Baldr wrote:No, the MAX wasn't the right business strategy in 2011. 737 MAX R&D costs + grounding costs are approaching the cost of that of an all new single aisle aircraft.
I guess you are comfortable giving yourself the benefit of hindsight, to me you are presenting total non-sequiturs.
With that kind of mindset, it's easy to understand why the management at Boeing thought that if they couldn't "kill" the A320 outright, they'd just copy what Airbus was doing with the A320neo, with their 737NG -- damn the consequences.
Again, a non-sequitur, the "consequences" you speak of are the gift of hindsight.
No, Boeing's management let the company down. Boeing's engineering team had a damn near impossible task making the MAX fully competitive with the A320neo family.
Yet that "damn near impossible" MAX will be flying again soon, go figure.
Even before the MAX disasters, Boeing had gone from a 50/50 split in the single aisle market to nearly a 60/40 split in favour of Airbus.
Is it a European thing to fixate on market share? If so I guess you're willing to concede that Airbus sucks at wide bodies, freighters, military aircraft, spacecraft, etc.
Engineers working for Airbus in Europe, however, won’t have to worry about missing an insurance premium, getting sick, becoming homeless, and "having to live in their car," if they were to resist heavy pressure from Airbus managers in order not to be responsible for the production of a poorly designed, implemented and tested airplane.
Yet everywhere I've gone in three decades of my professional engineering career I keep running into Europeans that chose to live and work in the US, go figure.