less dead people.
Signature. You just read one.
 
iamlucky13
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 6:49 am

aerolimani wrote:
It's questionable whether Boeing could have met their self-imposed launch schedule for the MAX, had they done MCAS properly. By "done properly," I mean that the hazard assessment would have been catastrophic, and required input redundancy. As I understand, achieving that is turning out to be a lot more difficult than initially assumed.

Boeing began work on the software shortly after the Lion Air crash, in November of 2018. It's December 2019 now. That's more than a year since they began work, and the plane is still not ready. I know that the bit-flip thing is also part of the situation, and that likely wouldn't have come up were it not for the crashes. The bit-flip issue appeared at the end of June, so still at least 8 months of delay. So, imagine Boeing telling its MAX customers that their aircraft are going to be delayed by 8, 12, 14 months… or even longer??? Who knows, exactly?


There should not have needed to be a delay.

It appears to me (Translation: I am speculating) that 6 months of work to modify the controls is stretching into 12+ because the regulators are trying to figure out how much they can trust Boeing, and I suspect are terrified of looking like they're going easy on Boeing, much less the (remote, I think) prospect that they let any issues slip through the certification.

Those 6 months would have simply happened in parallel with other work by a few extra flight controls engineers during the 5-1/2 year development program had the assessment identified a failure as catastrophic, and not only required matching redundant inputs to activate MCAS, but also prevented multiple activations beyond conditions tested in flight.
 
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flyingphil
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 8:27 am

Interesting article, if a bit long winded.
Seems that even a March 2020 return to service is looking optimistic.

It also assumes that MCAS and pilot training is the only issue.. and also that worldwide regulators will fall in line with the FAA after a month.

".. As pointed out in October, a Q4 return was nearly impossible, but we can now conclude that even a Q1 2020 return for the Boeing 737 MAX is going to pose a significant challenge to the plane maker.."

https://seekingalpha.com/amp/article/43 ... ne-slipped

If the rudder cables issue comes up again maybe that's another six months for a fix.. then there is the inadequate fireproofing around the APU and other non-compliant grandfathered items.

Then we have the MAX10 which has yet to fly and have it's new main landing gear tested and pass an evacuation test.

Not forgetting Ryanair's mysterious 'design issues' with its 737 MAX's.

I would not like to be dealing with DM's in tray this morning, especially hearing of the latest A321 XLR orders.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:13 am

aerolimani wrote:
So, imagine Boeing telling its MAX customers that their aircraft are going to be delayed by 8, 12, 14 months… or even longer??? Who knows, exactly?


Even if return to service were tomorrow, an unknown percentage of those stored will not be delivered until an unknown point in 2021.
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chiad
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:37 am

My friend just had a flight with Pobeda Airlines between St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kaliningrad.
He took a photo of the wing from his windows seat.
Can someone please tell me if this is a MAX8?
download/file.php?mode=view&id=487

How the heck do I post a photo on this site?
:mad:
 
uta999
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:56 am

A very old plane, just got older
Your computer just got better
 
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AECM
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 10:07 am

chiad wrote:
My friend just had a flight with Pobeda Airlines between St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kaliningrad.
He took a photo of the wing from his windows seat.
Can someone please tell me if this is a MAX8?
download/file.php?mode=view&id=487

How the heck do I post a photo on this site?
:mad:


Cannot see the picture but it must me a B738 with Split Scimitar winglets

Image
 
mjoelnir
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 10:15 am

B777LRF wrote:
Saintor wrote:

Sorry, absolutely nothing you wrote refuted what I wrote.

*Nothing*.

Again, it WORKED.


That is the most twisted logic we've seen here so far. Had it "worked" there would have been one crash, after which the cause would have been identified and rectified. But that didn't happen; Boeing blamed wake turbulence and/or poor piloting and the NTSB were none the wiser owing to lack of data. Then a second crash happened, Boeing stuck to their rhetoric and the NTSB was still left in the dark. It was only after a 3rd flight had a lucky escape the puzzle fell into place.

That's not "worked". That was, for lack of a better term, pure blinding luck. Had the NTSB and FAA had the data at hand after the first crash, the 737 Classic would indeed have been grounded until Boeing had replaced the rudder PCU. And that would have resulted in one less crash and around 130 less dead people.


The same modus of operation Boeing tried with the 737MAX crashes. Blame the pilots and keep flying. The point is just that the regulators outside the USA were not prepared to play that game.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 10:18 am

chiad wrote:
My friend just had a flight with Pobeda Airlines between St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kaliningrad.
He took a photo of the wing from his windows seat.
Can someone please tell me if this is a MAX8?
download/file.php?mode=view&id=487

How the heck do I post a photo on this site?
:mad:


Can’t be a MAX as none have been delivered to Podeba.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
chiad
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 10:29 am

AECM wrote:
chiad wrote:
My friend just had a flight with Pobeda Airlines between St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kaliningrad.
He took a photo of the wing from his windows seat.
Can someone please tell me if this is a MAX8?
download/file.php?mode=view&id=487

How the heck do I post a photo on this site?
:mad:


Cannot see the picture but it must me a B738 with Split Scimitar winglets

Image


Ah .. thank you so much.
:bigthumbsup:

scbriml wrote:
Can’t be a MAX as none have been delivered to Podeba.


Yes ... of course. I just didn't know about this Split Scimitar winglets being available for the B737-800.
 
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scbriml
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 10:37 am

chiad wrote:
AECM wrote:
chiad wrote:
My friend just had a flight with Pobeda Airlines between St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kaliningrad.
He took a photo of the wing from his windows seat.
Can someone please tell me if this is a MAX8?
download/file.php?mode=view&id=487

How the heck do I post a photo on this site?
:mad:


Cannot see the picture but it must me a B738 with Split Scimitar winglets

Image


Ah .. thank you so much.
:bigthumbsup:

scbriml wrote:
Can’t be a MAX as none have been delivered to Podeba.


Yes ... of course. I just didn't know about this Split Scimitar winglets being available for the B737-800.


It is different from the MAX winglet.
Time flies like an arrow. Fruit flies like a banana!
There are 10 types of people in the World - those that understand binary and those that don't.
 
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AECM
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 11:41 am

scbriml wrote:
chiad wrote:
AECM wrote:

Cannot see the picture but it must me a B738 with Split Scimitar winglets

Image


Ah .. thank you so much.
:bigthumbsup:

scbriml wrote:
Can’t be a MAX as none have been delivered to Podeba.


Yes ... of course. I just didn't know about this Split Scimitar winglets being available for the B737-800.


It is different from the MAX winglet.


https://twitter.com/jonostrower/status/864908282191691776

Yes, same type of concept but different profiles and angles

Image
 
djm18
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 12:13 pm

chiad wrote:
My friend just had a flight with Pobeda Airlines between St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kaliningrad.
He took a photo of the wing from his windows seat.
Can someone please tell me if this is a MAX8?
download/file.php?mode=view&id=487

How the heck do I post a photo on this site?
:mad:


An easy way to make out the max is by the back side of the engine cowlings, similar to the 787.
 
TaromA380
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 12:43 pm

Still no news whatsoever about that Canadian regulator proposal of getting rid of the MCAS in favor of native envelope flight + crew training.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 1:28 pm

It was not a Canadian regulator proposal but an internal message leaked to the net. So, not an official position.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 4:10 pm

airzona11 wrote:
You don’t believe all of this that you opined, do you? This is an alternate, hindsight interpretation of reality.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/20/boein ... anding-by/ was just posted to this thread a few posts ago.

While the bulk of the article addresses the eventual decision to do the MAX, one part addresses what I was saying:

“The (clean sheet) airplane as it was defined then was struggling to beat a reengined 737 from a performance standpoint and–if it contained significant composites–they had no idea how to build it at any kind of 737-like production rate (never mind all the handwringing about the where).”

Pretty much says exactly what I said.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 4:33 pm

Revelation wrote:
airzona11 wrote:
You don’t believe all of this that you opined, do you? This is an alternate, hindsight interpretation of reality.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/20/boein ... anding-by/ was just posted to this thread a few posts ago.

While the bulk of the article addresses the eventual decision to do the MAX, one part addresses what I was saying:

“The (clean sheet) airplane as it was defined then was struggling to beat a reengined 737 from a performance standpoint and–if it contained significant composites–they had no idea how to build it at any kind of 737-like production rate (never mind all the handwringing about the where).”

Pretty much says exactly what I said.


Oh I concur with what you are saying. I was addressing the other poster.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 4:52 pm

airzona11 wrote:
Revelation wrote:
airzona11 wrote:
You don’t believe all of this that you opined, do you? This is an alternate, hindsight interpretation of reality.

https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/20/boein ... anding-by/ was just posted to this thread a few posts ago.

While the bulk of the article addresses the eventual decision to do the MAX, one part addresses what I was saying:

“The (clean sheet) airplane as it was defined then was struggling to beat a reengined 737 from a performance standpoint and–if it contained significant composites–they had no idea how to build it at any kind of 737-like production rate (never mind all the handwringing about the where).”

Pretty much says exactly what I said.

Oh I concur with what you are saying. I was addressing the other poster.

Thanks for the clarification.
Wake up to find out that you are the eyes of the world
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 5:39 pm

morrisond wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:
morrisond wrote:

That was just an explanation on the background of the system. I do not know for sure but I expect there is more detail in the Maintenance manual that was available before Lionair.

If you look at the OPS bulletin here http://www.b737.org.uk/mcas.htm - Look at MLI-15 - it talks about what happens "in the event of erroneous AOA data".

MCAS 1.0 remains active as long as the AOA remains above the threshold and will keep firing until the AOA is below the threshold. I think reset just means stops acting unless AOA goes too high again.


We are not backpadeling suddenly?
You declared that the AD, the OPS and the memo would give full picture for a pilot flying the 737MAX, what he would have to expect and how he would have to react.
A perfect set of information.
Such information is not allowd to be ambiguous.
The first part of the message is worthy of a story teller. Nearly nothing to do with the reality of MCAS. The second part is ambiguous and ambiguous should a technical description never be. It does not matter what you think it means or what I thing it means, their should be no room for interpretations, technical descriptions have to be exact.

And once again,we are not talking about the maintenance manual, it has absolutely nothing to do with this discussion, we are talking about the information available to the pilot.


Yes it gives them more than enough information. What else would they need between the three that would be useful in a situation where they were faced with a MCAS failure?

Pilots don't need a full technical description to operate something safely - they just need to know what to look out for and what to do if it happens.

If this had been the information in the infamous iPad course we would not be having this discussion.

Are you finally willing to retract your statement that Boeing disclosed nothing about MCAS after the Lionair crash? Give up - you were wrong.

If all three documents you referenced are vague or otherwise imprecise, which they are, then they do not give enough information. What Boeing needed to do is make a document saying exactly what MCAS does, exactly in what conditions it run, exactly when it fails, and exactly how a crew is to overcome it without crashing. None of these documents single handedly or together fully do that. A maintenance manual should not be a go-to document for pilots. They need readily available specifics just like they need to know exactly how much weight the plane can land with or how fast they can extend the flaps or gear. Again the key is in the language; it says they can do corrective actions. It does not say what they must do leaving a lot of room for ambiguity and guess work. Without this is leaves the operator with the onus of telling the pilots what to do; not all of them will do so equally. Boeing should be specific so that everyone is on the same page. It leaves them looking out for too much and they could waste a lot of valuable time and effort.
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morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 6:59 pm

767333ER wrote:
morrisond wrote:
mjoelnir wrote:

We are not backpadeling suddenly?
You declared that the AD, the OPS and the memo would give full picture for a pilot flying the 737MAX, what he would have to expect and how he would have to react.
A perfect set of information.
Such information is not allowd to be ambiguous.
The first part of the message is worthy of a story teller. Nearly nothing to do with the reality of MCAS. The second part is ambiguous and ambiguous should a technical description never be. It does not matter what you think it means or what I thing it means, their should be no room for interpretations, technical descriptions have to be exact.

And once again,we are not talking about the maintenance manual, it has absolutely nothing to do with this discussion, we are talking about the information available to the pilot.


Yes it gives them more than enough information. What else would they need between the three that would be useful in a situation where they were faced with a MCAS failure?

Pilots don't need a full technical description to operate something safely - they just need to know what to look out for and what to do if it happens.

If this had been the information in the infamous iPad course we would not be having this discussion.

Are you finally willing to retract your statement that Boeing disclosed nothing about MCAS after the Lionair crash? Give up - you were wrong.

If all three documents you referenced are vague or otherwise imprecise, which they are, then they do not give enough information. What Boeing needed to do is make a document saying exactly what MCAS does, exactly in what conditions it run, exactly when it fails, and exactly how a crew is to overcome it without crashing. None of these documents single handedly or together fully do that. A maintenance manual should not be a go-to document for pilots. They need readily available specifics just like they need to know exactly how much weight the plane can land with or how fast they can extend the flaps or gear. Again the key is in the language; it says they can do corrective actions. It does not say what they must do leaving a lot of room for ambiguity and guess work. Without this is leaves the operator with the onus of telling the pilots what to do; not all of them will do so equally. Boeing should be specific so that everyone is on the same page. It leaves them looking out for too much and they could waste a lot of valuable time and effort.


And people accuse me of always making it about the pilots and not letting this die. Just for the record I did not bring this up again.

First the information in AVHerald was only an excerpt form the information Boeing sent to it's Operators. The full memo was posted somewhere in a previous thread - I could not find it.

If you make one bulletin too long you risk it being useless.

What is missing from that OPS bulletin document other than the word MCAS and a disclaimer to please ensure to not be stupid enough to operate outside of the normal operating envelope where the backup manual trim may not work? I think it is safe to Assume that any MAX pilot reading this OPS bulletin would see the reference to Lionair 610 and know this was the procedure to deal with MCAS. The only way they wouldn't know what this was (and if they didn't why didn't they ask) would be to assume that their training departments never circulated the Nov 10 information from Boeing that clarified what the ops bulletin was talking about or that they were completely unaware of the Lionair crash. That is really hard to believe either happened.

In the OPS bulletin It mentions you can use Electric Trim to counteract the effects twice - under Background Information and in the Note under operating instructions. It mentions exactly what the ET pilots experienced in the cockpit in terms of all the conflicting alarms.

Warnings such as Maintain sufficient thrust to stay above stall speed, or don't go above Vmo aren't necessary in the OPS bulletin or the Runaway Stabilizer Trim NNC list. Unless you believe that a pilot shouldn't have those facts committed to memory and you want a whole section of how to fly the aircraft appended to each bulletin or NNC thereby making them useless.

The ET 302 Runaway Stabilizer NNC in the ET Pre-lim report specifically says to disengage the Auto Throttle which they did not do which caused them to exceed Vmo and where Manual trim would have been useless even if they tried it.

You can see all the Procedures ET had in it's manuals staring on page 28 in this document. https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

Everyone - before you bash me again - please remember I did not resurrect this.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 8:23 pm

morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
morrisond wrote:

Yes it gives them more than enough information. What else would they need between the three that would be useful in a situation where they were faced with a MCAS failure?

Pilots don't need a full technical description to operate something safely - they just need to know what to look out for and what to do if it happens.

If this had been the information in the infamous iPad course we would not be having this discussion.

Are you finally willing to retract your statement that Boeing disclosed nothing about MCAS after the Lionair crash? Give up - you were wrong.

If all three documents you referenced are vague or otherwise imprecise, which they are, then they do not give enough information. What Boeing needed to do is make a document saying exactly what MCAS does, exactly in what conditions it run, exactly when it fails, and exactly how a crew is to overcome it without crashing. None of these documents single handedly or together fully do that. A maintenance manual should not be a go-to document for pilots. They need readily available specifics just like they need to know exactly how much weight the plane can land with or how fast they can extend the flaps or gear. Again the key is in the language; it says they can do corrective actions. It does not say what they must do leaving a lot of room for ambiguity and guess work. Without this is leaves the operator with the onus of telling the pilots what to do; not all of them will do so equally. Boeing should be specific so that everyone is on the same page. It leaves them looking out for too much and they could waste a lot of valuable time and effort.


And people accuse me of always making it about the pilots and not letting this die. Just for the record I did not bring this up again.

First the information in AVHerald was only an excerpt form the information Boeing sent to it's Operators. The full memo was posted somewhere in a previous thread - I could not find it.

If you make one bulletin too long you risk it being useless.

What is missing from that OPS bulletin document other than the word MCAS and a disclaimer to please ensure to not be stupid enough to operate outside of the normal operating envelope where the backup manual trim may not work? I think it is safe to Assume that any MAX pilot reading this OPS bulletin would see the reference to Lionair 610 and know this was the procedure to deal with MCAS. The only way they wouldn't know what this was (and if they didn't why didn't they ask) would be to assume that their training departments never circulated the Nov 10 information from Boeing that clarified what the ops bulletin was talking about or that they were completely unaware of the Lionair crash. That is really hard to believe either happened.

In the OPS bulletin It mentions you can use Electric Trim to counteract the effects twice - under Background Information and in the Note under operating instructions. It mentions exactly what the ET pilots experienced in the cockpit in terms of all the conflicting alarms.

Warnings such as Maintain sufficient thrust to stay above stall speed, or don't go above Vmo aren't necessary in the OPS bulletin or the Runaway Stabilizer Trim NNC list. Unless you believe that a pilot shouldn't have those facts committed to memory and you want a whole section of how to fly the aircraft appended to each bulletin or NNC thereby making them useless.

The ET 302 Runaway Stabilizer NNC in the ET Pre-lim report specifically says to disengage the Auto Throttle which they did not do which caused them to exceed Vmo and where Manual trim would have been useless even if they tried it.

You can see all the Procedures ET had in it's manuals staring on page 28 in this document. https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

Everyone - before you bash me again - please remember I did not resurrect this.

What you systematically resurrect to blame the pilots is the trim at Vmo, while it's just an another design flaw of the 737 from a security point of view. Regulators require aircraft pitch control up to Vd. I expect the ET302 final report to explain how that flaw is tolerated on the 737.
 
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Ryanair Announces MAX related base closures, job losses

Wed Dec 04, 2019 8:31 pm

From the WSJ, Ryanair attributes lack of promised MAX deliveries to their decision to close bases in Nuremberg, Germany, and Sweden’s Stockholm Skavsta Airport, with corresponding job losses:

Ryanair said Wednesday it had again revised its summer schedule for next year based on receiving just 10 MAX aircraft in time for the busy travel season, rather than the 20 it previously planned. As a result, the company now expects to carry 156 million passengers in the year ending March 31, 2021, compared with the latest revised guidance for 157 million. In total, it has cut back its growth plans for 2020 by about six million passengers.

As discussed upthread, Ryanair's aircraft type will likely take longer to deliver since it needs a discrete certification:

Ryanair’s MAX aircraft is a specially designed model that can fit more passengers. Because it is a different design, the aircraft needs to get its own certification from regulators, which means Ryanair will receive its first aircraft later than other carriers. The airline said last month it may get its first jets as late as April next year, but cautioned that timetable could slip further.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/delayed-ma ... low_a_pos1
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 8:37 pm

https://www.flightglobal.com/news/artic ... ra-462677/

Has the FAA taken similar steps?

EASA doing it's own thing with the MAX grounding, and FAA asking EASA to partner with them on the 777X certification seems a good idea.
Last edited by smartplane on Wed Dec 04, 2019 8:45 pm, edited 1 time in total.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 8:40 pm

djm18 wrote:
chiad wrote:
My friend just had a flight with Pobeda Airlines between St. Petersburg (Russia) and Kaliningrad.
He took a photo of the wing from his windows seat.
Can someone please tell me if this is a MAX8?
download/file.php?mode=view&id=487

How the heck do I post a photo on this site?
:mad:


An easy way to make out the max is by the back side of the engine cowlings, similar to the 787.

An even easier way is that if it is carrying passengers right now, it is not a MAX.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 8:59 pm

smartplane wrote:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/easa-advises-checks-for-parts-from-discredited-xtra-462677/

Has the FAA taken similar steps?

EASA doing it's own thing with the MAX grounding, and FAA asking EASA to partner with them on the 777X certification seems a good idea.



Oh my, the irony . . .

FlightGlobal wrote:
The Indonesian inquiry found that "inadequacy" of FAA oversight allowed Florida-based Xtra to carry out incorrect maintenance work.
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:10 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
morrisond wrote:
767333ER wrote:
If all three documents you referenced are vague or otherwise imprecise, which they are, then they do not give enough information. What Boeing needed to do is make a document saying exactly what MCAS does, exactly in what conditions it run, exactly when it fails, and exactly how a crew is to overcome it without crashing. None of these documents single handedly or together fully do that. A maintenance manual should not be a go-to document for pilots. They need readily available specifics just like they need to know exactly how much weight the plane can land with or how fast they can extend the flaps or gear. Again the key is in the language; it says they can do corrective actions. It does not say what they must do leaving a lot of room for ambiguity and guess work. Without this is leaves the operator with the onus of telling the pilots what to do; not all of them will do so equally. Boeing should be specific so that everyone is on the same page. It leaves them looking out for too much and they could waste a lot of valuable time and effort.


And people accuse me of always making it about the pilots and not letting this die. Just for the record I did not bring this up again.

First the information in AVHerald was only an excerpt form the information Boeing sent to it's Operators. The full memo was posted somewhere in a previous thread - I could not find it.

If you make one bulletin too long you risk it being useless.

What is missing from that OPS bulletin document other than the word MCAS and a disclaimer to please ensure to not be stupid enough to operate outside of the normal operating envelope where the backup manual trim may not work? I think it is safe to Assume that any MAX pilot reading this OPS bulletin would see the reference to Lionair 610 and know this was the procedure to deal with MCAS. The only way they wouldn't know what this was (and if they didn't why didn't they ask) would be to assume that their training departments never circulated the Nov 10 information from Boeing that clarified what the ops bulletin was talking about or that they were completely unaware of the Lionair crash. That is really hard to believe either happened.

In the OPS bulletin It mentions you can use Electric Trim to counteract the effects twice - under Background Information and in the Note under operating instructions. It mentions exactly what the ET pilots experienced in the cockpit in terms of all the conflicting alarms.

Warnings such as Maintain sufficient thrust to stay above stall speed, or don't go above Vmo aren't necessary in the OPS bulletin or the Runaway Stabilizer Trim NNC list. Unless you believe that a pilot shouldn't have those facts committed to memory and you want a whole section of how to fly the aircraft appended to each bulletin or NNC thereby making them useless.

The ET 302 Runaway Stabilizer NNC in the ET Pre-lim report specifically says to disengage the Auto Throttle which they did not do which caused them to exceed Vmo and where Manual trim would have been useless even if they tried it.

You can see all the Procedures ET had in it's manuals staring on page 28 in this document. https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploa ... ET-AVJ.pdf

Everyone - before you bash me again - please remember I did not resurrect this.

What you systematically resurrect to blame the pilots is the trim at Vmo, while it's just an another design flaw of the 737 from a security point of view. Regulators require aircraft pitch control up to Vd. I expect the ET302 final report to explain how that flaw is tolerated on the 737.


You have the elevator for pitch control. Regulators knew that the Manual trim wheels would be ineffective in some corners of the performance envelope but gave that a pass as they assumed no one in their right minds would fly in those corners.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:19 pm

morrisond wrote:
You have the elevator for pitch control. Regulators knew that the Manual trim wheels would be ineffective in some corners of the performance envelope but gave that a pass as they assumed no one in their right minds would fly in those corners.

That assumption, in direct contradiction with safety requirement, is now proved wrong. Two times, with a lot of peoples killed.
 
Nils75cz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:34 pm

Dear Mr. Morrisond, I'd love to see you in a cockpit, even more so as an instructor. Better yet, as an advisor in the jump seat. During Mayday.

"Those who paid attention or were educated by their airlines properly had everything they needed to safely operate the MAX. Having the issue happening to them (ET pilots) should not have been a surprise and they should have easily been able to handle it. A simulator was not needed."

Tell me Mr. Morrisond, why was the aircraft grounded and not airlines nor pilots?

With your wisdom you must be able to tell us immediately, EASILY.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:41 pm

By the way, a piece of history for those who care
This was the article where possibility of unexpected trim forces and their relation to crashes was first brought up:
https://leehamnews.com/2019/03/22/bjorn ... sh-part-2/
It happened after black box of ET crash was recovered and the data published. Until this article - that is, for 12 days after the crash - extra forces on trim wheel were not brought up. Not by Boeing, not by FAA. It was just radio silence.
 
morrisond
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:57 pm

Nils75cz wrote:
Dear Mr. Morrisond, I'd love to see you in a cockpit, even more so as an instructor. Better yet, as an advisor in the jump seat. During Mayday.

"Those who paid attention or were educated by their airlines properly had everything they needed to safely operate the MAX. Having the issue happening to them (ET pilots) should not have been a surprise and they should have easily been able to handle it. A simulator was not needed."

Tell me Mr. Morrisond, why was the aircraft grounded and not airlines nor pilots?

With your wisdom you must be able to tell us immediately, EASILY.


As I would have read the OPS bulletin and been familiar with it and got clarification on anything I didn't understand I don't think it would have been that big of an issue. So far in both crashes there is no real indication either Flight crew was panicking at least in the first few minutes. This is why they (are supposed to) train and they are meant to commit these procedures to memory.

On the grounding - Because the regulators quickly released that many of the pilots that are operating the MAX did not have the minimal skills or the training from there airlines they assumed they had so it was simpler to ground the airplane which has an obvious fault (but should have been manageable) than fix the problems in the training system and hope that there were no fatalities in aircraft that don't have an obvious problem like the MAX.

Apparently it's okay for lack of pilot skills to kill the amount of people in Rhinewaldners overall crash stats (the 3-4 gap I think) every year - however i don't think that is necessary if regulators held there operators to the standards that are already in place and seem to be being ignored.

The MAX isn't the only type of frame that has crashed in the last 10-15 years due to operator error. Issues in other more modern control systems and below standard pilots have killed more.
 
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 9:59 pm

Saintor wrote:
prebennorholm wrote:
Saintor wrote:

There was a 737 rudder issue in the '90s that lead to two crashes and almost 3rd one.

They were NOT grounded.

A protocol was quickly issued how to handle that potential pitfall and it was diligently & nicely done in a professional manner. 737s were updated between 1996 and 2002. No more drama. IT WORKED.

Apparently no longer possible 20 years later, in 2019. If JT610 and ET302 happened in western world, instead of in third-world countries, the 737 MAX would be flying by now. Now what we see is some kind of retaliation, .... because at least two crews didn't follow basic checklists.

The cases of '90s were much worse as it took MUCH longer to identify the direct cause (not the root causes) and no check list would have saved the planes, unlike 2019's cases.

Unbelievable...

No, not unbelievable. After accident in 1991, another accident in 1994, and the near miss in 1996, it took the NTSB until 1999 to fully understand what was wrong. The major reason was the extremely crude FDRs on these old planes which hardly gave any useful information for the investigators.

It wasn't until after the Eastwind 1996 incident they got the first useful information about what was going on, because the crew happened to live to tell their story.

Had these old planes had anything similar to modern day FDRs onboard, then the 737 would have been grounded in 1991 until rebuilt with modified PCUs. And 132 lives would have been saved by no 1994 accident.

For years on years the 737 rudder hardovers were hidden under the rug as wake turbulence and stupid pilots. Thank God our FDR manufacturers have progressed since then.


Sorry, absolutely nothing you wrote refuted what I wrote.

*Nothing*.

Again, it WORKED.


I'm not sure "nobody died" is the correct standard for something "working." And the sheer frequency of MAX MCAS crashes compared to the rudder issues (when adjusted for fleet size and flight hours) arguably justifies different initial treatment (grounding) in any event.

It seems a little much to place all the blame on pilots here when they were being asked to handle a failure mode that they hadn't received any training on and that didn't exist in the same way on the model of the plane they'd actually trained on. But that's not really the issue here: you're throwing a lot of stuff out there about where the crashes happened when it seems to me it doesn't matter much to the issue you're actually raising, which is whether the planes could be ungrounded and flown while the fix is implemented, now that it's understood what the failure mode is, how it happens, and how to counteract it. That's a reasonable discussion to have.

And I think the answer there is that there might have been a different outcome had Boeing not largely shot itself in the foot here with its PR snafus and trying to place the blame everywhere but on itself. If they'd come right out after ET and pushed for immediate crew training, promising an update fast, and admitting something was wrong, they would have had at least a chance of a much better outcome than the one they've got now.
 
Nils75cz
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 10:11 pm

morrisond wrote:
Nils75cz wrote:
Dear Mr. Morrisond, I'd love to see you in a cockpit, even more so as an instructor. Better yet, as an advisor in the jump seat. During Mayday.

"Those who paid attention or were educated by their airlines properly had everything they needed to safely operate the MAX. Having the issue happening to them (ET pilots) should not have been a surprise and they should have easily been able to handle it. A simulator was not needed."

Tell me Mr. Morrisond, why was the aircraft grounded and not airlines nor pilots?

With your wisdom you must be able to tell us immediately, EASILY.


As I would have read the OPS bulletin and been familiar with it and got clarification on anything I didn't understand I don't think it would have been that big of an issue. So far in both crashes there is no real indication either Flight crew was panicking at least in the first few minutes. This is why they (are supposed to) train and they are meant to commit these procedures to memory.

On the grounding - Because the regulators quickly released that many of the pilots that are operating the MAX did not have the minimal skills or the training from there airlines they assumed they had so it was simpler to ground the airplane which has an obvious fault (but should have been manageable) than fix the problems in the training system and hope that there were no fatalities in aircraft that don't have an obvious problem like the MAX.

Apparently it's okay for lack of pilot skills to kill the amount of people in Rhinewaldners overall crash stats (the 3-4 gap I think) every year - however i don't think that is necessary if regulators held there operators to the standards that are already in place and seem to be being ignored.

The MAX isn't the only type of frame that has crashed in the last 10-15 years due to operator error. Issues in other more modern control systems and below standard pilots have killed more.


Firstly, your answer was not quick enough to save an emergency.

Secondly, operator issue is a matter of fact the most common of crash causes.

Thirdly, you did not answer the single question. Now you have two:

With your expertise, please explain the 737 flamboyancy to us.
 
MSPNWA
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Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Wed Dec 04, 2019 11:41 pm

PixelFlight wrote:
That assumption, in direct contradiction with safety requirement, is now proved wrong. Two times, with a lot of peoples killed.


You have not provided the authority's safety requirement on a factual basis, so it should be noted to all here that your opinion is simply speculative. Considering the information you provide in this thread, such speculation should be considered unreliable.

Nils75cz wrote:
Dear Mr. Morrisond, I'd love to see you in a cockpit, even more so as an instructor. Better yet, as an advisor in the jump seat. During Mayday.


I'll tell you what. I'd rather have licensed Morrisond up there than the pilots of the two crashes.

However, it's irrelevant to this thread. What you're calling into question is the EAD itself. That's a high charge that doesn't have evidence supporting it.
 
morrisond
Posts: 1816
Joined: Thu Jan 07, 2010 12:22 am

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Thu Dec 05, 2019 12:15 am

Nils75cz wrote:
morrisond wrote:
Nils75cz wrote:
Dear Mr. Morrisond, I'd love to see you in a cockpit, even more so as an instructor. Better yet, as an advisor in the jump seat. During Mayday.

"Those who paid attention or were educated by their airlines properly had everything they needed to safely operate the MAX. Having the issue happening to them (ET pilots) should not have been a surprise and they should have easily been able to handle it. A simulator was not needed."

Tell me Mr. Morrisond, why was the aircraft grounded and not airlines nor pilots?

With your wisdom you must be able to tell us immediately, EASILY.


As I would have read the OPS bulletin and been familiar with it and got clarification on anything I didn't understand I don't think it would have been that big of an issue. So far in both crashes there is no real indication either Flight crew was panicking at least in the first few minutes. This is why they (are supposed to) train and they are meant to commit these procedures to memory.

On the grounding - Because the regulators quickly released that many of the pilots that are operating the MAX did not have the minimal skills or the training from there airlines they assumed they had so it was simpler to ground the airplane which has an obvious fault (but should have been manageable) than fix the problems in the training system and hope that there were no fatalities in aircraft that don't have an obvious problem like the MAX.

Apparently it's okay for lack of pilot skills to kill the amount of people in Rhinewaldners overall crash stats (the 3-4 gap I think) every year - however i don't think that is necessary if regulators held there operators to the standards that are already in place and seem to be being ignored.

The MAX isn't the only type of frame that has crashed in the last 10-15 years due to operator error. Issues in other more modern control systems and below standard pilots have killed more.


Firstly, your answer was not quick enough to save an emergency.

Secondly, operator issue is a matter of fact the most common of crash causes.

Thirdly, you did not answer the single question. Now you have two:

With your expertise, please explain the 737 flamboyancy to us.


Sorry I actually have a life outside of this forum.

Yes Operator error is still the most common factor in most crashes. Yet we are doing little in the training system to improve this. Training standards in general have not been going up.

Most of the fatals in the past 10ish years have been very basic piloting errors. They should not have happened.
 
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PixelFlight
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Joined: Thu Nov 08, 2018 11:09 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Thu Dec 05, 2019 1:27 am

MSPNWA wrote:
PixelFlight wrote:
That assumption, in direct contradiction with safety requirement, is now proved wrong. Two times, with a lot of peoples killed.

You have not provided the authority's safety requirement on a factual basis, so it should be noted to all here that your opinion is simply speculative. Considering the information you provide in this thread, such speculation should be considered unreliable.
I have in my post #2965 2 weeks ago

AC 25-7D document https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_25-7D.pdf

10.2 High Speed Characteristics—§ 25.253.

10.2.1.1 The maximum flight demonstrated dive speed, V DF /M DF , selected by the
applicant, is used along with V D /M D when establishing V MO /M MO in
accordance with the associated speed margins under the provisions of
§ 25.1505. Both V MO /M MO and V DF /M DF are then evaluated during flight
tests for showing compliance with § 25.253.

10.2.1.4 The airplane’s handling characteristics in the high speed range should be
investigated in terms of anticipated action on the part of the flightcrew
during normal and emergency conditions.


10.2.1.5 At least the following factors should be considered in determining the
necessary flight tests:

10.2.1.5.1 Effectiveness of longitudinal control at V MO /M MO and up to V DF /M DF .

10.2.1.6 Section 25.1505 states that the speed margin between V MO /M MO , and
V D /M D or V DF /M DF
, as applicable, “may not be less than that determined
under § 25.335(b) or found necessary during the flight tests conducted
under § 25.253.” Note that one speed margin must be established that
complies with both § 25.335(b) and § 25.253. Therefore, if the applicant
chooses a V DF /M DF that is less than V D /M D , then V MO /M MO must be
reduced by the same amount
(i.e., compared to what it could be if
V DF /M DF were equal to V D /M D ) in order to provide the required speed
margin to V DF /M DF
. In determining the speed margin between V MO /M MO
and V DF /M DF
during type certification programs, the factors outlined in
paragraph 10.2.1.5 above should also be considered in addition to the
items listed below:
 
sgrow787
Posts: 330
Joined: Fri May 16, 2014 8:12 pm

Re: Boeing 737MAX Grounded Worldwide Q4 2019

Thu Dec 05, 2019 1:48 am

smartplane wrote:
https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/easa-advises-checks-for-parts-from-discredited-xtra-462677/


The article by David KAMINSKI-MORROW states that the closure of Xtra Aerospace repair shop does not imply the crash AOA sensor was miscalibrated. Yet David leaves in the (false) statement:

Xtra Aerospace's repair station certificate was revoked by the US FAA following the discovery that a crucial angle-of-attack sensor was improperly calibrated before it was fitted to the Lion Air Boeing 737 Max which crashed in October last year.


Again, there's no proof that the crash AOA sensor was "improperly calibrated", either by Xtra Aerospace, or by Lion Air maintenance. There is a statement in the final Lion Air report that incorrectly assesses the NTSB report as saying the left AOA sensor had an offset. The NTSB report only stated that the "signal" from the left AOA sensor had an offset. Because that signal has a path from the sensor, to the ADIRU, to the FCC, it's unknown the source of the offset (aka erroneous data, erroneous reading).
Just one sensor,
Oh just one se-en-sor,
Just one sensor,
Ooh ooh oo-ooh
Oo-oo-ooh.

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